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Abstract
The thesis examines the changes in the labour market behaviour and welfare
participation of women in the UK. Over recent decades the UK has seen a dra-
matic rise in womens labour force participation. This growth led to remarkable
shifts in the familiesemployment structure. The UK has seen a rapid decline in the
male breadwinner model of employment due to rising dual-earner and single-adult
households over the years. In spite of this, the employment rate of single moth-
ers is one of the lowest amongst other mothers and other OECD countries. While
Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 evaluate two of the largest welfare transfers in the UK
in search for potential explanations for it, Chapter 3 traces the factors behind the
rise in dual-earner households. More precisely Chapter 1 investigates the impact of
the automatic withdrawal of Income Support on labour supply decisions of single
mothers with no qualications. Consistent with a simple labour supply model, a
substantial rise in mothersemployment rate and an increase in job search e¤ort
are reported. Indeed 20% of single mothers who were initially on Income Sup-
port enter work following the benet withdrawal. Chapter 2 studies the potential
causal relationship between the benet withdrawal and the availability of disability
transfers. It is observed that 25% of single mothers with no qualications who lose
Income Support transit into disability benets rather than work, in line with the
predictions of a model of benets choice. Finally, Chapter 3 uses a decomposition
exercise à-la-DiNardo-Fortin-Lemieux (1996) to pin down the rise in dual-earner
households to changes in: (1) returns to female characteristics conditional on fe-
male labour force participation; (2) returns to male characteristics; (3) assortative
mating; and (4) female characteristics. Female labour force participation appears
to be the primary factor while assortative mating plays a modest role.
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1 Introduction
The place of women in the UK and worldwide have changed dramatically over
the last 30 years. Due to legal, technological, institutional and cultural changes
(Goldin, 2006), women today make their family and/or labor market choices, from
among a larger set of options and in a variety of patterns as compared to their
predecessors. The changing role of women and their economic conditions have
brought a lot of attention to womens issues in recent decades. The attention
arises from interests in assessing the consequences of a wide array of public policies,
ranging from tax and welfare programs to the alteration of institutional features
of labour markets. A further motivation is in explaining the factors underlying the
dramatic changes in their employment patterns over the years.
Women in the UK have experienced signicant changes in their labor market
outcomes over time. Whereas in 1972, 47% of women and 92% of men were in
the labour force, by 1992 womens labour force participation had reached roughly
68% (Harkness, 1996), while mens had fallen considerably to 72% (OECD, 2000).
Since the late 1990s however womens increases in labour force participation have
slowed. The latter rose to only 72% in 2002 a much slower rate of increase than
in previous decades (Harkness, 2003).
At the same time that womens labour force attachment has been rising, both
the pattern of family formation and the employment structure of families changed.
Over the last 30 years, the proportion of married people has fallen, while the
proportions of single and divorced people have increased. While the fraction of
married women stood at 61% in 1991, a decrease of 13 percentage points since
1979, and fell further to 49% in 2002, the proportion of cohabiting couples in-
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creased. In 2001 32% of women aged 18-49 were cohabiting compared to 11%
in 1979 (National Statistics Online, 2004). The average age at rst marriage is
also increasing steadily. Between 1971 and 2000 the age increased from 22.6 to
28.2 years for women (National Statistics Online, 2004). At the same time the
number of one-parent families increased to nearly 25% in 2005, triple the propor-
tion recorded in 1972 (National Statistical Online, 2005). This is mainly due to
an increase in the rate of divorce, separation and never married single mothers
(Gregg et al., 2009). When comparing 14 European countries, Britain has by far
the highest proportion of single mothers in the European Union (Gonzalez, 2007).
The rise of single motherhood has a downside, one that is of increasing concern for
public policy - the rising incidence of children growing up in single parent homes,
often falling below the poverty line.
The observed increase in female labor force participation can be largely at-
tributed to increased participation of married women. According to Gregg et al.
(2007, 2009), the employment rate of married women increased by 15 percentage
points since 1983 to 69%. Harkness (2003) reports a rise from 49% in the 1970s
to about 72% in 2002 among both married and cohabiting women. As womens
returns to characteristics rise and market substitutes for home production be-
come less costly due to technological innovations, women increasingly contribute
nancially in the family. This in turn has led to the weakening of the traditional
male breadwinner model. Dual-earner families (where both individuals work) have
swiftly replaced the traditional married-couple model of a "breadwinner" husband
and a "homemaker" wife. In 2002 almost three-quarters of married/cohabiting
families were supported by two earners compared with 65% a decade earlier (Hark-
ness, 2003). The share of households where everyone works has risen alongside the
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share of workless households (Gregg et al., 2004) although the rise of no-earner
household has fallen since 1996. The implications of this changing phenomenon
are numerous. Not only is work is an important aspect of family life but it also
helps improve the standard of living and prevents families from falling into poverty.
Additionally studies based on intra-household bargaining models provide evidence
that the more money a woman brings in the family, the more her bargaining power
(Chiappori, 1988).
The employment rate of single mothers also increased although at a lower pace
than in the late 1970s. Harkness (2003) report that the growth also contributed
to the rapid decline of the male breadwinner model. However, according to a
study by Gregg and Harkness (2003) the UKs employment rate for lone mothers
is almost the lowest among other mothers and OECD countries. While Britains
employment rate for lone parents is just 56.5%, that of Denmark is 80%. In Spain
employment is higher among single mothers than married mothers. These very
low employment rates contributed towards the UK having the highest proportion
of children living in jobless households in OECD countries in 1996, and one of the
highest incidences of children in relative income poverty (see OECD, 1998, and
Micklewright 2000). On the one hand, single mothers who are more likely to have
a low level of qualications are more likely to be working in low-paid jobs. On
the other hand, those who would like to work have to secure jobs which can pay
enough to cover child care costs. Mother who are out of work will tend to rely
more on welfare benets.
The incorporation of people, especially the most disadvantaged groups, into the
formal labor market is considered central to the UK government. A series of policy
reforms in the 1990s in the UK by the incoming Labour government were designed
3
to help women into employment and to "make work pay". They set themselves
two targets for 2010: raising employment of single parents to 70% and halving
relative child poverty. To achieve these two targets, the UK system of benets
for families with children was expanded (Blundell and Hoynes, 2006). The result
was the adoption of the Working Families Tax Credit, an in-work benet providing
improved nancial incentives to work and the New Deal for Lone Parents. This led
to an increase of the employment rate of lone mothers from 45 to 56%. However
Gregg et al. (2009) argue that the rise started before the new policy regime came
into e¤ect and occurred during a period of general employment growth. They
further suggest that around 5 percentage points of this rise can be attributed to
the in-work tax policy reform and predict that the rate will reach at best 65% by
2010. To make up the extra 5% needed to meet the target policy changes that
encourage single mothers to work (if they would otherwise not have moved into
work) could represent another strategy.
Having motivated the analysis of womens labour market outcomes with labour
supply facts and policy issues, a brief review of the literature on female labour sup-
ply (relevant to the thesis) is presented, which draws heavily from a comprehensive
review by Blundell and Macurdy (1999). Understanding labour supply behaviour
is important in formulating policies that enhance work incentives while providing
income support. Models of labour supply behaviour with welfare were developed
which build on the standard model of labour supply. These models account for
non-convexities in the budget constraint, induced by high welfare withdrawal rates
and xed costs of work to estimate their work disincentive e¤ects (Blundell et al.,
2000).
Another innovation in the understanding of labour supply interactions between
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individuals within households stems from collective bargaining models of family
labour supply. The standard family labour supply model concerns the labour
supply behaviour of a household comprised of two working-age individuals and it
treats all individuals in the family as a single decision making unit. However to
the extent that the traditional division of labour is breaking down and men and
women more equally share home and market responsibilities, a household should
be described as a group of individual, each of whom is characterised by particu-
lar preferences and among whom a collective decision process takes place (Bour-
guignon and Chiappori, 1992). By analysing intra-household decision processes,
the e¤ect of particular policies (like the tax benet systems) can be investigated
on individual poverty or inequality. Studies based on intra-household bargaining
models provide evidence that the more money a woman brings in the family, the
more her bargaining power (Chiappori, 1988).
The evaluation of the labour supply responses to welfare policy reforms remains
the most signicant recent contribution of standard labour supply models. To an-
alyze how welfare policies inuence hours of work, there has been the expansion
of sophisticated statistical models that jointly describe work and program partic-
ipation. "Natural experiments" like the di¤erence-in-di¤erence and instrumental
variable approaches have been applied in this respect.
Another experiment which has been growingly used in the literature is the
regression discontinuity (henceforth, RD) designs. They have proven useful in
evaluating the socioeconomic impacts of a diverse set of government programs
and laws. Examples include: the labour supply e¤ect of welfare, unemployment
insurance, and disability programs; the e¤ects of Medicaid on health outcomes; the
e¤ect of remedial education programs on educational achievement; the empirical
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relevance of median voter models; and the e¤ects of unionization on wages and
employment (Lee and Lemieux, 2009).
In all these applications, the treatment variable or the probability of receiving
treatment changes discontinuously as a function of one or more underlying (po-
tentially endogenous) variables, which is the dening characteristic of regression
discontinuity data designs (van der Klauuw, 2008). The key advantage of the
RD approach is that it provides estimates that are "as credible as those from a
randomized experiment" under relatively weak conditions (Lee, 2008). In the RD
design, participants are assigned to program or comparison groups solely on the
basis of a cut-o¤ score on a pre-program measure. Thus the design is distinguished
from randomized experiments and from other quasi-experimental strategies by its
unique method of assignment. Unlike its randomized or quasi-experimental al-
ternatives, the regression discontinuity design does not require the assignment of
potentially needy individuals to a no-program comparison group in order to evalu-
ate the e¤ectiveness of a program. These facts likely explain why the RD approach
is considered at the forefront of research in capturing the institutional features of
welfare programs.
In light of the above, what have been less well quantied in the UK are the
labour supply disincentives e¤ects of the UKs non-contributory benets and ex-
planations behind the changes in within-household employment structures over
the recent decades. It is all the more surprising given the continued growth and
the level of policy attention devoted to the labour supply of women in the UK.
This thesis aims to ll these gaps in the literature.
The thesis is laid out in three chapters. Chapter 2 investigates the labor supply
disincentives in-built in Income Support, one of UKs largest non-contributory
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benets. According to the eligibility rules of Income Support, single mothers are
automatic eligible for the benet so long as they have a cohabiting child who is
aged less than 16. The age variation in the program is exploited to assess the
impact of the benet withdrawal on the labor supply of single mothers with no
qualications, both theoretically and empirically. The break in the eligibility of
Income Support arising when the youngest child turns 16 provides a natural setting
for the analysis using a regression discontinuity approach. Its key advantage is that
it provides estimates that are "as credible as those from a randomized experiment"
under relatively weak conditions (Lee, 2008). The study uses the quarterly Labor
Force Surveys which is longitudinal in nature. In this way, the panel structure of
the data absorbs all time invariant motherscharacteristics. The empirical analysis
shows that following an exogenous drop in their income when their youngest child
turns 16, 30% of mother who lose Income Support join the labor market. Mothers
who are already in work are also more likely to work 3 hours more per week.
Next, chapter 3 provides complementary evidence of the impact of the Income
Support withdrawal on welfare participation of single mothers with no qualica-
tions by investigating their responsiveness to the sickness and disability benets
programs. A simple theoretical model of benets choice is presented that shows
that it is fully rational for individuals to move onto disability benets upon benet
withdrawal, despite the fact that individuals can claim them prior to the youngest
child turning 16. In line with the predictions of the model, the empirical esti-
mates show a strong and discernible increase of about 4.2 percentage points in
the probability of claiming sickness and disability benets at the age-16 threshold,
mainly driven by an increase in the probability of claiming non-contributory health
benets.
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Finally Chapter 4 describes the changes in the relative position of women (both
married and cohabiting) in the family termed the female breadwinner index as
measured by their relative share of the couples earnings - in the UK between
1994 and 2004. It explicitly estimates the impact of changes in the returns to the
male characteristics, the returns to the female characteristics (conditional on fe-
male labour force participation), the patterns of assortative mating and the female
characteristics (everything else falls in the residual changes category) on the chang-
ing female breadwinner index by using a semiparametric methodology borrowed
from DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996). Overall, three main results emerge.
Consistent with other research studies, the proportion of two-earner families in-
creased (Harkness, 2003) and that of no-earner families fell from 8% to 5%. Gregg
and Wadsworth (2003) report that the share of workless households has stopped
falling since 1996. Second, the main factor driving the rise is the increasing fe-
male labour force participation. Third, changes in assortative mating account for
a modest 14% of the rise on average. Residual factors are non-negligible at the
bottom and top of the relative female earnings share distribution.
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2 Labour Supply Disincentives of Income Sup-
port: An Analysis of Single Mothers with No
Qualications in the UK
Abstract
This paper examines the labour supply disincentives of the Income Sup-
port system among single mothers with no qualications in the UK. It uses a
regression discontinuity approach that exploits the age-eligibility rule estab-
lishing automatic withdrawal of Income Support for single mothers whose
youngest child turns 16. At this cut-o¤ age, barely ineligible mothers expe-
rience an 8.5% increase in their probability of working and an increase in
hours of work of about 3. This is consistent with pronounced labour supply
disincentives of the income support policy.
Keywords: Single Mothers, Income Support, Labour Supply, Minimum
School Leaving Age, Regression Discontinuity
JEL code: C21, I38, J12.
2.1 Introduction
This paper examines the labour supply disincentives of the Income Support (IS)
system among single mothers with no qualications. For this, it uses a regression
discontinuity (RD) approach that exploits the age-eligibility rule that a single
parent qualies for IS so long as she is responsible for a cohabiting child under
the age of 16. IS is Britains principal income tested benet which serves as
a nancial safety net for several million people and their dependants. As many
social security benets, IS is a means of replacing earnings where no earnings
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exist or supplementing them where they are low. According to a report by the
Department of Work and Pension (henceforth, DWP), state support was the main
source of income for the bottom quintile of the income distribution in the UK in
2007. Families with children, particularly lone parent families, are more at risk of
low income than their childless counterparts (Adams et al., 2008).
Reducing, and ultimately eradicating, child poverty and stimulating labour
supply amongst families with children are two key objectives of the current govern-
ment. Promoting equality of opportunity is also at the heart of the governments
agenda. There were 3.9 million children living in poverty in 2006-2007 (after hous-
ing costs) (Adams et al., 2008). Very low employment rates among single mothers,
alongside a large rise in the number of children living in these one-parent families,
are two of the highest incidences of child poverty (OECD, 1998; Micklewright,
2000). The increase in worklessness among single parents in Britain and the rise
in the number of children living in single parent households with no work were the
biggest factors to account for the poverty rise among single parents in the 1990s
(Dickens and Ellwood, 2003). Over the last thirty years, the share of families
with children headed by lone parents has risen to nearly one in four. The UK is
almost alone among OECD countries in having employment rates for lone moth-
ers far below other countries, such as Spain, where employment is higher among
single mothers than married mothers. Programs are constantly being reviewed or
put in place to help single mothers, who are normally more at risk of falling into
poverty, bring their standard of living to a reasonable level. One such policy was
the Income Support program, implemented in April 1988, which replaced Supple-
mentary Benets. Although this welfare program gives rise to equity gains, it also
brings about e¢ ciency losses. By increasing the income of the poor, this creates
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an income e¤ect tending potentially to reduce their labour supply (Meghir and
Phillips, 2008).
Do the transfer programs in place lead to desired human capital investment and
welfare gains among single mothers? This study exploits the age-eligibility rule for
the entitlement of IS to answer this question. It assesses the implications of this
rule on the work incentives of single mothers, both theoretically and empirically.
Theoretically, it shows the implications for work e¤ort suggested by the basic
economic model of labour supply. Empirically, the paper reports how work and
hours of work of single mothers are a¤ected when their youngest child turns 16.
Under the current IS system, single parents have little reason to work between 4
and 16 hours per week because their income support entitlement is reduced pound
by pound for any earnings in excess of £ 20 per week (Bell et al., 2008). However,
once the youngest child turns 16, the parent can no longer claim IS unless she ts
in one of the other groups of people which can claim1.
The paper is novel in a number of ways. Although studies, mainly either
descriptive or qualitative in nature, have documented on the destinations of IS
leavers (Evans et al., 2003) for a descriptive analysis; Shaw et al., 1996 for a qual-
itative study), they do not look into the likely labour supply disincentives which
emerge from the IS system currently in place. Surprisingly little attention has
been paid to quantifying the behavioural impacts of Income Support. This is all
the more surprising given the continued growth and level of policy attention cur-
rently devoted to increasing single mothersparticipation in the labour market.
1Other types of people who are eligible for IS are pensioners, the long and short-term sick,
people with disabilities and other special groups. Special groups include people in private resi-
dential care and nursing homes, people in a local authority home, people in a hospital, asylum
seekers and other types of people from abroad.
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In addition, to my knowledge, quasi-experimental evidence on this subject is non-
existent. The institutional features of the UK benets system allow for a sharp
research design. The break in the eligibility of IS arising when the youngest child
turns 16 provides a natural setting for analyzing the impact of this age-eligibility
rule on labour market and benets outcomes using a regression discontinuity ap-
proach. The design has proven useful in evaluating the socioeconomic impacts of
a diverse set of government programs and laws. The RD approach was adopted
to evaluate the impacts of a social assistance program in Quebec (Lemieux and
Milligan, 2007), a US anti-discrimination law (Hahn et al., 1999), expansions in
government-provided health insurance to low-income households (Card and Shore-
Sheppard, 2004) and a federal disability insurance program (Chen and van der
Klauuw, 2008). In all these applications, the treatment variable or the probability
of receiving treatment changes discontinuously as a function of one or more under-
lying (potentially endogenous) variables, which is the dening characteristic of RD
data designs (van der Klauuw, 2008). The key advantage of the RD approach is
that it provides estimates that are as credible as those from a randomized experi-
mentunder relatively weak conditions (Lee, 2008). In the RD design, participants
are assigned to program or comparison groups solely on the basis of a cuto¤ score
on a pre-program measure. Thus the RD design is distinguished from randomized
experiments and from other quasi-experimental strategies by its unique method
of assignment. Unlike its randomized or quasi-experimental alternatives, the RD
design does not require the assignment of potentially needy individuals to a no-
program comparison group in order to evaluate the e¤ectiveness of a program. The
identication assumption used in this paper is based solely on the age-eligibility
rule in IS. In other terms, variations in a cross section arising from the discon-
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tinuity at the age-16 are used to capture the causal e¤ect of IS withdrawal on
labour market outcomes. One potential source of concern which may invalidate
the RD design is that changes in welfare policies to encourage single parents to
enter work (e.g. the National Minimum Wage was introduced in 1999 and the
Working Families Tax Credit which replaced Family Credits in 1999) may conta-
minate the evaluation of the IS benet policy per se if they are correlated with
the age rule. This is unlikely to be the case since the age-eligibility in the policy
did not vary discontinuously over time. Another worry is that there might be
changes in the entitlement for other benets (namely housing benets, council tax
benets and the UKs welfare to work program for lone parents, the New Deal)
which are also related to the age-16 eligibility rule. As a result the separate ef-
fect of the automatic withdrawal of IS on labour market outcomes may not be
identied. In fact while the loss of housing and council tax benets is likely to
overestimate the labour supply e¤ect the ineligibility to participate in the New
Deal for Lone Parents may lead to an underestimation of the same e¤ect (in this
way strengthening the results). A more serious source of concern could arise if
there are behavioural responses to other benets entitlement which are systemat-
ically related to the age-eligibility rule (e.g. the Child Benets and the Working
FamiliesTax Credit). This might generate some non-random selection which can
violate the identication assumption and hence invalidate the RD approach.
For the purpose of the analysis, this study uses the quarterly Labour Force Sur-
veys which are longitudinal in nature between the period 1994 and 2002. Although
there were reforms in the UK benets system over this time period, especially in
1999, they are not likely to substantially alter the results in the paper and in-
validate the RD approach as briey mentioned above and extensively discussed
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in section 2.6.3. The panel structure of the data allows to control for mother
xed e¤ects, i.e. unobserved time invariant motherscharacteristics that might be
correlated with their labour supply and welfare recipiency.
The empirical analysis leads to two main ndings, which hold up against a
wide array of robustness checks. First, there is evidence of pronounced and statis-
tically signicant labour supply disincentives of the age-rule in the IS system for
single mothers. As they lose eligibility, their work disincentives weaken. Following
an exogenous drop in their income mainly attributable to the fall in IS (which
potentially leads to further falls in related benets correlated with the entitlement
of IS), single mothers maximize their utility not only by entering work but those
who are already in work are also more likely to work more hours per week. This
conforms to the intuition that the removal of maintenance programs lead to e¢ -
ciency gains (Hoynes and Mo¢ tt, 1996). This nding is analogous to that found
by Lemieux and Milligan (2007) who conclude that more generous social assistance
benets reduce the employment probability of low-educated men without children.
Second, the IS system reveals a positive e¤ect on the proportion of unem-
ployment benet claims which might presumably be an income e¤ect of the IS
withdrawal. Yet, New Deal policy reforms in the UK may force these mothers to
search for work.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2.2 provides background
information on the benets system for single mothers in the UK. Section 2.3 sets
out a simple labour supply model for single mothers, which integrates welfare
programs. Section 2.4 presents the specication of the regression model and the
identication behind the empirical strategy proposed. Section 2.5 describes the
data followed by Section 2.6 on a discussion of the regression results. Finally,
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Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Institutional Features
2.2.1 Brief Overview of the UK Benet System
There are many di¤erent benets available in the UK depending on individuals
needs and circumstances. Panel a in Figure A2.1 in the Appendix displays a
summary of the main UK benets. They are either means-tested or non-means
tested. Means-tested benets are benets which depend on the claimants income,
personal and family characteristics. For instance IS are available to people on
low income who do not have to look for work (e.g. lone parents, carers, sick or
disabled people). Unemployed people, who are not eligible for IS, can instead
claim JobseekersAllowance (JSA). In October 1996, JSA was introduced to
replace unemployment benets and IS for unemployed people. It is intended for
people who are available for and actively seeking employment, including those in
remunerative work for less than 16 hours a week. Entitlement to IS or JSA is also
a passport to other benets, namely the Housing Benets (HB) and the Council
Tax Benets (CTB). On the other hand people who are on low income but who
work more than 16 hours per week can claim tax credits (either the Working
FamiliesTax Credits or Family Credit)2. In March 2003 theWFTC was replaced
by a Working Tax Credit (WTC) and a Child Tax Credit (CTC). In this way,
the current tax credit system now provides in-work support for households with
2Families with a net income (income after income tax and national insurance) below a certain
threshold (£ 90 a week in October 1999) receive the maximum amount of WFTC which varies
with the number and ages of children. Any increase in the net income above this income threshold
reduces the amount of WFTC at a rate of 55% (was 70% under FC regime). As a result, for
every extra £ 1 earned over the threshold the family loses 55 pence in WFTC payments.
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or without children.
Non-means tested benets are either contributory or non-contributory. While
to qualify for contributory benets, such as Incapacity Benets (IB), a person
must have paid enough national insurance contributions, a person does not have
to have paid them to be entitled to non-contributory benets. These benets, such
as child benets (CB), are usually paid irrespective of the claimants income level
and are universally available to people who meet some qualication criteria. Child
benets amount to £ 18.80 per week for the rst born and equals £ 12.55 per week
for each subsequent child.
There has been substantial changes in the UK benets system, summarised
in Table A2.1 in the Appendix, in the 1990s where welfare-to-work programmes
were developed and implemented to "make work pay". The central ones were the
introduction of the WFTC (which replaced the Family Credit, FC, in 1999) and
the New Deal. The WFTC reform was more generous that FC in four ways:
there was a higher credit for younger children (from £ 81.60 to £ 93.05 per week);
the income threshold for eligibility was increased (from £ 80.65 to £ 90 per week);
benet reduction rate was lowered from 70% to 55% and a childcare credit (up to
70% of childcare costs of up to £ 120 a week) was introduced.
The New Deal programs introduced between 1997 and 1999 were designed to
help unemployed individuals into work. There were four distinct programmes:
the New Deal for Young Persons (for those aged 1824) and the New Deal 25+
(for those aged 2549) compulsory for claimants of JSA and providing employment
subsidies and training grants to employers; the New Deal 50+ which was voluntary
and included a training grant and nally the New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP )
which was also voluntary and o¤ered training grants and childcare assistance to
20
participants3.
2.2.2 Benets to Single Mothers
Under the current benets system single mothers can claim certain types of ben-
ets depending on the age of their youngest child as shown in Panel b of Figure
A2.1. Benets which do not require this age condition are sickness and disability
benets and JSA (in the latter case single mothers must work less than 16 hours
per week to qualify). When their youngest child is less than 16 years single moth-
ers are automatically entitled to CB and if they also work less than 16 hours per
week, they can top up their benets by claiming IS, HB and CTB. They can
also participate in the NDLP programme. As noted above NDLP is specically
designed to assist single parents to enter or re-enter the labour market to increase
their living standards. Participation is voluntary and it aims to provide individ-
ualised help and advice to meet their needs. If single mother work more than 16
hours per week, although they cannot claim IS they may claim both CB and tax
credits. However single mothers whose youngest child is aged 16 or more are not
entitled to IS. They may claim JSA;HB and CTB. Receipt of both child bene-
ts and tax credits is automatic when their children are less than 16 and can be
extended if children between the ages of 16 and 20 stay in full-time non-advanced
education.CB and tax credits can be claimed provided that their youngest child
is between 16 and 20 years old and remains in full-time non-advanced education4.
3A more detailed summary and a more extensive list of major welfare reforms can be found
in Gregg and Harkness (2003).
4Non-advanced education means attendance at an educational establishment up to and in-
cluding GCE A levels, Scottish Certicate of Education (Higher level) or equivalent.
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2.2.3 Income Support
IS is one of the largest means-tested welfare transfers in the UK. It was introduced
in April 1988 to replace Supplementary Benets and is intended to help people on
low incomes who do not have to be available for employment. The amount of IS is
currently £ 60.50 per week for women who are aged 18 or over. While this amounted
to roughly 15% of the median gross weekly earnings of full-time employed women,
it represented more than 40% of the median earnings of part-time women (overall
21% of all women) in 2007 (ASHE, 2007). The rates prevailing between 1994 and
2002 (the sample period used in the paper) are shown in Tables A2.2 and A2.3 in
the Appendix.
Single mothers whose youngest cohabiting child is less than 16 years old (which
is also the minimum school leaving age in the UK) are automatically entitled to
IS. Receipt of IS is also a passport to housing and council tax benets. There are
obvious built-in disincentives to work in this policy for two reasons. Firstly, there
are no job search requirements for eligibility. Consequently, mothers who have low
labour market attachment and do not work can still receive IS. Secondly, if single
mothers are in employment they can claim IS so long as they work less than 16
hours per week and are entitled to a £ 20 earnings disregard (which is equivalent
to working 4 hours per week at a minimum wage of £ 5), after which IS is reduced
pound by pound. In practice, for minimum wage workers, IS is exhausted when
they work just over 16 hours per week5.
As the youngest child turns 16, single mothers automatically lose their entitle-
ment for IS except on a health basis, in which case they are eligible for Income
5Hours at benet exhaustion = IS+EarningsDisregardMinimumWage =
60:5+20
5  16.
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Support with a disability premium (this is explored in more detail in chapter 3).
The expected break in the eligibility of IS allows for a regression discontinuity de-
sign. In this case the RD design is "fuzzy"6 because the probability of treatment
jumps discontinuously by less than 1 at the cuto¤ point (because some mothers
may still claim IS on other grounds after their youngest child turns 16). They
also lose their eligibility to participate in the NDLP programme. The automatic
loss of IS at the age-16 discontinuity implies that mothers lose their housing and
council tax passported benets. However, mothers may still claim child benets
and working family tax credits if their children stay in full time education up to
the age of 19. As already hinted in the introduction, mothers who take advantage
of these rules comprise self-selected groups and this in turn might raise some issues
on identication, which will be discussed in section 2.6.3.
The automatic loss of IS also seems to interact strongly with the unemploy-
ment benets system in the UK, i.e. with the Jobseekers Allowance (henceforth,
JSA)7. Contrary to the entitlement for IS, single mothers have to register as
unemployed (i.e. actively looking for work) or else risk being sanctioned under
this benet scheme. JSA was introduced in 1996 and changes were represented
by a substantial increase in job search requirements for eligibility and more inten-
sive contact with the employment o¢ ces. Petrongolo (2009) found that tighter
job search requirements were successful in moving individuals o¤ unemployment
benets in the UK. It is anticipated that when their youngest child turns 16, single
mothers might be forced into this welfare programme. Indeed, there is pressure
6In a "sharp" RD design, the probability of treatment jumps discontinuously from 0 to 1 at
the cuto¤ point.
7The rates of IS and income-based JSA are usually the same. Mothers may want to claim
JSA instead of IS to receive national insurance contribution credits.
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from the Government which requires single mothers to attend social security o¢ ces
and register as unemployed because it is no longer considered necessary that they
remain at home to look after their children, once they turn 16.
Application Process The application for IS as a single parent is trivial. To
claim IS, the single mother has to ll in a specic form which is sent by post to
the DWP or can be completed on the spot at her local Jobcentre Plus O¢ ce. She
is then required to sign a statement recording her details, after which she presents
evidence and information in an arranged work-focus interview or by post if the
latter is not needed.
The maximum amount that a claimant can receive depends on her income
sources. The rate of IS payable to a claimant is normally the amount needed to
bring the resources of the benet unit up to their applicable amount (i.e. IS =
Applicable Amount - Total Resources). Resources of a benet unit consist of its
total income (e.g. from other DWP benets, earnings from part-time employment,
etc.) and assumed income from capital assets8. Applicable amounts are specied
by regulation and consist of a personal allowance which depends upon the age of
the claimant and the presence and age of any dependants.
2.3 Labour Supply Model for Single Mothers
In this section, the standard model of labour supply is used to analyze the behav-
ioural impact of the IS welfare program in both the labour market and the welfare
8Claimants aged under 60 whose income of assets is worth under £ 3,000 are ignored (some
assets may also be disregarded, e.g. property occupied by an aged relative). Savings between
£ 3,000 and £ 8,000 are treated as if each £ 250 or part of £ 250 brings in an income of £ 1 per week
(tari¤ income). If capital assets total more than £ 8,000, the claimant is not entitled to IS.
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benet systems. The model assumes that individualspreferences depend on hours
of work and net income. Net income is computed as the product of hours of work
and the gross hourly wage plus investment income plus transfer payments minus
all taxes. Individuals thus maximize their utility function subject to a budget
constraint. The decision to work is based on the comparison of the market wage,
which indicates how much individuals will earn for an hour of work, and the reser-
vation wage, which is the wage rate that makes them indi¤erent between working
and not working. Assume that there is a representative agent in the economy who
is a single mother. For simplicity, suppose that the woman does not have any
non-labour income and is paid a minimum wage of £ 5 per hour if in work.
A model without the £ 20 earnings disregard is considered rst to shed some
light on the labour supply disincentives in-built in the IS program followed by a
more complex model which includes the £ 20 earnings disregard and the working
family tax credits.
2.3.1 Model without Earnings Disregard
Assume that the welfare system consists only of IS (ignoring the £ 20 earnings
disregard for the time being). First, consider a mother who has no child younger
than 16. Figure 2.1 depicts the tangency condition between the budget line and
the slope of the indi¤erence curve for utility maximization. Income is plotted on
the vertical axis and leisure is on the horizontal axis. It also shows two solutions:
a tangency solution (where the economic agent allocates her time between work
and leisure - point X) and a corner solution (where it is optimal not to work at
all - point A). From Figure 2.1, panel a, in the absence of IS, the representative
mothers budget line is LBC. If she decides not to work, she locates at point L,
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where she has zero income. However she is better o¤ working (i.e. locating on
any part of LBC except at point L). For example she can decide to locate at
point X, at which she divides her time between work and leisure. Contrast this
with a mother, with a child who is aged less than 16, who is eligible to claim
IS. With the introduction of IS, of say £ 60, her budget line shifts in two ways.
First, because of the guaranteed income of £ 60 when the woman does not work,
the endowment point shifts from L to A. Her reservation wage rises. Second, the
program changes the slope of the budget line. This is because IS is reduced by £ 1
for every pound earned in the labour market, i.e. equivalent to a 100% tax rate on
her earnings. Because IS amounts to £ 60 and the woman is paid at a minimum
wage of £ 5, benet exhaustion occurs at 12 hours worked9. The net wage of the
woman on IS is zero between 0 and 12 hours, which is graphically represented
by the segment of the constraint having a slope of zero (AB). Her budget line is
now ABC. The entitlement of IS increases the reservation wage of the poor by
moving the lower end of the budget constraint out from LB to AB. The static
e¤ect of the entitlement to the IS policy on the labour supply of a single mother
is unequivocally negative, provided leisure is a normal good.
There are two reasons for this. First, the single mother is now a¤ected by the
welfare program. Since she does not need to be available for work and assuming
that she has low labour market attachment, she locates at point A. Second, the
shift in the budget line creates an income e¤ect tending to reduce the labour
supply from the hours associated with point X to those associated with point Y .
However, it also causes the wage to drop to zero due to the 100% withdrawal rate
in IS. This induces a substitution e¤ect, causing those claiming IS to reduce their
9Recall that hours at benet exhaustion = IS+EarningsDisregardMinimumWage =
60:5+0
5  12.
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hours of work to zero (point A). Of course, if a persons indi¤erence curves were
su¢ ciently at, then the persons utility would be maximized by choosing work
over welfare, as shown in Figure 2.1, panel b. In this case, the person attaches
a much lower value to leisure than someone who has a steep indi¤erence curve.
As such labour supply responses depend on the slope of the indi¤erence curves,
in other words the extent to which the mother is attached to the labour market
(a steeper indi¤erence curve will suggest a weak labour market attachment). In
this chapter single mothers with no qualications are more likely to be welfare
reliant (Evans et al., 1999) and jobless (Gregg et al., 2009) and hence more likely
to have steep indi¤erence curves. Overall, this simple model suggests that labour
supply disincentives are in-built in the IS system. As the single mother loses her
entitlement to IS when her child turns 16, she is less likely to stay inactive and
more prone to engage in labour market activities. Mothers located at point A are
prompted to start working and those located along AB increase their number of
hours worked.
2.3.2 Model with Earnings Disregard
The current benet system is however not as simple as the one described above.
There are human capital enhancement programs inherent in the welfare schemes
in the UK which are aimed at getting individuals into jobs as soon as possible
and focussing on job search assistance (Blank, 2002). The next step is therefore
to include tax credits and the £ 20 earnings disregard in the model. For simplic-
ity, housing and council tax benets are excluded from the incentive structures.
The inclusion of these benets will only result in a stronger e¤ect on the work
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incentives10. Child benets are also ignored at this stage. In these circumstances,
the labour supply model for single mothers developed by Blundell et al. (2000)
presents the work incentives stemming from the tax-benet system in the UK and
can serve as a guidance in the interpretation of the empirical results of this paper.
The budget constraint in Figure 2.2 is non-linear due to the complexities of the
system. For brevity and with minimal loss of generality, the work disincentives of
the representative single mother with one cohabiting child aged less than 16 years
who is paid the minimum wage of £ 5 is presented. With the entitlement of IS, the
mothers budget line is ABCDE. At zero hours, the representative agent receives
AL of IS. Between A and B, the budget constraint is upward sloping, representing
the earnings disregard. In this case, the mother can work 4 hours without having
her IS payments reduced. Between B and C (corresponding to 4 to 16 hours
respectively), the budget line is horizontal because of the 100% withdrawal rate
under IS. The benet exhaustion point is C, equivalent to the mother working
16 hours per week. Beyond point C, IS is exhausted and there is a sharp jump in
net income as the single mother becomes entitled to tax credits. From D onwards,
the overall withdrawal rate remains quite high as a result of the combination of
tax credits and direct taxes.
With the IS program, a single mother, who has a child aged less than 16, has
a high incentive to locate below 16 hours (referred to as "mini-jobs" as dened
by Bell et al., 2008) per week, more precisely at most 4 hours (when the earnings
disregard is exhausted). If the mother has a very strong preference to leisure, she
may not work at all and will choose to locate at point A. On the other hand, a
10Recall that people who receive IS are automatically passported to full housing and/or council
tax benets. As soon as entitlement to IS is lost, eligibility is based on the mothersincome and
the rules of housing and council tax benets.
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mother working more than 16 hours will not be entitled to IS and has no incentive
to reduce her labour supply because she maximizes welfare by locating anywhere
along the segment DE.
So, how does the age-policy rule in IS eligibility a¤ect a single mothers labour
supply? When her youngest child turns 16, she automatically loses entitlement to
IS (except if she falls in one of the other categories mentioned in Section 1). Her
budget line shifts to LCDE. The mothers endowment point shifts from A to L
and the budget line changes slope up to point C. A mother, who was located on
the ABC segment before the change in the benet entitlement, is unequivocally
worse o¤. A mother, who did not work or worked at most 4 hours, will have an
incentive to increase her hours of work. If she attaches a low value for leisure, she
is most likely to work 16 or more hours per week and vice versa.
In sum, what this model suggests is that there are large disincentives for single
mothers who are on IS to work more than 4 hours per week because of the 100%
withdrawal rate or work at all. The IS program works in such a way that mothers
who have a child aged less than 16 and who attach a low value for work choose to
be inactive rather than engage in job search. However the age-policy rule in the
entitlement to IS appears to play a signicant role in achieving the desired labour
supply incentives among single mothers. The intuition behind the above labour
market adjustments lies in the fact that the exogenous drop in income associated
with a loss in IS - which is exacerbated by a fall in other benets correlated with
the entitlement to IS - acts as a lump sum tax on net income. In an attempt
to o¤set the e¤ect of this tax, single mothers are less likely to remain inactive or
work very few hours, if in work, to compensate for the loss.
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2.4 Specication and Identication
This section sets out the regression strategy aimed at identifying the impact of the
age rule in the IS program on labour market and benets outcomes. The main
di¢ culty in identifying the disincentive e¤ect of the IS program on labour market
outcomes is that there is a potential reverse causality between labour supply and
the propensity to claim IS. For instance, a mother who works more than 4 hours
but less than 16 hours per week loses IS because of the 100% withdrawal rate.
There are also concerns about possible omitted variables although a multivariate
regression can improve upon the bivariate relationship between the outcomes of
interest and the entitlement to IS by controlling for factors likely to inuence
outcomes of interest. Because of these confounding e¤ects, the impact of the loss
in the entitlement for IS on labour market outcomes is likely to be overestimated.
In order to circumvent the classical identication problem which arises from
reverse causality, the paper uses the age-eligibility rule in the IS program, ap-
plicable to single mothers, which establishes an automatic loss of entitlement for
IS for those mothers whose youngest child turns 16. It further exploits the dis-
continuity in the probability of claiming IS induced by this age-rule to assess the
causal impact of the benet withdrawal on labour market and benets outcomes.
Ignoring for simplicity other covariates, suppose that an outcome, Y , depends
additively on a continuous function, f(:), in the age of the youngest child, a, also
called the running variable and on the age-eligibility rule for the entitlement to
IS. The reduced form model11 is written as follows:
11Instead, one can estimate a rst stage equation, ISia = 0 + 1TREATia +  (a) +
2 [TREATia   (a)] + ia, where IS is an indicator for whether the mother claims IS and
which is used as an instrumental variable (IV ) for the entitlement to IS in the second stage
regression, Yia = 0 + 1ISia +  (a) + 2 [ISia   (a)] + ia.
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Yia = 0 + 1TREATia +  (a) + 2 [TREATia   (a)] + "ia (2.1)
where the subscript ia represents individual i whose youngest child is aged a. 0 is
the intercept term,  (a) is a smooth, continuous function in the age of the youngest
child. " is an unobserved determinant of Y and is possibly correlated with  (a).
TREAT is a treatment dummy dened as
TREATia =
0 if a < 16
1 if a > 16
(2.2)
where TREAT equals 0 so long as the youngest child is less than 16 but
switches to 1 as the latter turns 16. A "Fuzzy" Regression Discontinuity (RD)
design is used in this paper because the probability of claiming IS is not likely
to fall from 1 to 0 at the age-16 threshold. The probability of claiming IS is not
equal to 1 prior to the age-16 threshold because some mothers may be working
more than 16 hours per week and hence not eligible for IS. At the cuto¤ point,
the probability of treatment is likely to jump by less than 1. This is because while
the IS eligibility is mainly determined by the age-16 cut o¤ rule for lone parents,
they can still be eligible for IS if they fall in other categories (see footnote 1). In
this case the reduced form estimate, 1
12, is the classical ("Fuzzy") RD estimator,
which carries a causal interpretation of the e¤ect of the age-eligibility rule for the
entitlement to IS on Y under one key assumption. The assumption underlying
the consistency of the RD estimator is that the dependent variable is a continuous
function of the running variable in the absence of treatment. Most notably, the
12The IV estimator can be recouped by dividing the estimator from the reduced form regression
with that of the rst stage regression.
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causal e¤ect of the policy can be identied when single mothers with similarly aged
children are also similar in other observable and unobservable dimensions both to
the left and to the right of the discontinuity.
To estimate the reduced form Equation (2.1), a xed e¤ect regression is used
by exploiting the longitudinal nature of the quarterly Labour Force Survey. The
xed e¤ect approach is preferred because it absorbs all time invariant observed and
unobserved characteristics (e.g. gender, education, occupation, ethnicity, region of
residence, immigration status, preferences) of mothers that may a¤ect the outcome
variables and be correlated with the treatment. As already hinted above, single
motherslabour supply and the loss in the entitlement to IS might be correlated
for reasons other than the causal e¤ect of the latter variable on the former. For
instance, it could be that mothers who have a stronger preference to work are more
likely to work more hours per week and less likely to be on IS, leading to overstate
the e¤ect of their IS ineligibility on their labour supply. In order to control for
such unobserved di¤erences amongst mothers, the following xed e¤ects model is
used
Yiat = 0 + 1TREATiat +  (a) + 2 [TREATiat   (a)] +mi + "iat (2.3)
where mi represents a set of individual e¤ects which are taken to be constant
over time and specic to the mother, TREAT equals 1 when the youngest child
is aged 16 or over and 0 otherwise and "iat is the disturbance term. Time vary-
ing characteristics, Xit, can also be included in Equation (2.3). In practice, the
functional form of  () is unknown. In this paper, it is approximated by a num-
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ber of polynomials (up to degree 5), interacting the linear and the higher-order
terms with the TREAT variable (Lee and Card, 2008). While 1 from Equation
(2.1) is based on the assumption that people close to the discontinuity are similar
in observed characteristics, the xed e¤ects RD estimator, 1 in Equation (2.3),
is based on the assumption that barely eligible mothers (mothers to the left of
the discontinuity) are similar to barely ineligible mothers (mothers to the right of
the discontinuity) in both observable and unobservable ways, except in whether
they have a child who is about to turn 16 and hence their probability of receiving
treatment.
2.5 Data
This paper uses data from the UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS). The
survey is continuous, with a sample drawn each quarter of approximately 57,000
households, representing around 135,000 respondents. The main reason for choos-
ing this survey, as well as the fact that it contains extensive socio-demographic
and benets information, is its size. The micro data runs from the Winter Quarter
of 1994 to the Autumn Quarter of 2002 (excluding Winter 1996 and all quarters of
1997 because IS claims were not recorded in the LFS following the introduction
of JSA). Data on the age and the date of birth of individuals beyond Autumn
2002 are not available from the UK data archive for reasons of condentiality.
The QLFS datasets are merged together to increase the sample size. As such the
longitudinal dimension of the QLFS is exploited in this paper. Each sample house-
hold is retained and followed through for ve consecutive quarters and a fth of
the sample is replaced each quarter. This enables the construction of a unique
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identier for each individual, who can then be linked across the quarters.
In view of the fact that people with low market opportunities (low skills or
qualications) are more likely to claim benets (Bound and Burkhauser, 1999;
Faggio and Nickell, 2003), this paper restricts the analysis to single mothers with
no qualications13. The analysis also focuses on these mothers because they are
not only the group which is most reliant on welfare, in terms of both participation
rate and spell length (Evans et al., 2004) but is also the target of the current
government in reducing their joblessness and poverty (Gregg et al., 2009). For
instance, research in the 1990s showed that more than two-third of lone parents
claimed Income Support (McKay and Marsh, 1994). Hoxhallari et al. (2007)
report that only 5% of lone parents work in jobs of less than 16 hours, compared
to 53% in jobs of 16 hours or more and 42% not in paid employment. With no
pay single mothers are more likely to stay within the poverty circle.
Table A2.4 in the Appendix provides some descriptive statistics on all single
mothers, single mothers with no qualications and single mothers with a youngest
cohabiting child aged just below and above 16. Age of the youngest child is
measured in months. As expected 95% of single mothers with no qualications
are likely to claim at least one benet on average as compared to 70% of all
single mothers. Statistics on benets should be taken with caution because benet
claims have been shown to be under-reported in the longitudinal Labour Force
Surveys (Brook, 2004). For example, child benets take-up of 65% for all single
mothers appear to be low compared to "universal" take-up of about 98% (CPAG
13Regression (2.3) was run seperately using the total sample of single mothers, a sample of
single mothers who were graduates (8%), who had an intermediate level of education (29%), who
had a low level of education (33%) and nally who had no qualications (30%). A discontinuity
at the age-16 threshold on the probability of claiming IS was more pronounced for single mothers
with no qualications than the other groupings, hence the selection.
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Policy Brieng). On average, single mothers with no qualications are one year
older than all single mothers on average. They are in their mid thirties and live
mainly in the south east (greater than 10%) and outer London (6.2%). They
are also more likely to be inactive (62% compared to 42% for all single mothers).
Barely eligible and barely ineligible mothers are not statistically di¤erent from
one another and have similar age and regional characteristics. A single mother
is dened as the head of the family unit, is unmarried14 and has at least one
cohabiting child. Unmarried women with children in the rst quarter in which
they appear in the data are included in the sample, irrespective of whether they
are married or without cohabiting children in the following quarters. Because of
the built-in attrition in the QLFS, there is no guarantee that the panel is balanced,
with each mother observed for at least 2 out of 5 consecutive periods. Indeed, the
nal sample contains 25,428 observations over 8,138 single mothers15. According
to the standard labour supply model, these benets generally lead to labour supply
disincentive e¤ects.
The QLFS is rich in information and carries a wide range of standard demo-
graphic characteristics such as day, month and year of birth of each individual,
qualications, ethnicity and region of residence as well as details on the presence
and ages of dependent children within the family unit. It also includes a wide array
of information on benet claims and labour market features. Benet claims include
IS (dened as income support for all groups except for income support for the dis-
abled people - also referred to as "income support with a disability premium") (see
14If mothers with an unmarried cohabiting partner are excluded from the sample, estimates
are very similar to those reported in this paper.
15About 3,286 single mothers with no qualications drop out of the sample and about 743
mothers change marital status since they enter the sample.
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chapter 3), unemployment-related benets (which include unemployment benets
before Spring 1995 and JSA, after Winter 1996), housing benets, council tax
benets and working family tax credits.
2.6 Empirical Results
This section provides both graphs and regression estimates for the e¤ects of the
age-policy rule in IS on the labour market and potentially related benets out-
comes as the youngest child turns 16, using the xed e¤ects model described in
section 2.4.
2.6.1 Income Support
Figure 2.3 plots the actual and predicted proportions of single mothers with no
qualications claiming IS with children aged between 1 and 20 years by age of their
youngest child for mothers.The sample is restricted to single mothers with children
in this age band because entitlement to certain benets depends on whether the
child is aged less than 20. For instance, one condition that individuals have to
satisfy to remain eligible for child benets and working family tax credits if their
children are aged 16 or above is that the children have to be aged between 16 and 20
and in full-time non-advanced education. This age window is also chosen because
the narrower the area that is examined the less data there are. Hence expanding the
analysis to observations outside the immediate neighbourhood of the discontinuity
may improve the statistical precision. The inclusion of polynomials (linear and
higher order) have more exibility and hence more capacity to match the data.
Predicted values are obtained by estimating the xed e¤ects model which ab-
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sorbs all time invariant characteristics of the mothers (i.e. education, ethnicity,
immigration status, preferences).  (a) is modeled as a parametric (linear in this
case) polynomial in a, whose shape and intercept are allowed to vary on either
side of the discontinuity point (Lee and Card, 2008). Further the actual values
are obtained by regressing the outcome of interest on a set of dummies for the age
of the youngest child and a set of time invariant mother xed e¤ects. Coe¢ cients
on the age dummies are reported. Standard errors are clustered by the age of the
youngest child.
While the probability of claiming IS is roughly about 55% for those with a
youngest child aged 15 years or less, this falls sharply to about less than 40%
when the child turns 16 and steadily falls afterwards. This is consistent with
the age-policy rule, which establishes that single mothers lose their entitlement to
claim IS when their youngest child is 16 (unless they fall in the other groups which
can claim IS). While the probability of claiming IS is not equal to 1 prior to 16
years because some mothers are not eligible to claim IS either because of high
earnings or high working hours (hours greater or equal to 16) or high wealth, the
proportion does not drop to 0 after the age of 16 because some mothers claim other
types of IS apart from IS for single parents (like IS as pensioners or IS for people
on training courses or IS as a carer other than their own child). In fact, Table
2.1, column (1), reports the xed e¤ects RD estimates with controls for benets
outcomes, using a linear specication for  (a). The proportion claiming IS falls
roughly by 15 percentage points at the discontinuity point and the negative jump
is precisely estimated and highly signicant.
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2.6.2 Labour Market Outcomes
Following the evidence that the age-eligibility rule leads to the expected negative
e¤ect on the proportion of single mothers claiming IS, this section assesses the be-
havioural e¤ects of the IS program on numerous labour market outcomes. Figure
2.4, in which a linear t is superimposed on the actual data, illustrates the trend
in the employment rates of mothers with low market opportunities by the age of
the youngest child. There appears to be a slight positive jump when the youngest
child is 16 and the employment rate increases at a slightly faster rate thereafter.
This conforms to the intuition behind the model of labour supply. Indeed labour
market disincentives of IS are detected. Table 2.2, column (1), reports the xed
e¤ects RD estimates16. It is clear that the estimated treatment e¤ect on the work
outcome is precisely estimated (and signicant at 5% level). Specically, as their
youngest child turns 16 and hence as they lose entitlement to IS, mothers with
no qualications have a lower incentive to stay inactive. In fact, the probability
of nding a job jumps upwards, by about 3 percentage points (i.e. about 20% of
single mothers with no qualications who leave IS). These mothers also increase
their number of hours worked per week (including zeros) as shown by the sudden
jump in Figure 2.5 at the age 16 for the youngest child and the upward trend con-
tinues thereafter. Table 2 reports a highly signicant estimated increase of about
16Time varying covariates were also included in the regression. These included age, marital
status and level of qualications of the mother. RD results were almost unchanged as the ones
reported in Table 2.2. Less than 0.2% of single mothers change from marital status and less
than 1% acquired some qualications over the quarters they were observed. So the analyses
in the paper do not include these time varying covariates. In addition there is no evidence
of a discontinuity a the age-16 threshold for these covariates. According to Lee and Lemieux
(1999), by construction the assignment to treatment is independent of covariates because of the
randomisation of the experiment. As such consistent estimates are obtained even in the absence
of these covariates.
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2.6 hours worked equivalent to about £ 13 if paid at the minimum wage of £ 5.
Table 2.2 also shows the e¤ect of the age-eligibility rule on hours of work. The
estimated e¤ect on the proportion of zero hours is -3 percentage points (equiv-
alent to the +3 percentage points e¤ect on the employment probability). This
is mirrored by a 10 percentage points increase in the proportion of mothers who
work 16 or more hours per week (panel c of Figure 2.6 and column 1 of Table 2.2)
and a fall of 7 percentage points in the proportion of mothers working between 0
and 16 hours. The age-policy rule in-built in the IS program therefore inhibits
labour market participation at both the extensive and intensive margins. As al-
ready hinted by the labour supply model for single mothers, the exogenous income
loss (fall in income following IS withdrawal and loss of potentially other benets
correlated to IS) pushes mothers into the labour market to compensate for the
income loss. Figure 2.7 plots the log of mothersreal family income (i.e. the sum
of earned and unearned income of all the members in the household)17 by age of
the youngest child. While there is an upward trend in real family income over all
ages of the youngest child, one can notice an acceleration in the rate of increase
in real family income after the age-16 threshold but it is not straightforward to
infer a discontinuity at the cut-o¤ point. The latter is conrmed by statistically
signicant RD estimates of the treatment e¤ect displayed in Table 2.2. Indeed,
as the youngest child turns 16, single mothers real family income falls by about
17-30%18. These gures should be taken with caution because the income variable
17All members in the households, i.e. the mother and the cohabiting child(ren), who are not
in work, are assigned an earnings level of £ 5 (equivalent to 1 hour of work paid at the minimum
wage) in order to solve the problem of zero earnings with logs. The analysis was also conducted
for varying levels of earnings and results are not sensitive to smaller values. Real family income
include earnings and state support of both the mother and her cohabiting child(ren).
18Single mothersreal income falls by about 11-20%. It appears that there are some changes
occurring in the real income (earned and unearned) of the other members of the family when the
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in the Labour Force Surveys are not very reliable and benets payments included
in the calculation of total family income and mothersincome are available up to
1999.
Turning to job search, Figure 2.8 plots the probability of claiming unemployment-
related benets and displays a clear discontinuity at the age-16 threshold. Table
2.1 reports a 5.5 percentage points increase in the proportion claiming unemploy-
ment benets as the youngest child turns 16. However one has to take into account
that this e¤ect is in-built in the benet structure since the same benets o¢ ce deals
with IS and JSA. Mothers are forced to attend job centres where they have no
alternative than to register as unemployed. Although this e¤ect is probably largely
mechanical, it may potentially lead to an increase in job search e¤ort and most
importantly the likelihood of nding a job. Not surprisingly, Figure 2.9 displays a
negative jump at age 16 with respect to the inactivity rate. However no conclusive
results can be drawn for the unemployment rate, displayed in Figure 2.10. This
may be an indication that a proportion of single mothers with no qualications
were already registered as unemployed but instead of claiming JSA, they were
claiming IS prior to their youngest child turning 16.
2.6.3 Identication Issues
Another potential explanation for the work patterns observed at the age-16 thresh-
old is that there might be changes in the entitlement for other benets which are
also related to the age-16 eligibility rule. In this case the separate e¤ect of the
automatic withdrawal of IS on labour market outcomes may not be identied. As
already hinted in section 2.2, receipt of IS implies automatic receipt of housing
youngest child turns 16.
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and/or council tax benets. Following the loss in entitlement to IS, it is highly
likely that the proportion of single mothers who claim housing and council tax
benets will fall discontinuously at or around the discontinuity point too. This is
conrmed in Figure 2.11 and Table 2.2 that show a fall in both housing benets
claims of 4.7 percentage points and in council tax benets of 4.3 percentage points
at the threshold. The exogenous fall in the mothersincome at the cuto¤ point
is therefore amplied by the withdrawal of these benets. In turn this negative
income e¤ect may drive more mothers to enter the labour market to compensate
for the loss. As a result the observed e¤ect on labour market outcomes may not
capture the genuine impact of the automatic withdrawal of IS but also that of
losing the passported benets. However the withdrawal of these benets does not
change substantially the results in this paper but is likely to imply that the im-
pact of IS withdrawal on the labour supply decisions of single mothers with no
qualications is overestimated.
The additional concern is that there might be a behavioural response to other
benets entitlement which might generate some non-random selection. The New
Deal for Lone Parents program participation is subject to the age-16 rule. Single
mothers can take part in the welfare-to-work programme until their youngest child
reaches 16. With the removal of individualised help and advice to get back into
work as their youngest child turns 16, some mothers may nd it hard to partici-
pate in the labour market. As such the main RD estimates are more likely to be
an underestimation of the true e¤ect of the IS withdrawal on labour market out-
comes rather than an overestimation, hence only strengthening the results. The
entitlement for child benets and working family tax credits are subject to an
age-16 eligibility rule as well. Mothers can claim these benets so long as they are
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responsible for a child under 16 or aged between 16 and 20 and in full-time non-
advanced education. For instance mothers with lower attachment to the labour
market might push their children to stay in school (and cohabit with them) as a re-
sponse to IS withdrawal. This might underestimate the impact of IS withdrawal
on labour supply (if these women would have otherwise been employed) or on un-
employment (if they would have otherwise sought employment). Similarly single
mother headed households might respond to IS withdrawal through an increase in
the labour supply of children turning 16, which is also the minimum school leaving
age in the UK19. A study on UK dropouts by Oreopoulos (2007) indicates that
16-25 year olds leave school at the minimum school leaving age because they are
either better o¤ working or they see no point in continuing or they need money.
This might generate an income e¤ect and reduce motherslabour supply (Willis,
1973; Basu, 1999). Because of this one might see a change in mothers labour
supply as the youngest child turns 16. In this case the e¤ect of IS withdrawal
on motherslabour supply will again be underestimated. Unfortunately, this pos-
sibility cannot be directly tested because information on childrens schooling and
labour supply before age 16 is not available in the data.
Although these concerns might be funded in theory, in practice the available
evidence makes them of little relevance. Figure 2.11 shows the proportion of
single mothers claiming child benets as a function of the youngest childs age.
Although the gure may suggest that there is a discontinuous jump at the age-16
threshold, the RD estimates in Table 2.1 are not statistically signicant for third
and higher order polynomials. This suggests that the changes in motherslabour
19Children under school leaving age can only be employed in light work which does not harm
them in the UK. However there are restrictions on the type of jobs they can do, when they can
work and the total number of hours they can work (Council of Europe, 1998).
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supply may not be contaminated by changes in the entitlement to child benets as
the youngest child turns 16. Furthermore there is no evidence of a discontinuity
in the proportion of mothers claiming tax credits (i.e. Working FamiliesTax
Credits which replaced Family Credits), which is conrmed by non-signicant RD
estimates in Table 2.1. It may therefore be reasonable to claim that the drop out
rate and the subsequent labour supply of children at the minimum school leaving
age are not major sources of concern for the empirical results.
Another concern on the validity of the RD design may arise if the age-eligibility
rule creates incentives for single mothers to sort around the discontinuity point in
a non-systematic manner. If manipulation of the running variable (age of the
youngest child) is possible and if mothers with potential gains from locating on
one side of the threshold actually endogenously do so, then barely eligible mothers
will not be identical to barely ineligible mothers. As mentioned by Lemieux and
Milligan (2007), people may "cheat" (e.g. falsifying birth certicates) on the age of
their children so that they remain eligible for IS. In this case, the RD estimate will
not be consistent. Although this might appear impossible, the age-eligibility rule
may further a¤ect household formation. Children may delay leaving their moth-
ers and single women may get married (or postpone marriage until the youngest
child turns 16) in which case mothers observed around the age-eligibility cut-o¤
comprise self-selected groups. If the propensity for children to leave the parental
nest or for mothers to get married is correlated with the unobserved determinants
of motherslabour supply this might again invalidate the consistency of the RD
estimate. Empirically, one can investigate whether there is a discontinuity in the
density of the covariate which underlies the assignment at the discontinuity point
(McCrary, 2008). A discontinuity in this case may indicate a violation of the no-
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manipulation assumption since this may be suggestive of childrens (or mothers)
ability to manipulate the running variable in a fashion that is correlated with the
entitlement for benets. As long as these selection biases are a smooth function
of the running variable, they will be captured by the function  () and the RD
approach will remain valid. Figure 2.12 displays a smoothed histogram of the
proportion of single mothers with a youngest child on either side of the age-16
threshold. It is reassuring to see that there is no excess bunching of mothers below
the threshold (DiNardo and Lee, 2004; McCrary, 2008) which implies that the
identication assumption appears to hold. In other terms, there is no indication of
eligible single mothers just below the age-16 threshold being overrepresented rela-
tive to those just ineligible20. Manipulation of the age eligibility does not appear
to be responsible for the e¤ects on single motherslabour supply responses.
2.6.4 Robustness Checks
A Variety of Specications The remaining columns of Tables 2.1 and 2.2
report tests of robustness of the estimated impact of IS withdrawal to a variety
of specications. Columns (2) - (5) present the xed e¤ects RD estimates for
polynomial specications of degrees 2 to 5 respectively. In practically all cases the
estimates are similar, have the same sign and are statistically signicant (except for
unemployment and inactivity rates). The estimated labour supply e¤ects are also
precisely estimated and have the expected sign across the specications. There is
20McCrary (2008) suggests a formal test for the presence of manipulation in a RD design. A
local linear regression of the proportion of single mothers with a youngest child is estimated below
and above the discontinuity point. The test consists of checking whether the proportion of single
mothes predicted to be at the age-16 threshold is the same for the two local linear regressions.
The point estimate of the log di¤erence at the threshold is just 0.031 (with a standard error of
0.038). The fact that the estimate is not signicantly di¤erent from zero implies that the null
that the distribution is continuous at the age of 16 for the youngest child cannot be rejected.
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no discontinuous jump in the probability of claiming child benets and working
family tax credits at the age-16 threshold. It may therefore be concluded that in
most cases the xed e¤ects RD estimates are robust to a variety of specications.
Narrowing Age Window An additional check for the robustness of the results
consists in estimating the model in Equation (2.3) for an increasingly narrow age
window around the discontinuity point. Both the t of the model (F-test) and the
signicance of the interaction terms (see Table A2.5) suggest the use of a linear
and quadratic specication. Indeed the F-statistics decays after the quadratic
specication and the interaction terms are less precisely estimated. Higher order
polynomials are not feasible when the age window is reduced because they may
tend to reect random noise rather than the underlying trend. The age windows
considered are four years above and below the discontinuity point, narrowing them
down to 1 year above and below the cut-o¤ point. Table 2.3 reports that the
xed e¤ects RD estimates are statistically signicant for "+/-2 years or less" age
windows. Reassuringly the signs are as expected in most cases. Non-signicance
of results appears to be driven by high standard errors, in turn due to the small
sample sizes as the age window is narrowed.
2.6.5 Interpretation
In this section, an interpretation of the ndings in the context of the standard
labour supply model is given in order to assess the magnitude of motherslabour
supply responses and to infer their labour supply elasticities. Because assignment
to the program near the age-16 threshold is as good as random, problems of
reverse causality, endogenous labour supply of children and omitted variables are
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not major concerns for the results. Therefore, xed e¤ects RD estimates reported
so far, i.e. the impact of the IS automatic withdrawal on the labour market re-
sponses of single mothers with no qualication, are reliably estimated. There is an
8.5% rise in the proportion of mothers who enter work following IS withdrawal.
This is consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model of labour supply
in section 2.3. While this represents 20% of single mothers with no qualications
who were initially on IS, about 37% of mothers who leave IS upon its withdrawal
move onto unemployment benets. There is also an added-in e¤ect from the fall
in housing and council tax passported benets. Additionally, due to the func-
tioning of the tax credits system in the UK these mothers have more incentive
to increase their hours of work per week. The income elasticity of labour supply
approximately equals 0.521 and is within the range of elasticities of other studies.
The participation elasticity using net income for single parents in the UK ranges
between 0.17 (Devereux, 2004) and 1.8 (Ermisch and Wright, 1991; Jenkins, 1992).
2.7 Discussion and Conclusion
The objectives of income transfer systems in the UK for low-income families are to
reduce poverty and encourage work, amongst others. As part of its strategy to meet
the objectives of tackling poverty and ensuring adequate nancial incentives to
work the Government has set a target to have 70% of single parents in employment
by 2010. There has been considerable success in encouraging single parents to work
16 hours or more since 1997, with the single parent employment rate rising from
45% to around 56% today. Research has focussed on the work incentives of in-work
21The labour supply elasticity is calculated as the percentage change in labour supply (w)
given a percentage change in total family income (I), i.e.  = %Mw%MI =
w
I :
I
w =
w
 ln I  1w where w
is evaluated at a = 16.
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benets like the Working Families Tax Credits (WFTC). Simulations by Blundell
et al. (2000) indicate that WFTC had the strongest incentives to work for single
mothers. Fancesconi and van der Klauuw (2004) calculated that WFTC increased
the employment rate of lone mothers by about 7 percentage points. However, there
is a lack of research on the disincentives of means-tested benets.
This paper assesses the work disincentive e¤ects of the Income Support program
system on single mothers and exploits the eligibility rule that a single parent
qualies for IS so long as she is responsible for a cohabiting child under the age of
16. A regression discontinuity approach is used based on the institutional features
of the UK benets system which allow for a sharp research design. The break in
the age-eligibility rule of IS provides a natural setting for analyzing its impact
on labour market and benets outcomes. The study also takes advantage of the
longitudinal nature of the Quarterly Labour Force Survey and estimates the e¤ects
using a xed e¤ects model to account for unobserved heterogeneity of individuals.
In the last section of the paper, a number of robustness checks are performed.
Narrowing the age window does not drastically change the e¤ects.
First, as expected, the empirical estimates show a strong and discernible impact
of the age-eligibility rule on the probability of claiming IS by single mothers when
their youngest child turns 16. This is accompanied by a fall in other related
benets, namely housing and council tax benets. It is obvious that at the cut-
o¤ age of 16 of the youngest child, single mothers most-at-risksof falling into
poverty experience an exogenous fall in total family income and this in turn, a¤ects
their labour market behaviour.
This leads to the second nding of the paper which is consistent with the
labour supply model underlying the analysis. A loss in transfer income induces an
47
increase in the labour force participation of poorly educated mothers. Indeed, this
study shows that the proportion of single mothers with no qualications who start
working rises by 3 percentage points, i.e. 20% of mothers who lose IS increase
their labour supply. A proportion of mothers also increases their hours of work
beyond 16. This nding is consistent with those of Evans et al. (2003) who show
that since October 1998, 51% of all leavers from the programme entered work of
at least 16 hours per week. Bell et al. (2008) analyzed whether encouraging lone
parents to work in jobs of less than 16 hours a week (mini-jobs) could increase the
employment rate of lone parents and tackle the high rates of poverty among this
group. They conclude that a cut in the qualifying hours for Working Tax Credits
(which replaced WFTC in March 2003) or an increase in the earnings disregard
for IS or housing benets and council tax benets will be mostly benecial to
relatively low-income lone parents.
Some care has to be exercised in inferring the channels behind the estimated
e¤ect of the age-eligibility rule of IS. Compulsory schooling laws and labour supply
decisions of children who reach the minimum school leaving age of 16 are likely to
be confounding factors a¤ecting the labour supply of mothers. The childs decision
to leave school and work at the age of 16 may increase the total family income in
such a way that it compensates or outweighs the fall in welfare benets experienced
by the mother. The results show that there is no clear jump in child benets and
working families tax credits claims at the discontinuity point implying that it is the
entitlement to the IS program that creates labour supply disincentives (with an
added-in e¤ect following receipts of housing and council tax passported benets)
among single mothers with low labour market potential, so long as their youngest
child is aged less than 16.
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An additional result is the ensuing e¤ect on the job search e¤ort which is
induced by Government actions as soon as the youngest child of single mothers
turns 16. They are directed to job centres where they are registered as unemployed.
Although mechanical, this directive increases the likelihood of nding a job for
these mothers and this can explain the rise in unemployment benets.
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Notes: The Figure reports the labour supply model for a mother who has no
qualifications and who is entitled to Income Support, which is the only
transfer program of the welfare benefit system. Panel a assumes that the
person attaches a high value to leisure (or low value to work) and panel b
assumes that the person attaches a low value to leisure. Leisure is a
normal good in both cases.
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The Figure reports the budget lines of a mother who has no
qualifications under different transfer programs. ABCDE is the original
budget line assuming the mother claims IS (AL) and tax credits. There is
also an earnings disregard of £20, equivalent to mothers working 4 hours
per week. The mother does not have an incentive to work more than 4
hours under the current IS program. She locates either at A or on
segment AB. As her youngest child turns 16 she loses her entitlement to
IS and is faced with a decrease in her net income. The new budget line
is now LCDE. To maximise her utility, she moves on segment DE, i.e enter
work (or if already in work) and work 16 or more hours per week.
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Notes: The Figure reports the proportion of mothers with no qualifications,
who claim income support (excluding income support with a disability
premium) by the age of their youngest child. A linear fit is superimposed
to the actual data.
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Notes: The Figure reports the proportion of lone mothers with no
qualifications, who are employed by the age of their youngest child. A
linear fit is superimposed to the actual data.
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Notes: The Figure reports the number of hours worked by mothers with no
qualifications, by the age of their youngest child. A linear fit is
superimposed to the actual data.
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Notes: The Figure reports the proportion of mothers with no qualifications,
who work zero hours (panel a, the reverse of Figure 4), between 0 and 16
hours (panel b) and more than 16 hours (panel c) per week by the age of
their youngest child. A quadratic fit is superimposed to the actual data.
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Notes: The Figure reports the log of real family earnings, which include
earnings and nonlabour income of each member of the family by age of the
youngest child. A linear fit is superimposed to the actual data.
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Notes: The Figure reports the proportion of mothers with no qualifications,
who claim unemployment-related benefits by the age of their youngest child.
A linear fit is superimposed to the actual data.
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Notes: The Figure reports the proportion of lone mothers with no
qualifications, who are inactive by the age of their youngest child. A
linear fit is superimposed to the actual data.
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Notes: The Figure reports the proportion of lone mothers with no
qualifications, who are unemployed by the age of their youngest child. A
linear fit is superimposed to the actual data.
6 7
F i g u r e 2 . 1 1
P r o p o r t i o n  C l a i m i n g  O t h e r  B e n e f i t s  b y  A g e  o f  Y o u n g e s t  C h i l d
Notes: The Figure reports the proportion of lone mothers with no
qualifications, who claim child benefits, housing benefits, council tax
benefits, tax credits and pension benefits by the age of their youngest
child. A quadratic fit is superimposed to the actual data.
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Notes: The Figure reports the density of the age of the youngest child
with no manipulation.
Age of Youngest Child
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) N
IS (excluding IS with Disability Premium)
Treat -0.149*** -0.143*** -0.131*** -0.128*** -0.157*** 25388
(0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.020) (0.022)
Unemployment-Related Benefits
Treat 0.055*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.042*** 0.030*** 25388
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Child Benefit
Treat -0.051** -0.023* -0.014 -0.004 -0.025 25388
(0.021) (0.013) (0.015) (0.023) (0.017)
Housing Benefit
Treat -0.050*** -0.037* -0.038* -0.039* -0.044* 25388
(0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.025)
Council Tax Benefit
Treat -0.043** -0.035* -0.032** -0.030** -0.054*** 25388
(0.018) (0.018) (0.012) (0.012) (0.020)
Tax Credits
Table 2.1
Fixed Effects Regression Discontinuity Estimates
Benefits Outcomes
Treat 0.000 -0.012 -0.024 -0.022 -0.015 25388
(0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019)
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Notes: The Table displays the fixed RD estimates of the impact of the youngest
child turning 16 on a number of benefits outcomes. Tax credits include Working
Families' Tax Credits and Family Credits prior to 1999. Columns (1) to (5)
refer to polynomials of degree 1 to 5 respectively. The specification includes
controls for the age of the youngest child, month and year dummies. The sample
includes single mothers with no qualifications who are reported to be single
mothers in the first period they appear in the survey. The age of the youngest
child is between 1 and 20 years. Standard errors in brackets are clustered by
the age of the youngest child. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and
10% respectively. Source: Quarterly Labour Force Surveys, Winter 1994 - Autumn
2002 (excluding Winter 1996 - Winter 1997).
Notes: The Table displays the fixed effects RD estimates of the impact of the
youngest child turning 16 on a number of labour market outcomes. Columns (1)
to (5) refer to polynomials of degree 1 to 5 respectively. The specification
includes controls for the age of the youngest child, month and year dummies.
The sample includes single mothers with no qualifications who are reported to
be single mothers in the first period they appear in the survey. The age of
the youngest child is between 1 and 20 years. Standard errors in brackets are
clustered by the age of the youngest child. ***, **, * denote significance at
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Source: Quarterly Labour Force Surveys, Winter
1994 - Autumn 2002 (excluding Winter 1996 - Winter 1997).
Notes: The Table displays the fixed effects RD estimates of the
impact of the youngest child turning 16 for different age windows.
Tax credits include Working Families' Tax Credits and Family Credits
prior to 1999. Columns (1) to (2) refer to polynomials of degree 1
and 2 respectively. The specification includes controls for the age
of the youngest child, month and year dummies. The sample includes
single mothers with no qualifications who are reported to be single
mothers in the first period they appear in the survey. The age of
the youngest child is between 1 and 20 years. Standard errors in
brackets are clustered by the age of the youngest child. ***, **, *
denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Source:
Quarterly Labour Force Surveys, Winter 1994 - Autumn 2002 (excluding
Winter 1996 - Winter 1997).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) N
Employed
Treat   0.030**  0.026*  0.026*   0.038** 0.049*** 25309
(0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018)
Unemployed
Treat 0.015 0.011 0.003 -0.018 -0.021 25309
(0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.020)
Inactive
Treat -0.045*** -0.037** -0.029 -0.020 -0.027 25309
(0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.023)
Number of Hours Worked
Treat 2.523*** 2.352*** 1.937*** 2.664*** 2.877*** 25309
(0.485) (0.509) (0.547) (0.597) (0.656)
Hours Worked Between 0 and 16
Treat -0.070*** -0.063*** -0.052*** -0.059*** -0.056** 25309
(0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.023)
Fixed Effects Regression Discontinuity Estimates
 Labour Market Outcomes
Table 2.2
Notes: The Table displays the fixed RD estimates of the impact of the youngest
child turning 16 on a number of benefits outcomes. Tax credits include Working
Families' Tax Credits and Family Credits prior to 1999. Columns (1) to (5)
refer to polynomials of degree 1 to 5 respectively. The specification includes
controls for the age of the youngest child, month and year dummies. The sample
includes single mothers with no qualifications who are reported to be single
mothers in the first period they appear in the survey. The age of the youngest
child is between 1 and 20 years. Standard errors in brackets are clustered by
the age of the youngest child. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and
10% respectively. Source: Quarterly Labour Force Surveys, Winter 1994 - Autumn
2002 (excluding Winter 1996 - Winter 1997).
Notes: The Table displays the fixed effects RD estimates of the
impact of the youngest child turning 16 for different age windows.
Tax credits include Working Families' Tax Credits and Family Credits
prior to 1999. Columns (1) to (2) refer to polynomials of degree 1
and 2 respectively. The specification includes controls for the age
of the youngest child, month and year dummies. The sample includes
single mothers with no qualifications who are reported to be single
mothers in the first period they appear in the survey. The age of
the youngest child is between 1 and 20 years. Standard errors in
brackets are clustered by the age of the youngest child. ***, **, *
denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Source:
Quarterly Labour Force Surveys, Winter 1994 - Autumn 2002 (excluding
Winter 1996 - Winter 1997).
Hours Worked >= 16
Treat 0.100*** 0.089*** 0.078*** 0.096*** 0.104*** 25309
(0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.023)
Log of Real Total Family Income
Treat -0.171* -0.189** -0.199** -0.236** -0.314** 14189
(0.089) (0.094) (0.101) (0.111) (0.122)
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Notes: The Table displays the fixed effects RD estimates of the impact of the
youngest child turning 16 on a number of labour market outcomes. Columns (1)
to (5) refer to polynomials of degree 1 to 5 respectively. The specification
includes controls for the age of the youngest child, month and year dummies.
The sample includes single mothers with no qualifications who are reported to
be single mothers in the first period they appear in the survey. The age of
the youngest child is between 1 and 20 years. Standard errors in brackets are
clustered by the age of the youngest child. ***, **, * denote significance at
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Source: Quarterly Labour Force Surveys, Winter
1994 - Autumn 2002 (excluding Winter 1996 - Winter 1997).
Age Window Width
(1) (2) N
IS (excluding IS with Disability Premium)
+/-
4 years -0.155*** -0.154*** 7492
(0.015) (0.018)
3 years -0.155*** -0.150*** 5793
(0.016) (0.019)
2 years -0.152*** -0.131*** 4038
(0.017) (0.023)
1 year -0.147*** -0.100** 2199
(0.022) (0.041)
Unemployment-Related Benefits
+/-
4 years 0.059*** 0.055*** 7492
(0.009) (0.011)
Fixed Effects Regression Discontinuity Estimates with Different Age Windows
Table 2.3
Notes: The Table displays the fixed RD estimates of the impact of the youngest
child turning 16 on a number of benefits outcomes. Tax credits include Working
Families' Tax Credits and Family Credits prior to 1999. Columns (1) to (5)
refer to polynomials of degree 1 to 5 respectively. The specification includes
controls for the age of the youngest child, month and year dummies. The sample
includes single mothers with no qualifications who are reported to be single
mothers in the first period they appear in the survey. The age of the youngest
child is between 1 and 20 years. Standard errors in brackets are clustered by
the age of the youngest child. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and
10% respectively. Source: Quarterly Labour Force Surveys, Winter 1994 - Autumn
2002 (excluding Winter 1996 - Winter 1997).
Notes: The Table displays the fixed effects RD estimates of the impact of the
youngest child turning 16 on a number of labour market outcomes. Columns (1)
to (5) refer to polynomials of degree 1 to 5 respectively. The specification
includes controls for the age of the youngest child, month and year dummies.
The sample includes single mothers with no qualifications who are reported to
be single mothers in the first period they appear in the survey. The age of
the youngest child is between 1 and 20 years. Standard errors in brackets are
clustered by the age of the youngest child. ***, **, * denote significance at
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Source: Quarterly Labour Force Surveys, Winter
1994 - Autumn 2002 (excluding Winter 1996 - Winter 1997).
Notes: The Table displays the fixed effects RD estimates of the
impact of the youngest child turning 16 for different age windows.
Tax credits include Working Families' Tax Credits and Family Credits
prior to 1999. Columns (1) to (2) refer to polynomials of degree 1
and 2 respectively. The specification includes controls for the age
of the youngest child, month and year dummies. The sample includes
single mothers with no qualifications who are reported to be single
mothers in the first period they appear in the survey. The age of
the youngest child is between 1 and 20 years. Standard errors in
brackets are clustered by the age of the youngest child. ***, **, *
denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Source:
Quarterly Labour Force Surveys, Winter 1994 - Autumn 2002 (excluding
Winter 1996 - Winter 1997).
3 years 0.058*** 0.053*** 5793
(0.010) (0.012)
2 years 0.056*** 0.052*** 4038
(0.012) (0.016)
1 year 0.053*** 0.016 2199
(0.015) (0.028)
Child Benefit
+/-
4 years -0.052*** -0.029 7492
(0.017) (0.019)
3 years -0.047*** -0.028 5793
(0.018) (0.022)
2 years -0.041** -0.019 4038
(0.020) (0.026)
1 year -0.032 0.009 2199
(0.025) (0.046)
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Age Window Width
(1) (2) N
Housing Benefit
+/-
4 years -0.049*** -0.041** 7492
(0.018) (0.020)
3 years -0.047*** -0.039* 5793
(0.018) (0.022)
2 years -0.048** 0.002 4038
(0.020) (0.026)
1 year -0.031 0.013 2199
(0.024) (0.045)
Council Tax Benefit
+/-
4 years -0.045** -0.045** 7492
(0.019) (0.022)
3 years -0.048** -0.037 5793
(0.020) (0.024)
2 years -0.043** -0.018 4038
(0.021) (0.028)
Notes: The Table displays the fixed RD estimates of the impact of the youngest
child turning 16 on a number of benefits outcomes. Tax credits include Working
Families' Tax Credits and Family Credits prior to 1999. Columns (1) to (5)
refer to polynomials of degree 1 to 5 respectively. The specification includes
controls for the age of the youngest child, month and year dummies. The sample
includes single mothers with no qualifications who are reported to be single
mothers in the first period they appear in the survey. The age of the youngest
child is between 1 and 20 years. Standard errors in brackets are clustered by
the age of the youngest child. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and
10% respectively. Source: Quarterly Labour Force Surveys, Winter 1994 - Autumn
2002 (excluding Winter 1996 - Winter 1997).
Notes: The Table displays the fixed effects RD estimates of the impact of the
youngest child turning 16 on a number of labour market outcomes. Columns (1)
to (5) refer to polynomials of degree 1 to 5 respectively. The specification
includes controls for the age of the youngest child, month and year dummies.
The sample includes single mothers with no qualifications who are reported to
be single mothers in the first period they appear in the survey. The age of
the youngest child is between 1 and 20 years. Standard errors in brackets are
clustered by the age of the youngest child. ***, **, * denote significance at
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Source: Quarterly Labour Force Surveys, Winter
1994 - Autumn 2002 (excluding Winter 1996 - Winter 1997).
Notes: The Table displays the fixed effects RD estimates of the
impact of the youngest child turning 16 for different age windows.
Tax credits include Working Families' Tax Credits and Family Credits
prior to 1999. Columns (1) to (2) refer to polynomials of degree 1
and 2 respectively. The specification includes controls for the age
of the youngest child, month and year dummies. The sample includes
single mothers with no qualifications who are reported to be single
mothers in the first period they appear in the survey. The age of
the youngest child is between 1 and 20 years. Standard errors in
brackets are clustered by the age of the youngest child. ***, **, *
denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Source:
Quarterly Labour Force Surveys, Winter 1994 - Autumn 2002 (excluding
Winter 1996 - Winter 1997).
1 year -0.039 -0.003 2199
(0.026) (0.048)
Tax Credits
+/-
4 years -0.007 -0.010 7492
(0.014) (0.017)
3 years -0.008 -0.018 5793
(0.015) (0.018)
2 years -0.016 -0.006 4038
(0.016) (0.022)
1 year -0.015 0.074* 2199
(0.021) (0.039)
Employed
+/-
4 years 0.037*** 0.037** 7455
(0.013) (0.015)
3 years 0.037*** 0.029* 5761
(0.013) (0.016)
2 years 0.036** 0.032* 4011
(0.014) (0.019)
1 year 0.031* 0.036 2187
(0.018) (0.034)
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Age Window Width
(1) (2) N
Unemployed
+/-
4 years 0.012 0.005 7455
(0.015) (0.017)
3 years 0.011 0.009 5761
(0.015) (0.018)
2 years 0.006 0.011 4011
(0.016) (0.021)
1 year 0.019 -0.036 2187
(0.021) (0.038)
Inactivity
+/-
4 years -0.048*** -0.042** 7455
(0.016) (0.019)
3 years -0.048*** -0.038* 5761
(0.017) (0.020)
2 years -0.041** -0.043* 4011
Notes: The Table displays the fixed RD estimates of the impact of the youngest
child turning 16 on a number of benefits outcomes. Tax credits include Working
Families' Tax Credits and Family Credits prior to 1999. Columns (1) to (5)
refer to polynomials of degree 1 to 5 respectively. The specification includes
controls for the age of the youngest child, month and year dummies. The sample
includes single mothers with no qualifications who are reported to be single
mothers in the first period they appear in the survey. The age of the youngest
child is between 1 and 20 years. Standard errors in brackets are clustered by
the age of the youngest child. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and
10% respectively. Source: Quarterly Labour Force Surveys, Winter 1994 - Autumn
2002 (excluding Winter 1996 - Winter 1997).
Notes: The Table displays the fixed effects RD estimates of the impact of the
youngest child turning 16 on a number of labour market outcomes. Columns (1)
to (5) refer to polynomials of degree 1 to 5 respectively. The specification
includes controls for the age of the youngest child, month and year dummies.
The sample includes single mothers with no qualifications who are reported to
be single mothers in the first period they appear in the survey. The age of
the youngest child is between 1 and 20 years. Standard errors in brackets are
clustered by the age of the youngest child. ***, **, * denote significance at
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Source: Quarterly Labour Force Surveys, Winter
1994 - Autumn 2002 (excluding Winter 1996 - Winter 1997).
Notes: The Table displays the fixed effects RD estimates of the
impact of the youngest child turning 16 for different age windows.
Tax credits include Working Families' Tax Credits and Family Credits
prior to 1999. Columns (1) to (2) refer to polynomials of degree 1
and 2 respectively. The specification includes controls for the age
of the youngest child, month and year dummies. The sample includes
single mothers with no qualifications who are reported to be single
mothers in the first period they appear in the survey. The age of
the youngest child is between 1 and 20 years. Standard errors in
brackets are clustered by the age of the youngest child. ***, **, *
denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Source:
Quarterly Labour Force Surveys, Winter 1994 - Autumn 2002 (excluding
Winter 1996 - Winter 1997).
(0.017) (0.023)
1 year -0.049** 0.000 2187
(0.021) (0.039)
Number of Hours Worked Including Zeroes
+/-
4 years 2.492*** 2.762*** 7455
(0.634) (0.730)
3 years 2.577*** 2.527*** 5761
(0.633) (0.765)
2 years 2.500*** 2.452*** 4011
(0.682) (0.917)
1 year 2.179** 2.045 2187
(0.846) (1.582)
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Age Window Width
(1) (2) N
Zero Hours Worked
+/-
4 years -0.037*** -0.037** 7455
(0.013) (0.015)
3 years -0.037*** -0.029* 5761
(0.013) (0.016)
2 years -0.036** -0.032* 4011
(0.014) (0.019)
1 year -0.031* -0.036 2187
(0.018) (0.034)
Hours Between 0 and 16
+/-
4 years -0.059*** -0.061*** 7455
(0.019) (0.022)
3 years -0.057*** -0.060** 5761
(0.020) (0.024)
2 years -0.052** -0.063** 4011
(0.021) (0.029)
Notes: The Table displays the fixed RD estimates of the impact of the youngest
child turning 16 on a number of benefits outcomes. Tax credits include Working
Families' Tax Credits and Family Credits prior to 1999. Columns (1) to (5)
refer to polynomials of degree 1 to 5 respectively. The specification includes
controls for the age of the youngest child, month and year dummies. The sample
includes single mothers with no qualifications who are reported to be single
mothers in the first period they appear in the survey. The age of the youngest
child is between 1 and 20 years. Standard errors in brackets are clustered by
the age of the youngest child. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and
10% respectively. Source: Quarterly Labour Force Surveys, Winter 1994 - Autumn
2002 (excluding Winter 1996 - Winter 1997).
Notes: The Table displays the fixed effects RD estimates of the impact of the
youngest child turning 16 on a number of labour market outcomes. Columns (1)
to (5) refer to polynomials of degree 1 to 5 respectively. The specification
includes controls for the age of the youngest child, month and year dummies.
The sample includes single mothers with no qualifications who are reported to
be single mothers in the first period they appear in the survey. The age of
the youngest child is between 1 and 20 years. Standard errors in brackets are
clustered by the age of the youngest child. ***, **, * denote significance at
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Source: Quarterly Labour Force Surveys, Winter
1994 - Autumn 2002 (excluding Winter 1996 - Winter 1997).
1 year -0.047* -0.068 2187
(0.024) (0.045)
Hours >= 16
+/-
4 years 0.095*** 0.098*** 7455
(0.020) (0.023)
3 years 0.094*** 0.089*** 5761
(0.021) (0.025)
2 years 0.088*** 0.095*** 4011
(0.023) (0.031)
1 year 0.077*** 0.104** 2187
(0.028) (0.052)
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Notes: The Table displays the fixed effects RD estimates of the
impact of the youngest child turning 16 for different age windows.
Tax credits include Working Families' Tax Credits and Family Credits
prior to 1999. Columns (1) to (2) refer to polynomials of degree 1
and 2 respectively. The specification includes controls for the age
of the youngest child, month and year dummies. The sample includes
single mothers with no qualifications who are reported to be single
mothers in the first period they appear in the survey. The age of
the youngest child is between 1 and 20 years. Standard errors in
brackets are clustered by the age of the youngest child. ***, **, *
denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Source:
Quarterly Labour Force Surveys, Winter 1994 - Autumn 2002 (excluding
Winter 1996 - Winter 1997).
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Figure A2.1
UK Benefits System
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Notes: The Figure reports the various benefits that individuals can claim in the UK. Panel a shows that the benefits can be divided
into two broad categories: means-tested and non-means tested benefits. The main benefits studied in the paper are Income
Support, Housing Benefits, Council Tax Benefits, Child Benefits and Tax Credits (which include both Working Families’ Tax Credits,
formally known as Family Credits). Panel b displays the benefits used mainly in the analysis which is available to single mothers in
the UK depending on their work condition and on the age of their youngest cohabiting child.
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Table A2.1
Major Reforms to the Benefits System in the UK
April 1988 Income support replaced Supplementary Benefits.
April 1992 Disability Living Allowance replaced Mobility Allowance
and Attendance Allowance for those aged under 65.
April 1995 Incapacity benefits replaced Invalidity Benefits and
Sickness Benefits.
October 1996 Jobseeker’s Allowance replaced Unemployment Benefits and
Income Support for the unemployed.
1997-1999 New Deal Programmes were introduced as part of the
government’s “welfare-to-work” strategy:
July 1997 New Deal for Lone Parents started in
some areas and was rolled out
nationally in October 1998.
January 1998 New Deal for Young People (18-24 years
old) was introduced.
October 1998 New Deal for Disabled People was
piloted and rolled out nationally from
July 2001.
April 1999 New Deal for Partners was introduced.
October 1999 New Deal 25+ began in some areas and
rolled out nationally from April 2004.
October 1999 Working Families’ Tax Credits replaced Family Credit
(which replaced Family Income Supplement in April 1988).
Disabled Person’s Tax Credit replaced Disability Working
Allowance.
April 2001 Children’s Tax Credit was introduced.
April 2003 Working Tax Credits replaced Working Families’ Tax
Credits and Disabled Person’s Tax Credits.
Child Tax Credits replaced Children’s Tax Credits.
October 2008 Employment and Support Allowance replaced Incapacity
Benefit and Income Support on grounds of incapacity.
Notes: The Table displays the main reforms that occurred in the UK
benefit system since the mid-1990s in chronological order. A more
detailed summary can be found in Gregg and Harkness (2003).
£ per week
18 or over
Usual Higher 18 to 25 or Usual Higher
Rate Rate 24 over Rate Rate
10 April 1989 20.80 - 27.40 34.90 20.80 - 34.90
9 April 1990 21.90 28.80 28.80 36.70 21.90 - 36.70
8 April 1991 23.65 31.15 31.15 39.65 23.65 31.15 39.65
7 October 1991 23.90 31.40 31.40 39.65 23.90 31.40 39.65
6 April 1992 25.55 33.60 33.60 42.45 25.55 33.60 42.45
12 April 1993 26.45 34.80 34.80 44.00 26.45 34.80 44.00
11 April 1994 27.50 36.15 36.15 45.70 27.50 36.15 45.70
10 April 1995 28.00 36.80 36.80 46.50 28.00 36.80 46.50
8 April 1996 28.85 37.90 37.90 47.90 28.85 37.90 47.90
7 April 1997 29.60 38.90 38.90 49.15 29.60 38.90 49.15
6 April 1998 30.30 39.85 39.85 50.35 30.30 39.85 50.35
12 April 1999 30.95 40.70 40.70 51.40 30.95 40.70 51.40
10 April 2000 31.45 41.35 41.35 52.20 31.45 41.35 52.20
9 April 2001 31.95 42.00 42.00 53.05 31.95 42.00 53.05
8 April 2002 32.50 42.70 42.70 53.95 32.50 42.70 53.95
Both
under 18 Under 11 11 to 15 16 to 17 18
10 April 1989 41.60 54.80 11.75 17.35 20.80 27.40
9 April 1990 43.80 57.60 12.35 18.25 21.90 28.80
8 April 1991 47.30 62.25 13.35 19.75 23.65 31.15
7 October 1991 47.30 62.25 13.60 20.00 23.90 31.40
6 April 1992 50.60 66.60 14.55 21.40 25.55 33.60
Table A2.2
Income Support: Personal Allowances 1988 to 2002
Under 18 Under 1818 or over
Single Person Lone Parent
Couple Dependent Children
18 or over
One or Both
12 April 1993 52.40 69.00 15.05 22.15 26.45 34.80
11 April 1994 54.55 71.70 15.65 23.00 27.50 36.15
10 April 1995 55.55 73.00 15.95 23.40 28.00 36.80
8 April 1996 57.20 75.20 16.45 24.10 28.85 37.90
Under 11(1a) 16-18(1c)
7 April 1997 58.70 77.15 16.90 29.60
6 April 1998 60.10 79.00 17.30 30.30
5 November 1998 19.80 30.30
12 April 1999(2) 80.65 20.20 30.95
4 October 1999 80.65 24.90 30.95
16-18(3b)
10 April 2000(3) 81.95 31.75
23 October 2000 31.75
9 April 2001 83.25 32.25
22 October 2001 33.75
8 April 2002 84.65 34.30
32.95
33.50
Dependent Children
26.60
30.95
31.45
25.35
25.90
25.90
Up to and inc 16(3a)
Dependent Children
11 to 16(1b)
24.75
25.35
Notes: 1. From 7 April 1997 the age banding used for the benefit calculation of dependent children have
changed.
From this date the banding are as follows:
a. Birth to September following 11th birthday.
b. From September following the 11th birthday to September following the 16th birthday.
c. From September following the 16th birthday to the day before the 19th birthday.
Some children will remain eligible for a different rate of benefit i.e. have 'protected
rights'. These are as follows:-
*Child aged 11 before 7 April 1997: allowance £25.35.
*Child aged 16 before 7 April 1997: allowance £30.30.
*Child aged 18 before 7 April 1997: allowance £39.85.
2. From 12 April 1999 the personal allowance for married or unmarried couples where both
members are not yet 18 or one of the couple is aged 18 or over
depends on the couple's circumstances. They may be entitled to a couple allowance or a
single person's allowance dependent upon certain criteria.
3. From 10 April 2000 there are only 2 age bands for dependents. From this date the age
banding are as follows:
a. Birth to September following 16th birthday.
b. From September following 16th birthday to the day before the 19th birthday.
Source: Quarterly Statistical Review, 2002.
     £ per week
Disabled Carer Single Couple Child Single Couple Single Couple Couple
Child (1) (One) (Both)
11 April 1988 6.15 - 13.05 18.60 - - - 24.75 24.75 49.50
10 April 1989 6.50 - 13.70 19.50 - - - 26.20 26.20 52.40
9 April 1990 15.40 10.00 15.40 22.10 - - - 28.50 28.20 56.40
8 April 1991 16.65 10.80 16.65 23.90 - - - 31.25 31.25 62.50
7 October 1991 17.80 11.55 17.80 25.55 - - - 32.55 32.55 65.10
6 April 1992 18.45 11.95 18.45 26.45 - - - 33.70 33.70 67.40
12 April 1993 19.45 12.40 19.45 27.80 - - - 34.30 34.40 68.60
11 April 1994 19.80 12.60 19.80 28.30 - - - 35.05 35.05 70.10
10 April 1995 20.40 13.00 20.40 29.15 - - - 36.40 36.40 72.80
8 April 1996 20.95 13.35 20.95 29.90 - - - 37.15 37.15 74.30
7 April 1997 21.45 13.65 21.45 30.60 - - - 38.50 38.50 77.00
6 April 1998 21.90 13.95 21.90 31.25 - - - 39.75 39.75 79.50
12 April 1999 22.25 14.15 22.25 31.75 - - - 40.20 40.20 80.40
10 April 2000 22.25 14.15 22.25 31.75 - - - 40.20 40.20 80.40
9 April 2001 30.00 24.40 22.60 32.25 11.05 11.05 16.00 41.55 41.55 83.10
8 April 2002 30.50 24.80 23.00 32.80 11.25 11.25 16.25 42.25 42.25 84.50
All Couple Lone Lone Single Couple Single Couple Single Couple
Parent Parent(4)
Table A2.3
Income Support: Rates of Premiums 1988 to 2002
Disability Enhanced Disability(5) Severe Disability
Higher PensionerFamily(2) Pensioner Enhanced
Pensioner(3)
11 April 1988 6.15 - - 3.70 10.65 16.25 - - 13.05 18.60
10 April 1989 6.50 - - 3.90 11.20 17.05 - - 13.70 19.50
9 October 1989 6.50 - - 3.90 11.20 17.05 13.70 20.55 16.20 23.00
9 April 1990 7.35 - - 4.10 11.80 17.95 14.40 21.60 17.05 24.25
8 April 1991 7.95 - - 4.45 13.75 20.90 15.50 23.35 18.45 26.20
6 April 1992 9.30 - - 4.75 14.70 22.35 16.65 25.00 20.75 29.55
12 April 1993 9.65 - - 4.90 17.30 36.25 19.30 29.00 23.55 33.70
11 April 1994 10.05 - - 5.10 18.25 27.55 20.35 30.40 24.70 35.30
10 April 1995 10.25 - - 5.20 18.60 28.05 20.70 30.95 25.15 35.95
8 April 1996 10.55 - - 5.20 19.15 28.90 21.30 31.90 25.90 37.05
7 April 1997 - 10.80 15.75 - 19.65 29.65 21.85 32.75 26.55 38.00
6 April 1998 - 11.05 15.75(4) - 20.10 30.35 22.35 33.55 27.20 38.90
12 April 1999 - 13.90 15.75 - 23.60 35.95 25.90 39.20 30.85 44.65
10 April 2000 - 14.25 15.90 - 26.25 40.00 28.65 43.40 33.85 49.10
9 April 2001(6)
- 14.20 15.90 - 39.10 57.30 39.10 57.30 39.10 57.30
8 April 2002 - 14.75 15.90 - 44.20 65.15 44.20 65.15 44.20 65.15
  Bereavement
8 April 2002 21.55
Notes: 1. Carer premium introduced in October 1990.
2. Family Premium increased to £8.70 from 7 October 1991.
3. Enhanced Pensioner premium introduced in October 1999.
4. From 7 April 1997 Lone parents receive one premium (Family premium - Lone parent
rate) instead of two separate premiums i.e. Family premium & Lone parent premium.
5. Enhanced Disability Premium introduced in April 2001.
6. Alignment of Premiums paid to 'aged 60 or over' (MIG) April 2001.
7. Bereavement Premium introduced in April 2002.
Source: Quarterly Statistical Review, 2002.
Table A2.4
Descriptive Statistics
Age Of Youngest Child Lone Mothers
Variables 15.75 16 16.25 No Qual All Sign
1. Age 44 44 44 36 35 ***
(5.959) (5.908) (6.091) (9.407) (8.631)
2. Ethnicity
White 0.932 0.938 0.941 0.930 0.928
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.002) (0.001)
Black 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.031 0.043 ***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Asian 0.053 0.050 0.038 0.026 0.015 ***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.001) (0.000)
Mixed 0.011 0.008 0.017 0.013 0.014
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.001) (0.000)
3. Region of Residence
North
Tyne & Wear 0.034 0.041 0.046 0.029 0.025
(0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.001) (0.000) ***
Rest of Northern Region 0.068 0.062 0.054 0.043 0.038 ***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.001) (0.000)
Yorkshire & the Humber
South Yorkshire 0.019 0.021 0.021 0.026 0.025
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.001) (0.000)
West Yorkshire 0.030 0.029 0.033 0.038 0.040 **
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.001) (0.000)
Rest of Yorks &
Humberside 0.023 0.021 0.017 0.028 0.027
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.001) (0.000)
East Midlands 0.061 0.058 0.063 0.069 0.067 *
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.002) (0.001)
East Anglia 0.019 0.012 0.008 0.024 0.031 ***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.001) (0.000)
London
Inner London 0.034 0.033 0.042 0.057 0.056
(0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.001) (0.001)
Outer London 0.072 0.075 0.096 0.062 0.068 ***
(0.016) (0.017) (0.019) (0.002) (0.001)
Rest of South East 0.091 0.116 0.134 0.110 0.158
(0.018) (0.021) (0.022) (0.002) (0.001)
South West 0.049 0.058 0.054 0.047 0.072
(0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.001) (0.001)
West Midlands
West Midlands
(Met County) 0.057 0.066 0.042 0.062 0.048 ***
(0.014) (0.016) (0.013) (0.002) (0.001)
Rest of West Midlands 0.049 0.041 0.046 0.041 0.041
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.001) (0.000)
Age Of Youngest Child Lone Mothers
Variables 15.75 16 16.25 No Qual All Sign
North West
Greater Manchester 0.057 0.054 0.050 0.060 0.052 ***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.001) (0.001)
Merseyside 0.038 0.037 0.025 0.038 0.031 ***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.001) (0.000)
Rest of North West 0.034 0.046 0.046 0.041 0.042
(0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.001) (0.001)
Wales 0.072 0.066 0.054 0.068 0.055 ***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.002) (0.001)
Scotland
Strathclyde 0.072 0.066 0.054 0.065 0.045 ***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.002) (0.001)
Rest of scotland 0.049 0.037 0.059 0.046 0.048 *
(0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.001) (0.001)
Northern Ireland 0.072 0.062 0.050 0.047 0.032 ***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.001) (0.000)
4. Labour Force Status
Employed 0.452 0.452 0.431 0.314 0.503 ***
(0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.003) (0.001)
Unemployed 0.080 0.071 0.109 0.067 0.069 ***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.020) (0.002) (0.001)
Inactive 0.468 0.477 0.460 0.619 0.429 ***
(0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.003) (0.001)
5. Hours Worked
Zero 0.593 0.581 0.598 0.721 0.557 ***
(0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.003) (0.001)
Between 0 and 16 0.091 0.066 0.050 0.064 0.080 ***
(0.018) (0.016) (0.014) (0.002) (0.001)
Greater than 16 0.316 0.353 0.351 0.215 0.362 ***
(0.029) (0.031) (0.031) (0.003) (0.001)
6. Number of Hours
Worked 9.9 11 12 7 12 ***
(13.9) (15.0) (16.0 (12.9) (16.7)
7. Gross Weekly Pay (£) 118 126 131 114 194 ***
(95.7) (70.2) (84.6) (86.0) (100.0)
8. Any Benefit Claim 0.989 0.954 0.902 0.948 0.703 ***
(0.007) (0.013) (0.019) (0.001) (0.001)
Age Of Youngest Child Lone Mothers
Variables 15.75 16 16.25 No Qual All Sign
9. Benefits
Income Support 0.424 0.315 0.234 0.504 0.255 ***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.027) (0.003) (0.001)
Unemployment-Related
Benefits 0.008 0.046 0.109 0.017 0.011 ***
(0.005) (0.013) (0.020) (0.001) (0.000)
Other
Child Benefit 0.928 0.884 0.799 0.888 0.654 ***
(0.016) (0.021) (0.026) (0.002) (0.001)
Housing Benefit 0.420 0.415 0.427 0.516 0.253 ***
(0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.003) (0.001)
Council Tax Benefit 0.462 0.448 0.439 0.524 0.261 ***
(0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.003) (0.001)
Tax Credits 0.186 0.154 0.192 0.168 0.145 ***
(0.024) (0.023) (0.026) (0.002) (0.001)
Observations 263 241 239 25428 159353
Notes: The Table reports summary statistics on all single mothers and single mothers with no
qualifications, observed to be single in the first period when they enter the survey. Tax credits
include Working Families' Tax Credits and Family Credits prior to 1999. Summary Statistics for
uneducated single mothers irrespective of the period of observation are similar as those
pertaining to single mothers observed in the first period they appear in the data. ***, ** and *
indicate that single mothers and single mothers with no qualifications are statistically different
from one another at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. Eligible mothers to the
left and ineligible mothers to the right of the age-16 threshold are not statistically different
from each other in terms of characteristics. Source: Quarterly Labour Force Surveys, Winter 1994 -
Autumn 2002 (excluding Winter 1996 - Winter 1997).
Income Support (without a disability premium) Employed
+/- 4 years +/- 4 years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age
-0.178 -0.133 -0.141 -0.194 -0.326 -0.013 -0.039 -0.003 -0.175 0.129
(0.163) (0.164) (0.168) (0.184) (0.233) (0.143) (0.144) (0.148) (0.161) (0.204)
Age2 0.008 0.006 -0.046 -0.250 -0.005 0.017 -0.163** 0.284
(0.005) (0.025) (0.081) (0.229) (0.005) (0.022) (0.072) (0.202)
Age3
-0.000 -0.019 -0.144 0.003 -0.062** 0.211*
(0.004) (0.029) (0.134) (0.003) (0.025) (0.118)
Age4 -0.002 -0.035 -0.008*** 0.064**
(0.003) (0.035) (0.003) (0.030)
Age5
-0.003 0.007**
(0.003) (0.003)
Age1*Treat -0.054*** -0.179*** -0.265*** -0.286*** -0.214 0.028** 0.096*** 0.098* 0.243*** -0.111
(0.016) (0.035) (0.061) (0.103) (0.182) (0.014) (0.030) (0.053) (0.091) (0.160)
Age2*Treat 0.016** 0.087** 0.239** 0.583** -0.008 -0.059* 0.158* -0.147
(0.008) (0.035) (0.105) (0.271) (0.007) (0.031) (0.092) (0.239)
Age3*Treat -0.012** -0.035 -0.014 0.002 0.052 -0.328**
(0.006) (0.038) (0.165) (0.005) (0.033) (0.145)
Age4*Treat 0.008 0.071 0.010** -0.030
(0.005) (0.045) (0.004) (0.039)
Age5*Treat -0.000
-
0.010***
(0.004) (0.004)
F-test 14.463 8.077 2.448 2.068 5.690 2.239 2.209 2.023
+/- 3 years +/- 3 years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age
-0.219 -0.197 -0.225 -0.337 -0.259 0.007 0.009 -0.083 0.174 -0.092
(0.199) (0.200) (0.208) (0.244) (0.360) (0.166) (0.168) (0.175) (0.204) (0.302)
Age2 0.008 -0.010 -0.158 -0.008 0.000 -0.072* 0.252* -0.250
(0.009) (0.046) (0.169) (0.529) (0.007) (0.039) (0.142) (0.444)
Age3
-0.004 -0.073 0.043 -0.015* 0.139** -0.250
(0.009) (0.077) (0.396) (0.008) (0.065) (0.332)
Age4 -0.011 0.029 0.024** -0.108
(0.012) (0.132) (0.010) (0.111)
Age5 0.005 -0.016
(0.016) (0.014)
Age1*Treat -0.078*** -0.212*** -0.276*** -0.262* -0.399 0.043*** 0.094*** 0.219*** -0.133 0.045
(0.019) (0.043) (0.082) (0.156) (0.319) (0.016) (0.036) (0.069) (0.131) (0.268)
Age2*Treat 0.030** 0.136** 0.467** 0.487 -0.019* 0.022 -0.104 0.667
(0.013) (0.062) (0.203) (0.590) (0.011) (0.052) (0.170) (0.495)
Age3*Treat -0.016 -0.049 -0.331 0.022** -0.243*** -0.115
(0.013) (0.096) (0.460) (0.011) (0.080) (0.386)
Age4*Treat 0.028* 0.053 -0.005 0.229*
(0.015) (0.160) (0.013) (0.134)
Age5*Treat -0.014 0.003
(0.020) (0.017)
F-test 14.183 4.169 4.129 0.361 3.826 3.766 2.899 2.255
Table A2.5
Coefficients of Polynomials in Age of Youngest Child
Income Support (without a disability premium) Employed
+/- 2 years +/- 2 years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age -0.118 -0.119 -0.150 -0.313 -0.566 0.052 0.037 0.100 -0.010 0.031
(0.319) (0.321) (0.345) (0.453) (0.998) (0.253) (0.255) (0.274) (0.361) (0.797)
Age2 -0.004 -0.034 -0.345 -0.951 -0.006 0.058 -0.150 -0.059
(0.021) (0.128) (0.565) (2.257) (0.017) (0.102) (0.451) (1.803)
Age3 -0.009 -0.216 -0.869 0.019 -0.119 -0.020
(0.038) (0.369) (2.375) (0.030) (0.294) (1.897)
Age4 -0.046 -0.362 -0.031 0.018
(0.082) (1.136) (0.065) (0.907)
Age5 -0.056 0.009
(0.202) (0.161)
Age1*Treat -0.103*** -0.232*** -0.265* -0.281 -0.223 0.055*** 0.130*** -0.020 -0.005 0.044
(0.025) (0.063) (0.142) (0.353) (0.964) (0.020) (0.050) (0.113) (0.281) (0.770)
Age2*Treat 0.077*** 0.195 1.036* 2.459 -0.027 0.044 0.536 0.069
(0.028) (0.155) (0.621) (2.350) (0.023) (0.123) (0.495) (1.877)
Age3*Treat -0.021 -0.252 -0.781 -0.065* -0.162 0.283
(0.047) (0.422) (2.546) (0.037) (0.337) (2.034)
Age4*Treat 0.157 1.160 0.090 -0.275
(0.096) (1.248) (0.077) (0.997)
Age5*Treat -0.082 0.055
(0.227) (0.181)
F-test 13.448 3.108 1.286 1.072 5.369 2.873 1.589 0.473
+/- 1 year +/- 1 year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age -0.467 -0.610 -0.586 -0.808 -0.176 0.048 0.049 -0.174 0.371 -0.133
(0.579) (0.593) (0.885) (1.108) (0.735) (0.484) (0.496) (0.744) (0.930) (0.616)
Age2 -0.115 -0.083 -0.701 0.750 0.007 -0.411 1.077 -0.222
(0.115) (1.228) (2.331) (0.767) (0.097) (1.034) (1.958) (0.644)
Age3 0.016 -0.691 0.174 -0.224 1.475 0.268
(0.655) (2.553) (0.303) (0.551) (2.144) (0.255)
Age4 -0.283 -0.933 0.679 0.545
(1.053) (1.440) (0.885) (1.209)
Age5 -0.613 0.215
(0.899) (0.755)
Age1*Treat -0.185*** -0.169 -0.485 -0.276 -0.871 0.096*** 0.014 0.149 -0.202 0.250
(0.044) (0.160) (0.707) (0.721) (0.679) (0.037) (0.134) (0.596) (0.606) (0.570)
Age2*Treat 0.247* 1.074 1.760 0.000 0.071 0.768 -1.730 0.000
(0.134) (1.281) (3.871) (0.000) (0.113) (1.078) (3.251) (0.000)
Age3*Treat -0.597 0.000 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.000
(0.701) (0.000) (0.000) (0.590) (0.000) (0.000)
Age4*Treat 0.338 0.000 -1.513 0.000
(2.307) (0.000) (1.938) (0.000)
Age5*Treat 1.008 -0.766
(1.945) (1.633)
F-test 7.034 4.535 0.000 0.000 0.673 0.458 0.397 0.000
Notes: The Table displays the coefficients of the age and age*Treat variables in five different specifications with
varied age windows for Income Support and Employment outcomes. Columns (1) to (5) refer to polynomials of degree 1
to 5 respectively. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Source: Quarterly Labour Force
Surveys, Winter 1994 – Autumn 2002 (excluding Winter 1996 – Winter 1997).
3 Disability Benets: A Substitute for Income
Support for Single Mothers with No Quali-
cations in the UK
Abstract
This paper examines the impact of the age-eligibility rule establishing
automatic withdrawal of Income Support for single mothers whose youngest
child turns 16 on the disability benets welfare participation decision of
single mothers with no qualications in the UK. Using the age discontinuity
in Income Support program assignment, the study reveals that these single
mothers are 4.2 percentage points more likely to claim health benets as
their youngest child turns 16, consistent with a theoretical model of benets
choice. More than a quarter of single mothers who were initially on Income
Support apply for sickness and disability benets, out of which 70% claim
non-contributory health benets.
Keywords: Single Mothers, Disability Benets, Regression Discontinuity
JEL code: J12, I38, C21.
3.1 Introduction
The primary focus of this paper is to investigate how single mothers with no qual-
ications respond to benet withdrawals in a variety of ways. In the previous
chapter it was shown that their labour supply increases when they automatically
lose entitlement to Income Support (henceforth, IS), consistent with an income
e¤ect in a simple labour supply model. In this paper the e¤ect of the same benet
withdrawal on Sickness and Disability Benets (henceforth, DB) welfare partici-
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pation is assessed. A theoretical model of the decision to apply for DB is o¤ered
and it demonstrates that, despite the fact that individuals can claim DB prior to
the youngest child turning 16, for a rational agent, this does not have to be the
case. While the model predicts that the likelihood of claiming IS falls, there is an
incentive for mothers to participate in the DB program at the age-16 eligibility
rule. An analysis of the micro data from the Quarterly Labour Force Surveys
yields results that are in line with these predictions. Indeed, more than a quar-
ter of single mothers with no qualications who were initially on Income Support
substitute away from IS into DB when their youngest o¤spring turns 16.
A considerable amount of research has recently been produced on the phenom-
enon of rising sickness and disability benets claims in the UK (Berthoud, 1998;
Beatty et al., 2000; Bell and Smith, 2004; Faggio and Nickell, 2005). The num-
ber of working age individuals claiming incapacity benets (prior to 1995, these
benets were known as invalidity benets) has been following an upward trend
for the last 30 years from less than 1 million in 1975 to 2.7 million in 2008. If
all the benets on the grounds of sickness and disability are added22 the numbers
are even higher (McVicar, 2008). Walker and Howard (2000) cite an overall gure
of 2.88 million people of working age claiming sickness and disability benets in
the UK in 1991. It is argued that this growth can be explained by underlying
changes in health (Bound and Burkhauser, 1999 and Autor and Duggan, 2003 for
the US; Molho, 1991 and Disney and Webb, 1991 for the UK), labour demand
conditions and the characteristics of sickness and disability benets (e.g. in terms
of generosity and screening intensity). Higher DB claims in the UK also lie behind
22These can include Incapacity Benets, Severe Disablement Allowance, Disability Living Al-
lowance, Income Support with a disability premium.
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the growth in inactivity on grounds of ill health and disability (Bell and Smith,
2004; Faggio and Nickell, 2005).
Due in part to the observed rapid growth in caseloads social assistance reforms
have recently been high on the policy agenda in the UK. In 2007, the Work and
Pensions Secretary, John Hutton, raised concern that over one third of lone parents
move on to incapacity benets or income support on grounds of disability within 12
months after their youngest child reaches the age of 16. In particular, this points
to a tendency towards welfare reliance among single parents. Gregg et al. (2006)
show that around 1 in 5 workless lone parents are receiving sickness and disability
benets, with the rest mainly receiving Income Support. The government has now
set a target that by 2015 the number of people who are claiming Incapacity Benet
should be reduced by one million.
The contribution of the paper is three-fold. First, it endeavours to ll in some
gaps in the disability literature in the UK by analyzing labour market and wel-
fare participation responses of women, in this case single mothers. Not only are
quantitative studies on the growth of UK disability benets limited but research
on women in the disability literature is remarkably scarce (McVicar, 2008). Over
the past decades, the growth in UK claims has been considered mainly a male
phenomenon. However, McVicar (2008) reports that since 1995, the growth in
disability claims can largely be attributed to the growing number of applications
from the female population. He states that female invalidity/incapacity claimants
have gone from making up for one fth of the overall total working age claimants
to close to two fths in recent years. The analysis also focuses on single mothers
because, with the exception of the disabled, they are not only the group which
is most reliant on welfare, in terms of both participation rate and spell length
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(Casebourne et al., 2004; Evans et al., 2004) but is also the target of the current
government in reducing their joblessness and poverty (Gregg et al., 2009). Also,
lone-mother families contain a large and growing fraction of poor children (Gregg
et al., 2009). Rising levels of benets use may signal further deterioration in the
socioeconomic prospects of these children.
Second, the paper is novel in that it develops a simple theoretical model of
benets choice to show how mothers respond to IS benet withdrawal in a variety
of ways. The model demonstrates that despite the fact that DB can be claimed
prior to the youngest child turning 16, it is fully rational for an economic agent
to do so at the cut-o¤ age. Indeed, the model predicts that as the youngest child
turns 16, while the probability of IS falls, the propensity toDB participation rises.
The reason for this is simple: when the youngest child turns 16, single mothers
automatically lose their entitlement to IS. Obviously, fewer single mothers will
claim IS. At the same time, their set of opportunities shrink and they readjust
their labour market and welfare participation decisions accordingly. They are
now faced with 3 options: either claim DB or face the stark choice of working
or staying out of work and not claiming any benets (henceforth, no-work-no-
benets). This may push mothers who otherwise would have stayed on IS onto
DB, hence increasing DB claims.
The third contribution is empirical. The predictions of the model are taken to
the data. As in chapter 2, the age-eligibility rule in the IS program is exploited
as a quasi-experiment for assessing the implications of the loss in the entitlement
of IS on health-related benets. The Regression Discontinuity (RD) approach is
used because the age break provides a natural setting for analyzing its impact on
the sickness and disability benets outcome. The RD approach is "fuzzy" in this
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case because the probability of claiming IS is not likely to fall from 1 to 0 at the
age-16 threshold. The probability of claiming IS is not equal to 1 prior to the age-
16 threshold because some mothers may be working more than 16 hours per week
and hence not eligible for IS. At the cuto¤ point, the probability of treatment is
likely to jump by less than 1. This is because while the IS eligibility is mainly
determined by the age-16 cut o¤ rule for lone parents, they can still be eligible for
IS if they fall in other categories (see footnote 1 in Chaper 2). Quasi-experimental
evidence on the substitutability between welfare programs for the UK is lacking
and this paper aims at lling this gap.
It is important to note that checks for no manipulation around the eligibility
threshold were conducted in the previous chapter. There was no evidence of non-
random sorting around the age-16 threshold arising from single mothers keeping
their child in full time education. As such the identication assumption of the RD
design holds for this paper too. Changes in the UK benets system are also not
likely to substantially a¤ect the results in the paper since the age-eligibility in the
policy did not vary discontinuously over time and changes in the entitlement for
other benets (namely housing benets, council tax benets and the UKs welfare
to work program for lone parents, the New Deal) which are also related to the
age-16 eligibility rule do not alter substantially the results. The e¤ect is likely
to be either over (housing and council tax benets) or under (New Deal for Lone
Parents) estimated. Furthermore this study again uses the quarterly Labour Force
Surveys between the period 1994 and 2002. Single mothers with no qualications
are again chosen mainly not only because they are more likely to be reliant on
welfare and jobless but also because of a clear discontinuity in the entitlement to
IS at the age-16 threshold for these mothers.
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The main empirical ndings illustrate that once unobserved di¤erences across
single mothers with no qualications are accounted for, the age-eligibility rule in
the IS program has a signicant positive e¤ect on the probability of claiming DB.
This is consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model of benets choice.
The result is unchanged across a variety of specications and after controlling
for unobserved heterogeneity. This suggests that some mothers choose to stay on
welfare benets rather than to work. According to Evans et al. (2004) self-reported
ill-health worsens single mothersprobability of entering work. Casebourne and
Britton (2004) nd that there are several constraints to work for single mothers
who were on IS. These mothers are more likely to have very limited or no work
history and it is the rst time that they have to seek work. In turn, their duration
of economic inactivity most likely leads to a lack of condence and a greater
apprehension about moving back to work which act as barriers to mothersjoining
the labour market.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section presents an overview
of the sickness and disability benets system in the UK. Section 3.3 presents a
simple theoretical model of welfare program participation. Section 3.4 discusses
the specication and identication strategy followed by a description of the data
in section 3.5. Section 3.6 reports empirical results and provides insights into the
channels behind the substitutability between IS and DB. Finally, section 3.7
concludes.
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3.2 The Sickness and Disability Benets System in the UK
This section provides a brief overview of the health-related benets system in
the UK. A full description can be found in the Welfare Benets and Tax Credits
Handbooks.
The health benets programs cover all participants in the social security sys-
tem. In order to qualify for DB, an individual must be deemed incapable of work
by the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP). According to the Disability
Discrimination Act 1995 an individual is disabled if "he has a physical or mental
impairment which has a substantial and long-term adverse e¤ect on his ability to
carry out normal day-to-day activities" (chapter 50).
There are two main types of DB in the UK: contributory and non-contributory
DB . Contributory DB are paid if national insurance contributions conditions
are met. Eligibility therefore requires a work history. The main contributory
sickness and disability benets is the Incapacity Benet (IB). It is the contributory
earnings replacement benet for those unable to work because of ill health or
disability23. IB is currently paid at one of three at rates depending on the
length of time the individual has been unable to work. The basic long-term rate
of IB, which stood at £ 64.70 per week in 1999, is now £ 84.50 per week. This
amount is topped up by £ 17 if the person is under 35 or £ 8 if he/she is between
35 and 44. Thus, the current basic long-term rate of IB stands at £ 101.50 per
week for someone who is less than 35 years of age. Non-contributory DB are
benets available for those unable to work because of ill health or disability and
who do not meet the contributions based eligibility criteria, e.g. because their
23It replaced Invalidity Benets (IV B) in 1995 and tightened up eligibility criteria, e.g. phasing
out payment to over 65s and tightened the screening (Burchardt, 1999).
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disabilities have prevented them building up su¢ cient work histories. The most
common one is Income Support with a disability premium (henceforth ISDB),
which amounted to £ 71.80 in 1999 and presently is £ 86.35 per week for someone
who is 25 or above24. ISDB is di¤erent from Income Support tout-court whereby
ISDB is payable to people who have a work-limiting illness or disability and it
consists of the basic rate of IS topped up by a disability premium25. Similar to
the IS program, DB claimants are automatically entitled to housing and council
tax benets. It should be noted that DB payments are unambiguously larger than
IS payments. For example, in the simplest situation, while a lone parent who has
a youngest child aged less than 16 automatically receives £ 60.50 per week as IS,
she will get £ 86.35 per week if she is eligible to claim ISDB.
3.2.1 The Application Process
Although it is nancially more advantageous to participate in the DB program,
the procedures to claim these benets may prove to be time consuming. To apply
for DB an individual must submit an application form to the DWP or a Jobcentre
Plus o¢ ce, which is a government agency and is part of the DWP. To claim IB
- in addition to proving his/her incapacity of work - the individual must also
satisfy the national insurance contributions requirement. In addition to lling the
form, the individual may be required to supply documentary proof relevant to
the claim. It is normally required to provide medical evidence of the individuals
24Other non-contributory benets include the Severe Disablement Allowance (SDA) and the
Disability Living Allowance(DLA). Mothers who receive these benets are automatically entitled
to ISDB. In this paper, DB include both contributory and non-contributory benets with the
purpose of having a larger sample.
25Income Support with a disability premium or Income Support on grounds of disability is
used interchangeably in this paper.
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incapacity of work. If this medical information is deemed insu¢ cient, the o¢ ce may
refer the applicant to a medical practitioner, who can be either a Medical Service
doctor contracted by the DWP or any other approved healthcare professional (e.g.
registered nurses, occupational therapists and physiotherapists), for a report and a
medical examination26. The report by the Medical Service is then sent to the DWP
decision-maker. If the DWP decision-maker nds that the applicant is incapable
of work, a disability award is made. In 2005, the approval rate for IB claims was
roughly 65% (DWP, 2009). If the original DB application is denied, an applicant
can appeal against the decision to an appeal tribunal. According to national
statistics, out of 100,000 people who fail the Personal Capacity Assessment each
year, 25,000 people a year successfully appeal against a decision to deny them IB
(BBC Channel News, 2008). This suggests that there might be some ine¢ ciencies
in the current system of assessing claimants.
3.3 Theoretical Framework
Since DB is more generous than IS, one will expect disabled single mothers to
claim DB rather than IS irrespective of the age of their youngest child. As such,
no sudden change in single motherspropensity to participate in DB should be
anticipated when the youngest o¤spring reaches 16. However, a standard economic
model of decision-making can reveal otherwise. In Chapter 2, a labour supply
model was used to explain the labour supply disincentives in-built in the Income
Support program. Here, a simplied version is provided to explain how mothers
26The individuals incapacity of work can be determined by one of two tests: the Own Occu-
pation test (a test conducted when the individual had an occupation at the time that he/she
was deemed incapable of work) or the Personal Capability Assessment (either after 196 days of
incapacity for work or if the Own Occupation test does not apply to the individual).
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react in a variety of ways to benet withdrawals.
Suppose that an economic agent is a single mother with no qualications with
a youngest child aged less than 16. Assume that she maximizes utility by choosing
amongst the mutually exclusive options of working at the expected wage o¤ered
for her characteristics (w) (the choice of being unemployed and working 0 hours is
included in the work option)27. In this case the mother receives JSA. The work
option, accepting either IS transfers or the sickness and disability transfers in lieu
of working (in other terms, she cannot work or claim IS if she applies for DB) or
is not receiving any benets and not working.
Let the utility function depends on consumption (C) and leisure hours per
period (L):
Us = U (Cs; Ls) (3.1)
where fs =work; IS;DB; no   work   no   benefitsg represent the employment
channel, the IS option, theDB transfer option and the no-work-no-benets (hence-
forth nwnb) option respectively. Assume a Cobb-Douglas utility function for each
of the four options as follows:
Us = lnCs +  ln (1 Hs) (3.2)
where C = f (w; V ) : w represents expected wage and V is non-labour income,
which includes, amongst others, IS or DB plus other non-labour income (A). H
denotes the predetermined hours of market work per week (equal to H in the work
option and 0 in the transfer options) and additionally, 0  H  1. Her total time
27The work option will include working 0 hours and claiming JSA from now on.
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endowment, T , is standardized to 1. Her options are fourfold:
Uwork = ln

(w + A)
 
1 H
UIS = ln (IS + A)
UDB = ln
h
(DB + A) (A  F )(1 )
i
; A > F
Unwnb = ln (A) (3.3)
Notice that the "no-work-no-benets" option will not be chosen by the single
mother who has a child less than 16 since she will always be better o¤ claiming IS
rather than not claiming any benets and being out of work, i.e. (UIS > Unwnb)28.
What is crucial to this model of benets choice is that the utility level associated
to DB is not simply a function of the level of the benets. Suppose that DB
applications leads to an uncertain outcome as a percentage of applications gets
rejected (where  represents the probability of a successful application) with a
certain opportunity cost, F (e.g. application and time costs and probably the
opportunity costs arising by proving ones disability status and hence not working).
For instance if a mother strongly expects that her claim will be denied ( is low),
she will be deterred from applying for DB. In this case, her expected benet may
be less than the costs of benet application29.
This model implies that there is a critical value of  which determines the
28Indeed, only 1.4% of mothers are are inactive and not claiming any benets in the sample.
29An alternative interpretation of Equation (3.3) is that mothers can lie on their disability
status. And similar to the classical model of crime (Becker, 1968; Freeman, 1999), they face a
penalty, F , if caught, where  in this case is a probability of apprehension. A third interpretation
is that  is the latent level of disability. The higher is , the larger is the expected benet from
applying for DB. Here, F can be interpreted as the opportunity costs of applying for the benets
(or foregone earnings) assuming that they cannot do anything else.
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mothers decision to claim either IS or DB. The Appendix presents the analytical
derivation of the decisions rules and the critical values of . In fact three regimes
are possible depending on the values of  (low, intermediate and high). These
possibilities are depicted in Figure 1, where age of the youngest child is plotted on
the horizontal axis and market wage (plus non labour income A) on the vertical
axis. A vertical line at age 16 is drawn to clearly indicate the cut-o¤ age for the
automatic loss in IS entitlement. It also provides insights into the labour market
behavior and welfare participation decisions of the economic agent. Indeed, for low
and intermediate values of 

< A1;where A1 =
ln(IS+A) ln(A F )
ln(DB+A) ln(A F )

(see panels a
and b in Figure 3.1), the economic agent chooses either to work or to claim IS
depending on her wage. Instead for high  (> A1) (see panel c of Figure 3.1),
it is rational for the mother to choose between work and claiming DB. In other
terms, the agent considers applying forDB rather than IS because the she believes
that there is a high chance that her application will be accepted. In either case,
local labour market opportunities (w) determines the mothers nal decision about
claiming benets. The lower is w, the less likely that the mother will work and
hence, the more likely that she will take up benets.
Now consider a mother whose youngest child is 16 or older. Obviously, the
mother is not entitled to IS. Her opportunity sets shrinks and she now has only
3 choices: either work or claim DB or in the extreme case, stay out of work and
not claim any benets. Her choice will depend on the probability of a successful
application (which is potentially positively correlated with the latent level of health
status). If  < A2, where A2 =
ln(A) ln(A F )
ln(DB+A) ln(A F ) < A1 (refer to the Appendix for
derivation), which in other terms, implies that the probability that her application
will be not be rejected is low, the mother faces the stark choice of working or
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being inactive. If wages are low, it is more likely that she will be out of the labour
market and not claim any benets and hence, locate in region nwnb. On the
other hand, if  > A2, she has su¢ cient incentives to apply for DB.
What happens when the youngest child turns 16? Panel a of Figure 3.1 shows
that for low  (< A2), i.e. the probability of a successful application is low, a
rational agent who was claiming IS, chooses either to work or be out of work and
without any benets when her youngest child turns 16. If local labour market
conditions are poor, the mother is likely to choose the latter. If  is high (> A1),
the mothers decision will not be a¤ected. A high  reects a high propensity
that the application will be successful and hence, she is bound to be claiming DB
before the youngest child turns 16.
So far, these two regimes represent those applicable to inframarginal mothers,
i.e. mothers whose probability of a successful application is either high or low.
The third and last regime is the case of marginal mothers (Panel b), i.e. those
with intermediate levels of . Panel b in Figure 3.1 shows that a rational agent in
this marginal situation claims IS before her youngest child turns 16 and responds
to incentives attached to the DB program at the cut-o¤ age. Moreover, the model
predicts that the poorer the local labour market conditions, the more incentive
she has to claim DB. When the mother loses IS, her probability of nding a
job is very low not only because she has very limited or no work history but also
because of the larger pool of unemployed individuals30. In this case she is better
o¤ claiming DB rather than staying out of work and not claiming any benets.
In summary, the model demonstrates that the age-16 eligibility break in the
30Adverse local labour market conditions suggest that there may be a large fraction of dis-
couraged and displaced workers (Autor and Duggan, 2003).
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entitlement to IS drives single mothers with no qualications to respond to eco-
nomic incentives. Table 3.1 provides a summary of the the comparative statics of
the model. One prediction of the model (panel a of Figure 3.2), is that there is
a discontinuous negative jump in the proportion of IS claimants as the youngest
child turns 16. As shown in row 3 of Table 3.1, the probability of employment
unequivocally rises for the single mothers with no qualications at the cut-o¤ age,
a nding which has already been conrmed by the empirical analysis in the previ-
ous chapter. Another prediction of the model is that a proportion of mothers who
were initially on IS is likely to transit to sickness and disability benets (panel b
of Figure 3.2). This e¤ect of IS withdrawal on DB claims is among mothers whose
probability of a successful application for DB is neither high nor low. Finally, the
model predicts that mothers whose probability of a successful application is low
are more likely to stay out of work and not claim any benets when their youngest
child reaches 16.
3.4 Specication and Identication
The main goal of this paper is to take the predictions of the theoretical model
to the data in order to empirically identify the responsiveness of single mothers
with no qualications to economic incentives at the age-eligibility rule in the IS
program. Similar to the previous chapter, a xed e¤ects model is used to purge
the results from the e¤ect of unobserved di¤erences across mothers. In practice
the following model is estimated using the "Fuzzy" Regression Discontinuity (RD)
approach, which is in line with Equation (2.3) in chapter 2:
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Yiat = 0 + 1Treatiat +  (a) + 2 [Treatiat   (a)] +mi + "iat (3.4)
where Yiat is the probability that single mother i, whose youngest child is aged a,
claims DB at time t. As in the previous chapter, Treat is a treatment dummy
which equals 1 if the age of the youngest child  16 and equals 0 if the youngest
child is aged <16.  (a) is a smooth, continuous function in the age of the youngest
child (also called the running variable) and is approximated by a number of poly-
nomials (up to degree 4). mi is mother xed e¤ects and "iat is an error term which
captures unmeasured factors. The coe¢ cient of interest is 1, the xed e¤ects
RD estimate. The identifying assumption underlying the consistency of this esti-
mate (Lee, 2008; McCrary, 2008) is that, as in Chapter 2, the dependent variable
is continuous in the age of the youngest child around the age-16 threshold other
than at treatment, i.e. for the rule governing the automatic loss of entitlement to
IS (Hahn et al., 2002). In this way, single mothers with no qualications do not
manipulate the running variable. Most notably, the causal e¤ect of the policy can
be identied when single mothers with similarly aged children are also similar in
other observable and unobservable dimensions both to the left and to the right
of the discontinuity. 1 captures the change in the outcome variable at the age-
eligibility threshold and according to the predictions of the theoretical model, it is
expected to be positive for DB, work and no-work-no-benets outcome variables,
with the reverse being true for IS.
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3.5 Data
For the purpose of this analysis, the same longitudinal datasets as in chapter 2, are
used, i.e. the QLFS from 1994 to 2002. In addition to information on claims for
IS and other passport benets (i.e. Housing Benet, Council Tax Benets etc.),
the survey collects information on contributory and non-contributory disability
benets. Hence DB includes both benets with the purpose of having a larger
sample. No-work-no-benets is equal to 1 if the mother is out of the labour market
and does not claim any benets and 0 otherwise. As in chapter 2, the sample
includes mothers who are single in the rst period they appear in the survey and
who have no qualications31. Overall there are 25,148 observations. Table 3.2
reports descriptive statistics on all single mothers who have no qualications and
those who are disabled. Roughly 23% of the sample of mothers claim to su¤er from
a work-limiting disability, out of which 80% are inactive. On average, mothers are
in their late thirties. Half of all mothers with no qualications claim IS and about
only 11% claim sickness and disability benets, out of which about 4% claim IB
and 4.3% claim Income Support with a disability premium. Only about 1.4% of
the mothers are o¤-benets and out of work and mothers whose youngest child is
less than 16 accounts to only 0.7%.
31As noted in Chapter 2, Regression (3.4) was run seperately using the total sample of single
mothers, a sample of single mothers who were graduates (8%), who had an intermediate level of
education (29%), who had a low level of education (33%) and nally who had no qualications
(30%). A discontinuity at the age-16 threshold on the probability of claiming IS was clear for
single mothers with no qualications, hence the selection. Also, these mothers are more likely to
be welfare reliant, jobless and poor.
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3.6 Empirical Results
This section provides both graphs and regression estimates for the e¤ects of the
age-policy rule in IS on the probability of claiming sickness and disability benets.
In chapter 2, it was reported that, as the youngest child turns 16 and mothers
automatically lose IS, the probability of claiming IS drops sharply. Mothers
substitute away from IS and into either work or job search. In this paper, the
focal point is to see whether the predictions of the theoretical model of benets
choice in section 3.3 hold.
3.6.1 Causal E¤ect on Sickness and Disability Benets
Figure 3.3 plots the actual and predicted proportions of single mothers with no
qualications on DB as a function of the age of their youngest child. While there
appears to be a slight rise in the probability of claiming DB before the cut-o¤
point, there is a clear positive jump at the age-eligibility break, after which the
probability increases monotonically at a faster rate. Mothers whose youngest child
is less than 16 are less likely to have acute health problems. However their disability
or health status deteriorates as the child becomes older, hence a higher propensity
to claim health benets. The observed jump conforms to the intuition behind the
model, whereby a proportion of mothers decide to transit onto DB in lieu of work
at the age-eligibility threshold. To formalize the evidence in Figure 3.3, the xed
e¤ects model in Equation (3.4) is estimated with  (a) being modeled as a linear
parametric polynomial whose shape and intercept are allowed to vary on either
side of the discontinuity point. Standard errors are clustered by the age of the
youngest child. Table 3.3 presents initial estimates of Equation (3.4).
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Column (1) - row (1) of the top panel of Table 3.3 reports a 3.8 percentage
points increase at the cut-o¤ point and indicates a strong link between the age-
eligibility rule and growth in the proportion of DB claimants. As a robustness
check, rows (2) to (4) present the xed e¤ects estimates for the models using higher-
order polynomials of  (a). Estimates are precisely estimated and range between 3
and 4 percentage points. Essentially, as the youngest child turns 16 and mothers
lose their entitlement to IS, roughly 25.5% of mothers with no qualications who
leave IS move onto DB compared to about 20% who increase their labour supply.
Interestingly, column (1) of Table 3.4 presents the xed e¤ects RD estimates
for the probability of claiming ISDB, which range between 2-3 percentage points.
Recall that DB include non-contributory benets, ISDB. This shows that the
increase in the probability of claiming DB is largely due to the increase in claiming
income support with a disability premium. In fact, out of the pool of single mothers
with no qualications who lose IS and who move on to DB, about 70% of mothers
transit on ISDB. This suggests that single mothers with no qualications who
switch from IS into DB are those mothers who may not have worked at all.
As a next step, additional covariates are included in Equation (3.4) to check the
sensitivity of the estimates. According to the disability literature, mainly in the
US, disability benets applications are correlated with labour market conditions
(Black et al., 2002). For example, Autor and Duggan (2003) demonstrate that
between 1984 and 1998 during a period of deteriorating labour market conditions
in the US, disability benets applications increased. They claim that this pattern
became apparent because a growing fraction of discouraged and displaced workers
claimed disability benets. Based on the UK disability literature, the ndings on
the positive link are mixed. Faggio and Nickell (2005) and Molho (1991) nd that
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the local unemployment rate does not have a signicant e¤ect on disability rolls.
On the other hand, Disney and Webb (1991) nd the probability of health ben-
ets receipt to be signicantly related to local unemployment rates only in 2 out
of 3 years under investigation. In an attempt to examine this e¤ect, local labour
market conditions is included in the regression model as a covariate32. Column
(2) of Table 3.3 displays analogous xed e¤ects RD estimates for the DB program
participation, after controlling for the state of the local labour market. It reports
point estimates for the 4 specications, after controlling for local labour market
conditions and additive region e¤ects and time e¤ects. While time dummies are
used to pick up the e¤ect of business cycles common to the regions, region dum-
mies are included in the estimation equations to capture time invariant regional
variations in earnings or employment prospects. Results from Table 3.3 indicate
that local labour market conditions do not appear to have an impact on the growth
in the disability benets claims when the youngest child turns 16. Perhaps this
is not surprising as more than 60% of single mothers with no qualications are
already inactive before their youngest child reaches 16. The xed e¤ect estimate
of the Treat variable remains precise and statistically signicant, its magnitude is
not di¤erent from the previous specication.
In the event that local labour market conditions might be correlated with other
unobserved covariates, the above regression model may not absorb all the e¤ects.
For instance, in regions where labour market conditions are poorer, it could be
that the application process is more stringent and application acceptance rates are
lower, leading to an underestimation of the e¤ect of the age rule on the outcome
32Local labour market conditions is measured by a standardized local unemployment rate 
URrt   URt

, where r includes 12 regions and t refers to the month and year of interview.
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variable. In order to purge the estimate from this potential bias, Equation (3.4)
is estimated by including the interaction of region and time xed e¤ects. These
account for any variation in the local labour market conditions over time. Column
(3) in Table 3.3 reports the xed e¤ects RD estimates. They are signicant and
slightly higher than the ones in column (1): as the youngest child turns 16, the
proportion of mothers who enter DB welfare programs increases by 4.2 percentage
points. In this case, about 28.2% of mothers, who initially claimed IS, apply for
DB.
3.6.2 Causal E¤ect on Being O¤Benets and Out of Work
Having ascertained that mothers substitute away from IS and into DB welfare
programs when their youngest child turns 16, a nding which is consistent with
the theoretical model in section 4, this section examines the e¤ect on the propor-
tion who are out of work and o¤ benets. The relationship is depicted in Figure
3.4. Interestingly, at the age of 16, the probability of no-work-no-benets jumps
from near 0 to around 1 percentage point, after which it rises. This is consistent
with the predictions of the theoretical model. Table 3.5 reports the magnitude
of the discontinuous jump, which is estimated to be about 1.6 percentage points.
The estimate is statistically signicant at the 5% level. Yet again, labour market
conditions do not appear to have an impact on this outcome variable as displayed
in column (2) of Table 3.5. Similarly, the xed e¤ects RD estimate is positive and
statistically signicant when local labour market conditions and additive regions
and time xed e¤ects are controlled for. Out of total number of the single mothers
with no qualications who automatically lose IS when their youngest child turns
16, 8.7% of them are out of work and do not receive any benets. Intuitively
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these mothers, who eventually have no source of income at the age-16 threshold,
may either have moved in full-time education or could have married. However
this line of argument is unlikely to hold because no discontinuity was apparent in
both cases. As such it appears that single mothers with no qualications become
dependent on the other members of the household.
At this stage, it is important to recall that checks for no manipulation around
the eligibility threshold were conducted in the previous chapter. There was no
evidence of excess bunching of single mothers below the threshold (DiNardo and
Lee, 2004; McCrary, 2008) to those just ineligible. In other terms there was no
evidence of non-random sorting around the age-16 threshold arising from single
mothers keeping their child in full time education to get child benets or tax
credits. Manipulation of the running variable does not appear to be responsible
for the e¤ects of the IS benet withdrawal onDB claims and reported xed e¤ects
RD estimates are consistent.
3.6.3 Discussion and Interpretation
In this section, an interpretation of the ndings in the context of the theoretical
model of benets choice is given in order to assess the magnitude of mothersDB
welfare participation responses. The empirical estimates in the previous section
show that the age-eligibility rule has a positive e¤ect on the probability of claiming
DB, as predicted by the model. Not only do a proportion of single mothers with
no qualications who initially was IS join the labour market (20%) as their IS
entitlement ceases, but another 25.5% out of those who leave IS respond to other
economic incentives related to sickness and disability benets. This is in line with
previous research, which shows that people who have non-employment spells are
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more likely to stay on welfare (Evans et al., 2004). The fact that the increase in
DB applications as the youngest child turns 16 is almost entirely explained by the
increase in the probability of claiming ISDB, which is a non-contributory benet,
also suggests that mothers who have no work history are more likely to transit
from one welfare benet on another (Shaw et al., 1996).
One potential explanation for why single mothers with no qualications do not
claim DB before the youngest child turns 16 is related to imperfect about their
own disability status or their eligibility for DB. As mothersentitlement for IS
ceases these mothers get re-evaluated by the DWP. In this process they might be-
come aware that their health status is su¢ ciently poor for them to become eligible
for DB and may therefore apply for these benets. The incentives of the DWP
bureaucrats also might give reason of such discontinuous entitlement. Based on
anecdotal evidence in the 1980s in the UK, individuals who lost their jobs were
advised by the Employment Service to claim invalidity benets (National Audit
O¢ ce, 1989). Beatty et al. (2000) and Webster (2002) suggest that during peri-
ods of high unemployment, the employment services may have purposely directed
individuals of the long-term unemployed with health problems or disabilities o¤
unemployment benets and onto health benets. Also, in the early 1990s, doctors
were inuenced by their assessment of the probability of their patients nding a
job (Ritchie et al., 1993) such that people who had di¢ culties in nding a job were
identied as being sick or disabled. This suggests that the DWP bureaucrats were
either to some extent altruistic towards or sluggish in assessing DB claimants.
Based on the above discussion, further empirical analysis was carried out which
shows that the proportion of single mothers with no qualications who self-identify
as disabled rises discontinuously at the age-16 threshold. The proportion of self-
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reported disabled mothers by the age of the youngest child is shown in Figure 3.5.
There is a clear jump at the age-16 eligibility break. Table 3.6 presents estimates of
Equation (3.4) where the outcome variable is the proportion of mothers who self-
identify as disabled. Interestingly, as the child turns 16, there is a 7-8 percentage
points increase in the proportion of disabled population and the estimate is very
precise and highly signicant.
A potential concern arise from the fact that health and/or disability status
is self reported. Individuals are asked whether they have a work-limiting health
problem or disability33. In this way individuals may exaggerate their impair-
ments to justify their benets claims or labour market non-participation status
(Bound and Burkhauser, 1999). There is substantial controversy over the use of
self-reported health and disability indicators as explanatory variables in economic
models. Several studies provide evidence that self-reported health and disability
measures are biased and endogenous. The most commonly suggested explanation
for these ndings is that some survey respondents may inate the incidence and
severity of health problems and disabilities in order to rationalize their labour
force non-participation and receipt of disability benets. However, these "sub-
jective" self-assessed measures have been found to be powerful predictors for a
range of outcomes and behaviors, namely for labour supply decisions (Dwyer and
Mitchell, 1999) and for individualsdecisions to apply for disability insurance ben-
ets (Benitez-Silva et al., 1999). Bound and Burkhauser (1999) conclude "measur-
ing disability based on relatively simple self-report, while not perfect, identies,
33The questions posed in the Labour Force Survey are "Do you have any health problems or
disabilities that you expect will last for more than a year? 1 yes, 2 no" and "Does this health
problem a¤ect the kind of paid work that you might do? 1 yes, 2 no". If the individual answers
"yes" to both questions, he/she is assigned a value 1 for having a work-limiting health problem
or disability.
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both in the cross section and dynamically, populations with substantial di¤erence
in health status and functional limitations".
To sum up, single mothers with no qualications who automatically lose their
IS entitlement rely on DB benets when their youngest child turns 16 in line
with the predictions of the theoretical model of benets choice. Living on ben-
ets accentuates poverty and makes it harder to nd work, as claimants become
accustomed to the state providing for them. According to the model, the move
o¤ IS and on DB is fully rational. This can be explained by either a mechanical
or behavioural e¤ect. Because these justications are hard to disentangle, the RD
estimates represent net e¤ects.
3.6.4 Robustness Checks
A Variety of Specications Rows (2) to (4) of Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 re-
port tests of robustness of the estimated impact of IS withdrawal to a variety of
specications and present the xed e¤ects RD estimates for polynomial specica-
tions of degrees 2 to 4 respectively. In practically all cases the estimates are not
substantially di¤erent, have the same sign and are statistically signicant.
Narrowing Age Window As in chapter 2, an additional check for the ro-
bustness of the results consists in estimating the model in Equation (3.4) for an
increasingly narrow age window around the discontinuity point using a polynomial
of up to degree 234. The age windows considered are four years above and below
the discontinuity point, narrowing them down to 1 year above and below the cut-
o¤ point. Table 3.7 reports that the xed e¤ects RD estimates are statistically
34Recall that in chapter it was shown that the t of the model (F-test) and the signicance of
the interaction terms suggested the use of a linear and quadratic specication.
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signicant for all age windows in the case of a linear specication and "+/-3 years
or more" age windows for the quadratic polynomial for sickness and disability
benets. Reassuringly the signs are also as expected. RD estimates for no-work-
no-benets option are not statistically signicant under both specications and
across the four age windows. This may be driven by high standard errors, in turn
due to the small sample sizes as the age window is narrowed.
3.7 Summary and Conclusions
This study provides some insights into the labour market and welfare partici-
pation decisions of single mothers with no qualications in the UK based on the
age-eligibility rule in the IS program. A simple theoretical model of benets choice
is o¤ered to show that it is fully rational for individuals to respond to economic
incentives upon benet withdrawal. Consistent with the predictions of the eco-
nomic theory, a small percentage, about 8.7% of mothers who automatically leave
IS move out of work and do not claim any benets. While the previous chapter
revealed that a portion of single mothers with no qualications either work or
engage in job search at the age-16 threshold, this paper provides complementary
evidence that poorly educated single mothers, in the margin of claiming either
IS or DB, positively respond to sickness and disability benets programs partic-
ipation following the loss in IS entitlement. In line with the predictions of the
model, the empirical estimates show a strong and discernible increase of about 4.2
percentage points in the probability of claiming sickness and disability benets at
the age-16 threshold, mainly driven by an increase in the probability of claiming
income support with a disability premium. This suggests that single mothers with
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no qualications who claim sickness and disability benets are more likely to have
no work history.
In turn, the fact that mothers do not claim DB prior to their youngest child
turning 16 is puzzling becauseDB payments are unequivocally larger than IS pay-
ments (Casebourne and Britton, 2004). However, the theoretical model not only
shows that this is fully rational but it also provides insights about the transitional
behavior of mother from IS to DB at the age-16 breaking point. In fact, about
25% of single mothers who were initially on IS switch into DB compared to 20%
who choose to enter the labour market. Also, single mothers with no qualications
are 7-8 percentage points more likely to self-identify as disabled as their youngest
child turns 16. This can be due to either a mechanical or a behavioural e¤ect. On
the one hand, single mothers with no qualications have a higher propensity to
claimDB as their youngest child turns 16 because they mechanically become more
aware of their own disability status (which then translates into a lower probability
of a successful application). On the other hand, with an exogenous fall in their
resources, they have no other choice but to apply for the health benets by lying
on their health status35.
The rapid growth in the number of UK sickness and disability benets claimants
over the last 30 years is clearly a matter of concern for policy makers, e.g. in terms
of the capacity of labour markets, costs to tax payers, the risks of poverty, social
exclusion and welfare reliance. By 2015, the government aims to reduce by one
million the 2.7 million people who are presently claiming Incapacity Benet on the
basis that they are too ill or disabled to work. Switching between welfare programs
35Another reason can be due to stigma costs (i.e. from the disutility arising from participation
in the welfare program) attached to claiming benets (Mo¢ tt, 1983; Blundell et al., 1988).
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can lower the chance of these mothers coming o¤ out-of-work benets. Mothers
who have been a long time on welfare may face a lot of problems when the benets
are withdrawn. Financial di¢ culties (includes payment of rent, mortgage, debts,
living expenses), job or work-related problems (lack of experience and condence,
the job not lasting or not being the sort of work the mothers want) and over
bureaucratic procedures (the time needed to receive in-work benets) may have
an impact on the decision of mothers to make a claim for other out-of-work benets
(e.g. DB) the rst time they are required to work. Overall, this may have the e¤ect
of increasing expenditure on welfare programs and even potentially decreasing
human capital investment.
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Figure 3.1
A Simple Model of Sickness and Disability Benefits Choice
Panel a:low Panel b:intermediate Panel c: high
Notes: The Figure reports the decision of a representative poorly educated single mother
between working at the wage offered for her characteristics (w) (including the option of
being unemployed, working 0 hours per week and claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA)) or
accepting either income support transfers (IS) or sickness and disability transfers (DB) in
lieu of working as their youngest child turns 16. The labour market and welfare
participation decisions depend on Φ. While panel a represents mothers with low Φ and has
either the option to work or be out of work and benefits (nwnb) as IS entitlement ceases,
panel c corresponds to mothers who are too sick or disabled and are most likely to be
claiming DB even before their youngest child turns 16 (high Φ). Panel c relates to mothers
who are neither too healthy to work nor too sick or disabled (intermediate Φ) to have
claimed DB earlier.
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Figure 3.2
Predictions of the Model When The Youngest Child Turns 16
% %
Notes: The Figure reports the predictions of the model. Panel a displays a fall
in the probability of claiming IS at the age-16 cut-off point and panel b shows
a discontinuous jump in the probability of participating in the DB program as
the youngest child turns 16.
0 16 0 16
Age of Youngest Child Age of Youngest Child
Panel a: Probability Claiming IS Panel b: Probability Claiming DB
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Figure 3.3
Proportion Claiming Health-Related Benefits
by Age of Youngest Child
Notes: The Figure reports the proportion of single mothers with no
qualifications who claim health-related benefits by the age of their youngest
child. A quadratic fit is superimposed to the actual data.
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Figure 3.4
Proportion Off Benefits and Out of Work
by Age of Youngest Child
Notes: The Figure reports the proportion of single mothers with no
qualifications who are not claiming any benefits and who are out of work by
the age of their youngest child. A quadratic fit is superimposed to the actual
data.
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Figure 3.5
Proportion of Single Mothers with a Disability
by Age of Youngest Child
Notes: The Figure reports the proportion of single mothers with no
qualifications who self-report as suffering from work limiting health problem
or disability by the age of the youngest child between the age of 1 and 20. A
cubic fit is superimposed to the actual data.
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Table 3.1
Comparative Statics When The Youngest Child Turns 16
Effect On Low Φ Intermediate Φ High Φ Overall
effect
P(claim DB) - -
P(claim IS) -
P(work) -
P(no-work-no-benefits) - -
Notes: The Table displays the effect of the age-eligibility rule in Income Support
program on poorly educated single mothers’ probability of claiming sickness and
disability benefits (DB), the probability of claiming Income Support (IS), the
probability of work) and the probability of being out of work and without benefits
(no-work-no-benefits) as shown in Figure 3.1. For instance, row (1) reports the
separate effect on the probability of claiming sickness and disability benefits
when the youngest child turns 16 given different levels of Φ. The last column adds
up the three effects to give the overall effect. Rows (2) to (4) are read
similarly.
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Table 3.2
Descriptive Statistics
Mothers Youngest
Variables All Child<16
1. Age of Mother 36 35
(9.407) (8.631)
2. Work-Limiting Disability 0.232 0.211
(1 = yes ; 0 = no) (0.003) (0.003)
3. Inactivity 0.619 0.635
(0.003) (0.003)
Off Benefits 0.014 0.008
(0.001) (0.001)
4. Income Support Benefits 0.504 0.550
(0.003) (0.003)
5. Sickness & Disability Benefits 0.111 0.092
(0.002) (0.002)
Contributory: 0.036 0.028
Incapacity Benefits (0.001) (0.001)
Non-Contributory:
Income Support with Disability Premium 0.043 0.029
(0.001) (0.001)
Disability Living Allowance 0.039 0.037
(0.001) (0.001)
Severe Disability Allowance 0.011 0.009
(0.001) (0.001)
Observations 25428 22209
Notes: The Table displays summary statistics on poorly educated single
mothers. Column (2) reports statistics on all mothers and mothers whose
youngest child is less than 16. Source: Quarterly Labour Force Surveys,
Winter 1994 - Autumn 2002 (excluding Winter 1996 - Winter 1997).
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Table 3.3
Fixed Effects Regression Discontinuity Estimates
Sickness and Disability Benefits
(1) (2) (3)
Linear 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.042***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
Quadratic 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.034***
(0.006) (0.010) (0.011)
Cubic 0.023*** 0.023** 0.028**
(0.006) (0.011) (0.011)
Quartic 0.026*** 0.026** 0.031**
(0.007) (0.012) (0.012)
Region Effects No Yes Yes
Time Effects No Yes Yes
(URrt-URr) No Yes No
Region-Time Effects No No Yes
N 25428 25428 25428
Notes: The Table displays the fixed RD estimates of the impact of the
youngest child turning 16 on sickness and disability benefits (both
contributory and non-contributory) outcomes. Rows (1) to (4) refer to
polynomials of degree 1 to 4 respectively. Columns (1) to (3) refer to three
different specifications. Specification 1 includes controls for the age of
the youngest child. Specification 2 includes controls for the age of the
youngest child, time fixed effects, region fixed effects and local labour
market conditions. Specification 3 includes controls for the age of the
youngest child, additive region and time fixed effects. The sample includes
single mothers with no qualifications who are reported to be single mothers
in the first period they appear in the survey. The age of the youngest child
is between 1 and 20 years. Standard errors in brackets are clustered by the
age of the youngest child. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%
respectively. Source: Quarterly Labour Force Surveys, Winter 1994 - Autumn
2002 (excluding Winter 1996 - Winter 1997).
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Table 3.4
Fixed Effects Regression Discontinuity Estimates
Income Support with a Disability Premium
(1) (2) (3)
Linear 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.028***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Quadratic 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.030***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Cubic 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.026***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Quartic 0.021** 0.021** 0.020**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Region Effects No Yes Yes
Time Effects No Yes Yes
(URrt-URr) No Yes No
Region-Time Effects No No Yes
N 25428 25428 25428
Notes: The Table displays the fixed RD estimates of the impact of the youngest
child turning 16 on the Income Support with a Disability Premium (non-
contributory health benefits) outcome. Rows (1) to (4) refer to polynomials of
degree 1 to 4 respectively. Columns (1) to (3) refer to three different
specifications. Specification 1 includes controls for the age of the youngest
child. Specification 2 includes controls for the age of the youngest child,
time fixed effects, region fixed effects and local labour market conditions.
Specification 3 includes controls for the age of the youngest child, additive
region and time fixed effects. The sample includes single mothers with no
qualifications who are reported to be single mothers in the first period they
appear in the survey. The age of the youngest child is between 1 and 20 years.
Standard errors in brackets are clustered by the age of the youngest child.
***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Source:
Quarterly Labour Force Surveys, Winter 1994 - Autumn 2002 (excluding Winter
1996 - Winter 1997).
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Table 3.5
Fixed Effects Regression Discontinuity Estimates
Out of Work and Benefits
(1) (2) (3)
Linear 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.013**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Quadratic 0.011* 0.011* 0.010*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Cubic 0.012* 0.013** 0.011*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Quartic 0.012* 0.013* 0.012*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Region Effects No Yes Yes
Time Effects No Yes Yes
(URrt-URr) No Yes No
Region-Time Effects No No Yes
N 25206 25206 25206
Notes: The Table displays the fixed RD estimates of the impact of the youngest
child turning 16 on no-work-no-benefits outcome. Rows (1) to (4) refer to
polynomials of degree 1 to 4 respectively. Columns (1) to (3) refer to three
different specifications. Specification 1 includes controls for the age of the
youngest child. Specification 2 includes controls for the age of the youngest
child, time fixed effects, region fixed effects and local labour market
conditions. Specification 3 includes controls for the age of the youngest
child, additive region and time fixed effects. The sample includes single
mothers with no qualifications who are reported to be single mothers in the
first period they appear in the survey. The age of the youngest child is
between 1 and 20 years. Standard errors in brackets are clustered by the age
of the youngest child. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%
respectively. Source: Quarterly Labour Force Surveys, Winter 1994 - Autumn
2002 (excluding Winter 1996 - Winter 1997).
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Table 3.6
Change in Proportion of Disabled Population
(1) (2) (3) (4) N
Treat 0.020* 0.016 0.079*** 0.067*** 25131
(0.011) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016)
R2 0.031 0.031 0.033 0.033
Notes: The Table displays RD estimates of the proportion of poorly educated
single mothers who claim to have a work-limiting health problem or disability.
Columns (1) to (4) refer to polynomials of degree 1 to 4 respectively. The
specification includes controls for the age of the youngest child, additive
region and time fixed effects. The sample includes single mothers with no
qualifications who are reported to be single mothers in the first period they
appear in the survey. The age of the youngest child is between 1 and 20 years.
Standard errors in brackets are clustered by the age of the youngest child. ***,
**, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Source: Quarterly
Labour Force Surveys, Winter 1994 - Autumn 2002 (excluding Winter 1996 - Winter
1997).
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Table 3.7
Fixed Effects Regression Discontinuity Estimates
with Different Age Windows
Age Window Width      (1)        (2) N
Health-Related Benfefits
+/-
4 years 0.032*** 0.025* 7492
(0.012) (0.013)
3 years 0.030** 0.017 5793
(0.012) (0.015)
2 years 0.026** 0.008 4038
(0.013) (0.017)
1 year 0.026** 0.008 2199
(0.013) (0.017)
IS with Disability Premium only
+/-
4 years 0.024** 0.025** 7492
(0.010) (0.012)
3 years 0.023** 0.024* 5793
(0.011) (0.013)
2 years 0.026** 0.021 4038
(0.011) (0.015)
1 year 0.031** 0.018 2199
(0.013) (0.017)
No Work No Benefits
+/-
4 years 0.010 0.010 7492
(0.009) (0.010)
3 years 0.012 0.016 5793
(0.009) (0.011)
2 years 0.014 0.019 4038
(0.010) (0.014)
1 year 0.017 0.015 2199
(0.013) (0.024)
Notes: The Table displays the fixed effects RD estimates of the impact of
the youngest child turning 16 for different age windows. Columns (1) and
(2) refer to polynomials of degree 1 and 2 respectively. The specification
includes controls for the age of the youngest child, additive region and
time fixed effects. The sample includes single mothers with no
qualifications who are reported to be single mothers in the first period
they appear in the survey. The age of the youngest child is between 1 and
20 years. Standard errors in brackets are clustered by the age of the
youngest child. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%
respectively. Source: Quarterly Labour Force Surveys, Winter 1994 - Autumn
2002 (excluding Winter 1996 - Winter 1997).
3.9 Appendix
Utility function of the single mother:
U = lnCk (1)
where C is consumption and k = (1 H) < 1.
Utility from Work option (including being unemployed and claiming JSA):
Uwork = ln (w + A) + ln k (2)
Utility from IS option:
UIS = ln (IS + A) (3)
Utility from DB option:
UDB = ln
h
(DB + A) (A  F )1 
i
= ln k1 (4)
where k1 = (DB + A)
 (A  F )1  ; 0 <   1 and A > F .
Utility from Not Claiming Benets and Not in Work (nwnb) option:
Unwnb = ln (A) (5)
Note that DB > IS. Under the assumption that there are no intrinsic costs
to applying for income support, the single mother will not consider the "no-work-
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no-benets" option (i.e. UIS is strictly greater that Unwnb)36.
Decision of mother before the youngest child turns 16:
 She works if
either Uwork > UIS
) ln (w + A) + ln k > ln (IS + A)
) w + A > (IS+A)
k
or Uwork > UDB
) ln (w + A) + ln k > ln k1
) (w + A) > k1
k
 She claims income support if
either UIS > Uwork
) w + A < (IS+A)
k
) (IS + A) > k1
or UIS > UDB
) ln (IS + A) >  ln (DB + A) + (1  ) ln (A  F )
) ln (IS + A) > ln (A  F ) +  [ln (DB + A)  ln (A  F )]
)  < ln(IS+A) ln(A F )
ln(DB+A) ln(A F )  A1
where 0 < A1 < 1 since 0 < IS < DB.
 She claims sickness and disability benets if
either UDB > Uwork
36UIS > Unwnb )  ln (IS +A) >  ln (A) and hence IS > 0.
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) (w + A) > k1
k
or UDB > UIS
)  > A1
Decision of mother when the youngest child turns 16:
Under this circumstance, the mother has the options of either working or claim-
ing sickness and disability benets or in the worst case scenario, being o¤ welfare
and out of work:
 She works if
either Uwork > UDB
) ln (w + A) + ln k > ln k1
) w + A > k1
k
or Uwork > Unwnb
) ln (w + A) + ln k > lnA
) w + A > A
k
 She claims DB if
either UDB > Uwork
) w + A < k1
k
or UDB > Unwnb
)  ln (DB + A) + (1  ) ln (A  F ) > lnA
) ln (A  F ) +  [ln (DB + A)  ln (A  F )] > lnA
)  > ln(A) ln(A F )
ln(DB+A) ln(A F )  A2
where 0 < A2 < A1 < 1.
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 She is out of work and o¤ benets (i.e. no-work-no-benets) if
either Unwnb > Uwork
) w + A < A
k
or Unwnb > UDB
)  < A2
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4 A Semiparametric Analysis of the Rising Bread-
winner Role of Women in the UK
Abstract
This paper describes the changes in the relative position of women in the
family - as measured by their share of household labour income - in the UK
between 1994 and 2004. Using a methodology that borrows from DiNardo,
Fortin and Lemieux (1996), it assesses the contribution of changes in mens
and womens characteristics, the market returns to these characteristics and
the role of assortative mating. The main factor which accounts for the
increase in the relative female earnings share is the rising female labour
force participation across the whole distribution of the female breadwinner
index. Changes in assortative mating have a modest positive impact on the
index at the mean, 25th and 75th percentiles of the distribution. This is
explained by increasing positive assortative mating between 1994 and 2004.
Keywords: Female Earnings Share, Female Labour Force Participation,
Assortative Mating, Semiparametric Approach
JEL code: C14, J12, J21, J31.
4.1 Introduction
This paper updates the trends in the intra-household earnings share of men and
women between 1994 and 2004 in the UK. The paper moves on to examining four
factors which account for the changes. Based on simple economic reasoning, the
factors include the returns to the male and female characteristics, assortative mat-
ing patterns and female characteristics. For this, the semiparametric approach
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à-la-DiNardo-Fortin-Lemieux is applied to quantify the impact of these four ex-
planatory factors on the relative position of women within families.
The place of women in the UK and worldwide has changed dramatically over
the past 50 years. Due to legal, technological and cultural changes, women today
make their choices (for instance, family and labour market) from a larger set of
options and in a variety of patterns di¤erent from their predecessors. The majority
of women, in the rst half of the 20th century, would marry, have children and
stay at home to care for the children. However, nowadays, women may still marry,
have children but work even when their children are young. Married women are
increasingly likely to work and the increase in their labour force participation
rates have been the main factor behind the overall rise in female labour force
participation during the twentieth century. According to Gregg et al. (2007,
2009), the employment rate of married women increased by 15 percentage points
since 1983 to 69%. Harkness (2003) reports a rise from 49% in the 1970s to about
72% in 2002 among both married and cohabiting women. Their contribution in
monetary terms within the family also increased. Despite the fact that women
are now almost as likely as men to work in the labour market, they still bear the
majority of responsibility for household-related activities, including childcare and
housework (Blau et al., 2006).
The type of families where the man works and the woman stays at home is
known as the male breadwinner family. This intra-household behavior can be
explained by the theory of marriage, developed by Becker (1973, 1974, 1981 and
1985). When one partner has a comparative advantage in market work relative to
home production, a couple can produce more total output by forming a household
and engaging in specialization and exchange. Typically, it is the husband who has
134
the comparative advantage in the labour market. More time will be allocated to
the market sector by the man if the wage rate of the man is higher relative to
the womans. However, as womens returns to characteristics have risen and the
cost of market substitutes for home produced goods and services has fallen due
to technological advancements - increasing their incentives to participate - women
have growingly brought earnings in the family, thereby weakening the traditional
male breadwinner model. The rising labour force participation of women and
falling participation rate of men over time are likely to lead to increasing the
female earnings share within couples. Machin and Waldfogel (1994) show that,
as of 1991, in the UK there were almost three times more families where both
partners worked than male breadwinner families. Dual-earner families (where both
individuals work) have swiftly replaced the traditional married-couple model of a
"breadwinner" husband and a "homemaker" wife. Harkness (2003) documents
the shift in family employment between 1992 and 2002 in the UK and nds that
in 2002, 75% of married/cohabiting couples were supported by two earners as
compared to 65% in 1992.
The implications of this changing phenomenon are numerous. Work is an im-
portant aspect of family life. It helps improve the standard of living and prevent
families from falling into poverty. Studies based on intra-household bargaining
models provide evidence that the more money a woman brings in the family, the
more bargaining power she has (Chiappori, 1988). Several papers have analyzed
the behavioral impact of variables that may inuence the intra-household distrib-
ution of power. For instance, Thomas (1990) and Browning et al. (1994) provide
evidence that the distribution of total intra-household income has a signicant im-
pact on household expenditure in the UK. Lungberg et al. (1996) show that moth-
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ers care more about their childrens welfare, in terms of household consumption in
the UK. Empowering mothers through marital law changes, childrens allowance
schemes, education and increased income leads to more spending on childrens and
womens consumption relative to spending on men. In France empowering women
also reduces fertility and womens share of housework (Anxo and Carlin, 2004).
More female power also leads to better reproductive health choices (Beegle et al.,
2001) and improved household health by reducing the consumption of tobacco and
alcohol (Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995). Intra-household decision processes may
also be a¤ected by relative incomes (Thomas et al., 1997; Duo, 2000). According
to Ward, Joshi and Dale (1996), income dependency of women in partnerships
which can lead to female poverty is also another issue that needs to be tackled by
policy makers. Womens earnings also make an important contribution towards
keeping families out of poverty. According to Machin and Waldfogel (1994), the
poverty rate in 1991 would have been up to 50% higher without womens pay.
This paper makes several contributions. Firstly, it updates the trends in the
intra-household earnings shares of men and women between 1994 and 2004 using
the Family Resource Surveys. It is also one of the rst papers to explicitly esti-
mate the impact of changes in the returns to the male characteristics, the returns
to the female characteristics (conditional on female labour force participation),
the patterns of assortative mating and the female characteristics (everything else
falls in the residual changes category) on the changing female breadwinner index.
To do so, it applies the semiparametric technique developed by DiNardo, Fortin
and Lemieux (1996), henceforth DFL. Not only does this methodology yield a
visual representation of the impact of the four di¤erent factors but it also esti-
mates the magnitude of the changes. The semiparametric procedure is similar to
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the Oaxaca-Blinder (1973) decomposition. However, the Oaxaca-Blinder decom-
position considers only the mean of the distribution and ignores its tails. The
DFL technique, instead, enables the construction of counterfactuals for the entire
density of the outcome variable, such as "what would have the density of the fe-
male earnings share in family earnings been in 2004 if female characteristics had
remained at their 1994 level". The counterfactuals can be estimated using appro-
priate "reweighting" functions which will be described in more detail in section
4.3.
Third, the paper pays special attention to changes in assortative mating in
education and age37 due to the fact that the decomposition exercise automati-
cally suggests that there might be an important element of assortative mating.
The literature on assortative mating (Becker, 1981) addresses the question of who
marries whom, as well as who marries and who remains single. "Positive (nega-
tive) assortative mating" on a characteristic means that individuals tend to match
with partners who are similar (dissimilar) with respect to that characteristic38.
In the US, studies have typically focused on assortative mating with respect to
education and nd positive assortative mating (Mare, 1991; Pencavel, 1998; Qian,
1998). Empirical work on changes in assortative mating in the UK is scarce. Using
data from the British Household Panel Survey, Chan and Halpin (2003) nd that
educational homogamy has declined for Britain, from 40.7% in the 1980s to 39.7%
in the 1990s.
37Individuals can also partner according to other traits like neighbourhood, religious beliefs
and practices, race-ethinicity, leisure activities, or economic success of physical attractiveness
which for simplicity are ignored.
38Assortative mating can be divided into homogamy (people partnering with the same traits),
hypogamy (people partnering with others of inferior traits than themselves) and hypergamy
(people partnering with others of superior traits than themselves).
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The di¤erent types of partnerships determine the characteristics of the next
generation. This in turn has the potential for widening or narrowing educational
inequalities in the next generation (Epstein and Guttman, 1984; Mare 1991). The
importance of assortative partnerships for long-run changes in inequality is also a
debated issue in the United States. In the UK, for a sample of married individ-
uals drawn from the British Cohort Study, Fernandez (2001) reports a schooling
homogamy of 0.5, with homogamy increasing as inequality (or segregation) in-
creases. From the standpoint of the woman, an increase in positive assortative
mating, everything else equal, might lead to a more equal nancial sharing within
couples. For instance, suppose that more medium educated women partner with
medium educated men now as compared to marrying high educated men in the
past, the womens share in the family will increase in such a way that the more ed-
ucated women nancially contribute more equally within the couples than before.
However if there is a graduate wage premium the relative female earnings share
when graduate women partner with graduate men is not likely to change while it
may rise if graduate women partner with lower educated men. As such the e¤ects
of changes of assortative mating on the female breadwinner index should be con-
sidered with caution. Additionally changes in the educational distribution of men
and women over time may a¤ect the composition within couples. These changes
are however not incorporated in the analysis principally because identifying these
separate e¤ects is hard and also because the DFL methodology assumes that the
distribution of characteristics is xed. Another limitation to the analysis is that
later age of marriage and increased divorce and remarriage rates which may lead to
a fall in educational homogamy are not accounted for in the model because there
is a lack of information on marriage dates in the data. Changes in assortative
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mating may therefore overpredict the increase in the female breadwinner index.
A few papers have considered the impact of changes in assortative mating on
the changes in family income inequality in the 1990s and concluded that it had a
moderate impact on family income inequality (Daly and Valetta, 2006; Fortin and
Schirle, 2003). However these studies looked at changes in income inequality across
rather than within families. Studies in the UK on the labour market position of
dual-earner couples are scarce. Machin and Waldfogel (1994) found that the corre-
lation between earnings of married men and women had very little impact on the
increase in family income inequality in the UK in the 1980s. Both Daly and Valetta
(2006) and Fortin and Schirle (2003) report that the increased female labour force
participation was the main contributing factor. In the UK the observed increase
in female labor force participation can be largely attributed to increased partici-
pation of married women. Not surprisingly therefore it is expected that married
womens increasing labour force participation and mens falling participation rate
may be important factor behind the rising female breadwinner index.
Overall, three main results emerge. First, the female earnings share has con-
tinued its rise over the last decade. Dual-earner families are also on the rise. The
main factor driving the observed changes in the distribution of female earnings
share is the rising female labour force participation, in turn due to increases in the
returns to observable characteristics of women in partnerships. Changes in female
characteristics account on average for about one fourth of the rise in the female
breadwinner index. Increases in mens returns to characteristics (which also reect
changes in the real wages of men at xed male characteristics) have acted in the
opposite direction, hampering the growing role of women as income earners in the
family by about 33%. Changes in assortative mating account for around a 14%
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increase in the breadwinner index on average. Overall, these four explanatory fac-
tors account for about 116% of the increase at the mean. In light of this, the model
slightly overpredicts the changes in the index so that residual (unexplained) factors
are associated with a reduction in the female breadwinner index. Similar patterns
are observed at the upper and lower tails of the female earnings share distribution
except that residual factors appear to be of non-negligible importance.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 4.2 describes the data used and
documents the general trends in the labour market for men and women. Section 4.3
presents the methodology used to decompose the changes in the breadwinner index
within the family. Section 4.4 presents the empirical results of the decomposition
strategy. Section 4.5 discusses the results and section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Data and Summary Statistics
For the purpose of the analysis, this paper uses data from the Family Resource
Surveys (FRS), as already hinted in the introduction. The years considered are
1994/95 and 2004/05. The FRS collects information on the incomes and circum-
stances of private households in the United Kingdom and has been running since
October 1992. More than 23,000 households are interviewed in this survey. The
data are cross-sectional in nature. Compared to the Family Expenditure Survey,
the sample size is much larger. It is also considered the principal source of in-
formation on the income distribution in the UK while the Family Expenditure
Survey had a similar role until the mid 1990s (Micklewright and Schnepf, 2007).
According to the National Centre for Social Research (NatCen), the survey is well
established as the DWPs main source of information. The main variable is real
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monthly labour earnings from work. For each partner, this includes the wage
and salary earnings and self-employment income39. Nominal monthly earnings are
deated by the monthly UK retail price index to obtain real monthly earnings.
Given the primary objective of analyzing the changing female earnings share in
the family unit, all individuals who are in partnerships (married or cohabiting) are
kept in the sample.
In restricting to individuals who are either married or cohabiting, one might be
worried about the sample selection issue that potentially arises if the proportion of
women in partnerships has drastically changed over time in a fashion that is sys-
tematically related to their potential contribution to family income. To check for
this, the proportion of women in partnerships are calculated and plotted against
each female earnings decile. By visual inspection, Figure 4.1 shows that the prob-
ability of partnership declined on average between 1994 and 2004. Regrettably the
fall was not approximately uniform across women at di¤erent deciles of the earn-
ings distribution (except probably at the upper tail), suggesting that the selection
issue may be a source of concern. However the sample selection problem is ignored
39Self-employment income is included in individual income in line with the literature on family
income inequality (Machin and Waldfogel, 1994; Fortin and Schirle, 2003). More than 90 % of
men and women who are self-employed report an income level (except for 84% of women in
2004). Although self-employment income can be subject to measurement error it would seem
unlikely that the reported income would be worse in the case of self-employment than in other
employment. Although this issue is certainly relevant, this paper abstracts from it as it is not the
focus of the paper. Another potential source of concern arises if the proportion of self-employed
is unevenly distributed across the income distribution. It may suggest that observed changes in
the female earnings share are being driven by the inclusion of self employed income in earnings.
A look at the proportion of self employed by the income distribution reveals that while self
employed men are not evenly distributed at the bottom half of the distribution self employed
women are not evenly distributed across the income distribution. However the latter observation
may not largely a¤ect the female earnings share as self employed women comprise only about
4% of the total labour force. On the other hand the fact that there appears to be more self
employed men (which implies more measurement error or under-reporting) at the bottom of the
distribution may suggest that changes in the female earnings share may be underestimated at
the bottom of the distribution.
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in this paper and will be explored in future work.
The analysis is further restricted to women who are aged 24-55 in order to
capture women who are not only of working age but also at the stage of their
life-cycle where they have a high propensity to be active in the labour market.
Womens age is categorized into six groups: 24-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49,
50-55. Men aged 24-64 are included in the sample and their age is categorized
into 8 groups: 24-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-55, 56-59 and 60-64. The
measure of education used in this study is the age at which the individual left
full-time education. Individuals are classied into three groups: "low education"
(individuals who left full time education at 16 or under); "medium education"
(people who left full time education at ages 16-18) and "high education" (those who
left full time education at age 19 or later). The resulting sample, after considering
the sample selection criteria described above, contains 9,678 couples in 1994 and
9,417 in 2004.
Table 4.1 reports some summary statistics on the partnerslabour market out-
comes for the years 1994 and 2004. It reveals that the real monthly total couples
earnings increased by about 26% between the two sample periods. Real monthly
earnings for the male partners rose by 14% while those of the female partnersin-
creased by about 33%. Hourly earnings, in real terms, also saw a greater increase
among female partners (32%) than among males (7%). The higher increase in real
monthly earnings relative to hourly earnings for women suggests that part-time
work must have fallen over time. Men and women in partnerships are older, by
one year on average, in 2004 compared to 1994.
Table 4.1 also displays summary statistics for the male and the female labour
force participation rates. Women are increasingly participating in the labour mar-
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ket compared to men. While Machin and Waldfogel found that in the early 1990s
the participation rate of husbands fell by 4% and wivesparticipation increased
by 23%, descriptive statistics in this paper suggest that by the mid of 1990s, the
change in the male labour force participation rate was positive and increased by
0.5%. This is not surprising because inactivity rate of married men fell over this
time period, ndings which are in line with those of Faggio and Nickell (2003). The
female participation rate continued its upward trend, rising from 72% to 77% over
the last decade while the inactivity rate of married women fell. Not surprisingly
the fall is more pronounced for women who started working in increasing numbers
since the 1970s. While more than 70% of men are in employment (an increase
of roughly 10% from 1994 to 2004), more than 75% of women are working which
represents an increase of about 13% over the last decade40.
While Table 4.1 gives an inkling of the economic progress of women over the
last decade, it does not provide much information on how this got reected in
their relative position within the family. Harkness (2003) reports a rise in couple
earners, a fall in both male and female breadwinner couples and a fall in no earner
couples in the UK from 1992 to 2002. Figure 4.2 graphs the kernalised distribution
of the female earnings shares, z. This measure is dened as the ratio of the female
partners earnings relative to the sum of the male and female earnings.
It is noted that z ranges from 0 to 1, inclusive. While z = 0 indicates families
where there is a sole male breadwinner, z = 1 indicates families where there is a
sole female breadwinner. A value of z between 0 and 1 indicates families where
both men and women are working. Several features are noticeable. There are
three main bumps in Figure 4.2. The spike to the left shows a high proportion
40Around 75% of men and 90% of women report an income level.
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of families where the female partner does not work and the spike to the far right
represents the proportion of families with a female breadwinner. The graph also
shows that the distribution of the female earnings share has shifted to the right.
The increased labour force participation of women in partnerships means that
the concentration of the female earnings share at zero has fallen. The rightward
shift in the distribution for women with a positive earnings share reects both
an increase in hours and in their earnings. Figure 4.2 ignores workless households
(where both the man and the woman do not work in which case the female earnings
shares in the couple is not dened). Gregg and Wadsworth (2001) show that the
proportion of workless households was about 20% in the mid 1990s but has fallen
by 3 percentage points since 1996 (similar ndings are observed by Walling (2006)
between 1995 and 2005). They argue that government policies like the New Deal
Programmes, the Working Family Tax Credits and the MinimumWage introduced
in 1999 may be behind this trend. In order to quantify this change, Table 4.2
displays the changing proportion of three groups of families: no-earner/workless
families, one-earner families (either the man or the woman works) and two-earner
families (where both the man and the woman work). Indeed Table 4.2 reports that
the proportion of no-earner families fell from 8% to 5%.
In line with the ndings of Gregg andWadsworth (2001), the proportion of one-
earner families (whether headed by a male or a female) also decreased between 1994
and 2004 and the proportion of two-earner families increased. This was mainly
attributable to those families where the female share was greater than or equal to
the male share. These ndings are also consistent with those reported by Harkness
(2003). The author uses the Labour Force Survey to investigate work patterns of
families in the UK between 1992 and 2002. She nds that dual earner families
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increased by about 6.6 percentage points to 72% in 2002.
Until now, this paper has shown that dual-earner families are on the rise and
women are increasing their bargaining power within the family. It is unclear though
if this e¤ect is uniform across di¤erent types of families. To investigate this, trends
in the female earnings share by male earnings decile in Table 4.3 are examined.
First, as it seems reasonable, women tend to contribute more to the family if they
live with men who have low earnings. Second, the female earnings share increased
across the entire male earnings distribution between 1994 and 2004 but this change
was less pronounced at the two extremes of the distribution.
The descriptive work, so far, does not give any insight about what factors may
be driving the change observed in Figure 4.2. Simple economic reasoning suggests
that this change can be ascribed to changes in men and womens characteristics
over time, changes in the returns to these characteristics (hence, incentives to
participate in the labour market) and to the mating patterns between men and
women based on their observable characteristics. Therefore, it is helpful to see
how these factors have evolved between 1994 and 2004 and how they might have
a¤ected the distribution of z.
4.2.1 Returns to Female Characteristics
In the previous section, it was observed that the female participation rate increased
on average over the last decade. Figure 4.3 shows the increase was however not
consistent across the male earnings distribution. The participation rate increased
slightly for women who are partnered with non-working men or men with low
earnings but was higher for women partnered with men in the middle and upper
male earnings distribution. Turning to the returns to the female characteristics,
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a simple least squares model of earnings is inadequate to estimate the returns
given that women for whom earnings are observed will not be a random draw
from the population but a self-selected group. Since womens participation is non-
trivial, wages (i.e. log of earnings of women) are observed for working women
only. Among women capable of earning the same real market wage, those in work
will have relatively low reservation wage. Similarly, among women with the same
reservation wage, those in work have relatively higher real market wages. In both
cases, working women are not likely to be a representative sample of the entire
female population. If the unobserved components of womenswages depend on
the unobserved determinants of their labour force participation decision, then the
least squares estimates will be biased if data on working women only are used for
estimation purposes (Killingsworth and Heckman, 1981).
In order to correct for the possibility of sample selection, this paper estimates a
selectivity-corrected earnings function using the Heckman two step procedure. For
the standard Heckman sample selection correction technique to work, a variable
that a¤ects the propensity for a woman to participate in the labour market but
which does not have a direct e¤ect on the wages of the woman is required. In this
paper, it is hypothesized that the male partners earnings inuences the womans
decision to participate but not her earnings. This follows from the DFL decompo-
sition exercise which assumes that male partners earnings are exogenous. In this
way male partners earnings will directly a¤ect his partners reservation wage and
hence her decisions to participate in the labour market and indirectly a¤ect her
actual wage. The econometric model is written as
wf = X
= + f (ym) + "f
146
part = X= + mym + f (4.1)
The rst line of Equation (4.1) is the log of earnings regression equation where
X is a vector of the female and the male characteristics [Xf ; Xm] which includes
dummy variables for age, education and region.  is the inverse mills ratio that
identies selection into participation41. It picks up the bias deriving from the
compositional changes in the (selected) sample of workers from which wages are
measured under the assumption of joint normality of the distribution of the error
terms in the wage and the participation equation (Blundell et al., 2003). Because
wages are not available for all workers in the sample, the wage equation is usually
estimated from a censored sample that includes employed workers only. Hence
the Heckman selection picks up the upward bias in wages which occurs when only
working women are observed. Those who are not working constitute a self-selected
group as women who would earn low wages choose not to work. As such wages
of women are likely to be overestimated. The second line of Equation (4.1) is the
selection equation where part is a latent variable determining participation in the
labour force (=1 if the woman participates in the labour market or 0 otherwise)42.
The  are the returns to the (male and female) observable characteristics. In this
paper, it is assumed that the decision for the woman in a couple to participate in
the labour market depends on her partners earnings, ym. ym will hence indirectly
a¤ect the wages of his partner and in turn the breadwinner index, through the
41 = (Zi)( Zi) where  and  are, respectively, the density and distribution function for a
standard normal variable, Z:
42In line with modern empirical labour literature which nds that labour supply responses
tend to be more concentrated along the extensive margin (labor force participation) than along
the intensive margin (number of hours worked) (Heckman, 1983; Eissa and Liebman, 1996), this
paper focuses on the labour force participation of women.
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sample selection variable. The probability that the female partner participates
in the labour market will be a¤ected by changes in the male partners earnings
due to an income e¤ect43. Given the above model and methodology, estimates of
; f ; ;  and m are obtained for the years 1994 and 2004.
Estimates of the Heckman model are presented in Table 4.4a for the year 1994
and Table 4.4b for the year 2004. The estimates of the selection equation suggest
that there is a signicant non-linear age participation prole. The age group at
which labour force participation peaks for women is 45-49 and the e¤ect is higher
over time. The less educated the women, the less likely they participate in the
labour market and the e¤ect over time is more pronounced for the least educated
group of women. Women living in the eastern region compared to Greater London
also seem to be participating more in the labour market in 1994 while in 2004,
women who live outside London were more likely to participate in the labour
market. Graduate women who were in partnerships with lower educated men as
compared to graduate men were also more likely to be in the labour market (about
16%). However the probability decreased over time. The older the male partner,
the less likely the female partner will enter the labour force. The coe¢ cients on the
male partners earnings in the selection equation for both years are equal to zero
and not statistically signicant in 2004. Unfortunately male partners earnings is
not very good at identifying the margin of endogenous selection. This is most likely
due to the fact that it is not a strong predictor of female labour force participation.
As stated in the methodology section, selectivity corrected earnings functions
43Although it is usual practice to include the number of children in the female labour supply
selection equation, this variable is not included here. In order to make the model more tractable
and avoid the endogeneity problem of the fertility decision with respect to tastes for work or
labor market opportunities, fertility is ignored.
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rather than OLS ones are needed in order to obtain consistent regression estimates
if the unobserved components of womens earnings are correlated with the unob-
served determinants of their decision to participate. Accordingly, Tables 4.4a and
4.4b also display the earnings function, corrected for sample selection bias using
the Heckman two-stage correction procedure. The selectivity term, , is not statis-
tically signicant. This suggests that for both sample years women in partnerships
do not self select into work. This nding has to be taken with some caution due to
the weak rst stage where the male partners income has little power in explaining
the womans decision to participate.
Overall it is observed that the returns to education for higher educated women
relative to their low educated counterparts increased over time and the changes
are statistically signicant at 5% level of signicance. Increases in the relative
returns of graduate women will potentially lead to increases in their earnings and,
in turn, this e¤ect is likely to shift the distribution of the breadwinner index, z, to
the right, keeping all the other factors constant. However a fall in the returns to
lower educated women may shift the distribution to the left. In sum the overall
e¤ect on the z distribution depends on which e¤ect dominates.
4.2.2 Returns to Male Characteristics
As a next step, the patterns in the returns to the male characteristics are doc-
umented. Returns are obtained through the application of the Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) technique to the econometric model wm = X
=
mm + X
=
ff + "m
44
44This specication is used because male labour market experiences have been found relatively
unresponsive to family variables such as wifes earnings and the household circumstances of men.
Indeed, in studies of the marriage premium in male wages, the e¤ects of children are generally
not reported (Korenman and Neumark, 1992; Gray, 1997) or are reported to be insignicant
(Loh, 1996).
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where wm = ln(ym). As above, the characteristics, Xm and Xf , consist of dummy
variables for age, education and the region of residence. Results of the OLS re-
gressions are presented in Table 4.5.
As expected, the results show that the older the man (until his mid forties)
in the couple and the more educated he is, the higher is his wage and hence
his earnings in the labour market. Men also have higher earnings if they live in
Greater London. Table 4.5 also reports that graduate young men whose female
partners are more educated and older also appear to earn more and this e¤ect is
more pronounced over time. Changes in returns to graduate relative to medium
educated men are statistically signicant at 10% level of signicance. In this case
higher relative returns to the male characteristics over time will lead to increases
in male earnings. However a fall in returns of lower educated men will shift the
distribution to the right. Other things equal, the direction of the shift of the z
distribution will depend of which e¤ect dominates.
Taken altogether, the net e¤ect of the observed changes in the returns to the
female and to the male characteristics on the female breadwinner index is ambigu-
ous. If female earnings increase more (less) than the male earnings, the female
breadwinner index is expected to rise (decline).
4.2.3 Assortative Mating
The third factor which is considered in this paper to have an impact on the bread-
winner index is assortative mating. Tables 4.6 and 4.7 present the distribution of
Following some related studies (see Fortin and Schirle, 2003 and Daly and Valetta, 2006) the
Heckman selection is not done for male wages. Also this issue has been mainly considered in the
context of womens labor supply functions (Heckman, 1979; Blau and Kahn, 2005). Furthermore
if the selectivity bias was explored in the male wage equation it will be hard to nd a good
identier in the Heckman equation.
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mens characteristics conditional on their female partnerseducation and age re-
spectively. As a crude measure of educational homogamy, the elements in the main
diagonal can be added up. In this case the change in the index will then indicate
whether women are partnering more or less with men of exactly the same traits as
themselves. The index fell minimally from 170.1 in 1994 to 169.8 in 2004. Panel a
in Table 4.6 provides additional insights into the various partnership formation de-
cisions of women with di¤erent levels of education. Although low educated women
partner disproportionately within the same category, this proportion appears to
have decreased over time as they are more likely to partner with more educated
men. Medium educated women seem not only to increasingly partner up but g-
ures from Table 4.6 suggest that there may be a growing proportion who partner
in the same category. Although it appears that more low educated women were
parterning up (an increase of 4.3 percentage points), positive assortative mating
may be rising for higher educated women. Table 4.7 shows the changes in assorta-
tive mating by age. Women appear to be partnering within the same age category
but the proportion seems to have fallen especially among younger women between
1994 and 2004. While women in their late thirties and early forties may be more
likely to partner down one level younger women in their late twenties and early
thirties appear to be more likely to partner with older men (at least 10 years their
senior).
In general, it is expected that the more likely poorly educated women partner
up the more likely their bargaining power is weakened within the family because
their more educated male partners will have relatively higher earnings, other things
equal. In this case, it is highly likely that z will be low. If the proportion of this
type of couple rises over time, the distribution of z will shift to the left. On the
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other hand, if higher educated women are more likely to partner down (i.e. to
lower educated men), they will normally contribute more to the couples earnings.
As such, z will be higher than 0.5 and equal to 1 in the extreme case where only
the woman works. If this mating pattern is more pronounced over time relative
to the other types of couple formation described above, a rightward shift in the
distribution of z will be observed. In sum, the exact position of the distribution
of the female breadwinner index depends on how and to what extent these three
ways of mating change over time.
Because of the potential increase in positive assortative mating (i.e. more
women partner with men of similar characteristics as themselves) the middle of the
distribution may shift to the right, while the bottom of the distribution may shift to
the left because more low educated women and to a lesser extent medium educated
women partner up. Although the likelihood of partnering down one level may have
increased for higher educated women (where they seem to be more likely to partner
with medium educated men), the change seemed to have been outweighed by a
fall in the highly educated women partnering with low educated men. As a result,
the top of the distribution of z may be expected to shift to the left. These changes
should be considered with caution not only because they do not change much over
time (and may not be statistically signicant) but the e¤ect may also be partly
driven by changes in the educational distribution of men and women over time.
If the number of low (high) educated females in partnerships falls relative to the
number of their male counterparts, the number of low (high) educated women
partnering up (down) will increase, other things equal. Regrettably it is hard to
identify these separate e¤ects and hence this issue is abstracted from the analysis.
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4.2.4 Female Characteristics
The fourth factor which is considered in this paper to have contributed to the
rightward shift in the distribution of z is changes in female characteristics. These
changes are displayed in the last columns of Panel a in Tables 4.5 and 4.6. Female
partners are older in 2004 compared to 1994 and are more educated on average.
A positive correlation that normally exists among education, age and earnings
suggests that the observed changes in female characteristics are going to increase
womens earnings. In turn, the distribution of z is likely to shift to the right,
holding other factors constant.
4.3 A Decomposition Strategy
4.3.1 Motivation and Assumptions
One of the main aims of this paper is to estimate the e¤ect of the di¤erent factors
described above to changes in z. This is not straightforward because of the poten-
tial reverse causality that exist between labour supply and wages (Killingsworth
and Heckman, 1981) and the matching of individuals in the marriage market. In
order to operationalise the decomposition, it is thus assumed that women in part-
nerships make decisions in a sequential manner. A woman rst decides to acquire
some observed characteristics. Then, based on her acquired characteristics, she
chooses who to marry (or cohabit with). When a couple is formed, the male part-
ners characteristics together with his earnings, which are assumed to be exogenous
to the womans labour market outcomes, will determine the mans earnings. Fi-
nally, these together with the womans characteristics, will determine the womans
participation decision and earnings and hence, her contribution to the couples
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earnings. To make the model more tractable, it further ignores fertility. Modelling
fertility is complicated in this context because this is simultaneously determined
with the womens labour supply (Angrist and Evans, 1988) (and possibly also with
the decision to marry, if at all). Furthermore, the model is simplied by ignoring
individuals who are not in partnerships. However the DFL technique could, in
principle, be modied to include this margin of selection. The model also only ac-
counts for the e¤ect of changes in observable characteristics and in the returns to
these characteristics but it ignores unobservable determinants (the error terms).
In this sense, the model will not be able to account fully for changes between
two time periods. Di¤erences between the counterfactual densities and the actual
density will be both due to the above factors plus a residual term.
4.3.2 Construction of Counterfactual Densities
The semiparametric procedure developed by DFL (1996) is applied. It provides
both a graphical and a quantitative tool to investigate the distributional e¤ects of
the chosen factors. It allows for the construction of counterfactual densities using
observable characteristics from other years by reweighting the original distribution
density. The notation in this paper follows that of DFL but relates to the bread-
winner setting. To begin with, the section below introduces the notation used in
the rest of the paper. The procedure is then extended, by using the DFL tech-
nique in constructing "reweighting" functions, to include observable characteristics
of individuals.
Notation
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Excluding Observables For simplicity, the male and female characteristics
are excluded to give an idea about how counterfactual densities can be constructed.
The distribution of z at time t, ft (z), is, by denition, the distribution of z con-
ditional on the circumstance that the time at which z is observed (tz) is equal to
t. Notation-wise,
ft (z)  f (zjtz = t) (4.2)
This in turn can be written as the integral of the cumulative density function
of z conditional on tz, i.e. ft (z) 
R
dF (zjtz = t) :
Given that the value of z is univocally determined by the values of yf , which
is the female earnings, and ym, the male earnings, [z = g (yf ; ym)], it implies that
ft (z)  f
 
zjtyf ;ym = t

. Another way of rewriting this is to observe that the
timing at which yf and ym
 
tyf ;ym

are observed can be factored into the timing
of a conditional distribution
 
tyf jym

and a timing of a marginal distribution, tym,
so that
ft (z)  f
 
zjtyf jym = t; tym = t

(4.3)
Here, an individual observation is dened as a vector (z; yf ; ym; t). Equation
(4.3) represents the distribution of z, given the timing at which the distribu-
tion of ym (tym) is observed and the timing at which yf are observed (tyf jym).
The estimation of counterfactual densities involves the combination of di¤erent
years and Equation (4.3) introduces the notation that accounts for these time
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periods. For example, while f2004 (z)  f
 
zjtyf jym = 2004; tym = 2004

repre-
sents the observed distribution of the breadwinner index in 2004, the expression
f2004 (z)  f
 
zjtyf jym = 2004; tym = 1994

represents the distribution of z that
would have prevailed in 2004 had the distribution of ym remained as it was in
1994.
Including Observables As a next step, observable characteristics, X, are
introduced. An individual observation is now dened as a vector of (z; yf ; ym; Xm; Xf ; t).
Here, z depends directly on yf and ym and indirectly on the characteristics of the
male and female partners, i.e. ft (z)  f
 
zjtyf ;ym;Xm;Xf = t

where Xm denotes
the male partners characteristics and Xf denotes the female partners character-
istics. The density of z, as described in the case where observables were excluded,
can be modied to incorporate observables. This time, the timing at which yf ,
ym, Xm and Xf
 
tyf ;ym;Xm;Xf

are observed can be factored into the timing of
several conditional distributions
 
tyf jym;Xm;Xf ; tymjXm;Xf and tXmjXf

and a timing
of a marginal distribution, tXf such that
ft (z) = f
 
zjtyf jym;Xm;Xf = t; tymjXm;Xf = t; tXmjXf = t; tXf = t

(4.4)
Equation (4.4) represents the distribution of z, given the timing at which the
distribution of womens characteristics is observed (tXf ) (see section 4.2.4), the
timing at which the mapping between mens and womens characteristics, i.e. as-
sortative mating, are observed (tXmjXf ) (see section 4.2.3), the timing at which the
mens returns to observable characteristics are observed (tymjXm;Xf ) (see section
4.2.2) and the timing at which the returns to womens characteristics (including
the male partnersearnings) are observed (tyf jym;Xm;Xf ) (see section 4.2.1). Similar
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to the Oaxaca decomposition (and to the DFL procedure), this approach ignores
the general equilibrium e¤ect of the changes in the distribution of observable char-
acteristics on the structure of z. In other terms, the fact, for example, that changes
in the distribution of Xm (say education) could a¤ect the distribution of tymjXm;Xf ,
i.e. the returns to these characteristics (in this case the returns to education).
4.4 Estimation of Counterfactual Densities
4.4.1 Contribution of Changes in Returns to Female Characteristics
f
 
zjtyf jym;Xm;Xf = 1994; tymjXm;Xf = 2004; tXmjXf = 2004; tXf = 2004

is estimated
in the rst step, under the assumption that women in partnerships follow a sequen-
tial decision making process described above. This represents the counterfactual
density of z in 2004 had the returns to the female partners characteristics remained
at their 1994 level, ceteris paribus. To estimate the counterfactual distribution of
z, a counterfactual distribution of yf is initially estimated. In order to derive the
distribution of female earnings that would have prevailed in 2004 had the distrib-
utions of characteristics (Xm; Xf ) and the level of mens earnings (ym) remained
those of 2004 but the returns to these characteristics be the ones observed in 1994,
estimates of  and m (see section 4.2.1) for the year 1994 are rst applied to the
2004 data to predict the probabilities of participation among women. After some
experimentation with the data, it was decided that women with a predicted prob-
ability to be in the labour force of 0.4 or below45 would be predicted to be out of
45Women whose probability of being in the labour force in 2004 (had their returns to charac-
teristics remained those in 1994) is 0.4 or below are assigned a value of zero as wages in order
to construct the counterfactual distribution of yf . This probability corresponds to the propor-
tion of unemployed and inactive women in 1994 (i.e. 1   Probability of Being Employed  
Probability of Being Self  Employed = 1  0:6  0:03 = 0:37  0:4 (rounded to the nearest 1
decimal place)).
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work. From this step, a counterfactual distribution of the inverse mills ratio,b1994,
is estimated. The next step involves substituting b and b, estimated for 1994, to
the log of earnings equation to adjust the female wages as follows
wfX2004b1994 = X=2004b1994 + bf1994b (ym) + b"f2004 (4.5)
where wfX2004b1994 is the female wages given the female and the male char-
acteristics in 2004 and the returns to their characteristics in 1994, b (ym) is the
inverse mills ratio estimated based on the returns to the characteristics and the
male earnings prevailing in 1994. b"f2004 is the predicted residuals obtained from
estimating Equation (4.4) on the 2004 data. Note that in this way changes in
returns to characteristics imply both changes in the constant and the coe¢ cients
of observable characteristics.
4.4.2 Contribution of Changes in Returns to Male Characteristics
The second decomposition exercise involves the construction of the counterfactual
accounting for changes in the returns to the male characteristics.
f
 
zjtyf jym;Xm;Xf = 1994; tymjXm;Xf = 1994; tXmjXf = 2004; tXf = 2004

is constructed.
This represents the counterfactual density of z in 2004 had the returns to the female
and the male characteristics remained at their 1994 levels. The di¤erence between
this counterfactual and the one above gives the e¤ects of the changes in z given
a change in the returns to the male characteristics between 1994 and 2004. This
step captures the direct e¤ect of changes in the returns to the male characteristics
on the breadwinner index. Initially, estimates of the male partners monthly wages
for the years 1994 and 2004 are obtained by estimating wm = X
=
mm+X
=
ff + "m.
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Male wages are adjusted by taking the 1994 estimates of m and f to the male
partners characteristics in the labour force and adding the residuals of the 2004
male wages regression, namely
wmX2004b1994 = X=m2004bm1994 +X=f2004bf1994 + b"m2004 (4.6)
4.4.3 Contribution of Changes in Assortative Mating
Next in the decomposition exercise is to adjust the distribution of z for changes in
assortative mating.
f
 
zjtyf jym;Xm;Xf = 1994; tymjXm;Xf = 1994; tXmjXf = 1994; tXf = 2004

is estimated
to account for these changes. This expression represents the density that would be
observed if the distribution of the returns to the female partners characteristics
and to the male partners characteristics and the partnering patterns of women
remained as in 1994. Based on alternative datings, the counterfactual distribution
of z can be estimated by the application of conditioning weights. This distri-
bution can be expressed as the original unconditional distribution of z in 2004,
with individual observations reweighted by the function  XmjXf (Xm; Xf ) ;where
 XmjXf (Xm; Xf ) =
dF

XmjXf ;tXmjXf=1994

dF

XmjXf ;tXmjXf=2004
 . This reweighting function represents
the changes that have occurred between 1994 and 2004 in assortative mating.
Assuming that the proportion of homogamy (individuals partnering in the same
educational and age categories) rose between 1994 and 2004, e¤ectively this proce-
dure consists in downweighting couples in homogamous partnerships (and similarly
upweighting couples in non-homogamous relationships). To derive the appropri-
ate conditioning weights, the conditional probabilities are estimated using a simple
multinomial logit model for each year under consideration. The outcome variable,
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Xm is dened by twenty-four mating categories46 and the covariates are dened
by an Xf vector of female characteristics. In estimating the multinomial logit
equations, controls for the age and the education categories of the women are
included.
4.4.4 Contribution of Changes in Female Characteristics
Finally, the process by which the impact of changes in the female partners charac-
teristics on the breadwinner index is accounted for is similar to that for assortative
mating.
f
 
zjtyf jym;Xm;Xf = 1994; tymjXm;Xf = 1994; tXmjXf = 1994; tXf = 1994

, which is
the counterfactual distribution of z, is estimated through the estimation of con-
ditioning weights,  Xf (Xf ), where  Xf (Xf ) 
dF(Xf jtXf=1994)
dF(Xf jtXf=2004)
=
Pr(tXf=2004)
Pr(tXf=1994)

Pr(tXf=1994jXf)
Pr(tXf=2004jXf)
. This reweighting function represents the relative probability of ob-
serving a woman with characteristics X in the 1994

Pr
 
tXf = 1994jXf

versus
the 2004

Pr
 
tXf = 2004jXf

sample, normalized by the unconditional probabil-
ities of these women being in 1994

Pr
 
tXf = 1994

or 2004

Pr
 
tXf = 2004

.
The function is estimated by, rst pooling both samples and then, estimating a
probit model for a dummy variable indicating the sample from which the obser-
vation is obtained. The conditional probabilities Pr
 
tXf = tjXf

are obtained by
taking predicted probabilities for women in the 2004 sample based on their X val-
ues. The unconditional probabilities are the shares of the 1994 and 2004 samples
in the pooled sample.
46A cross-tabulation of the age groups and education categories of men for each year reveals
that there are no-near empty cells in the regression. Hence, estimates are not likely to su¤er
from very large coe¢ cient estimates.
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4.5 Results
Figure 4.4 displays the impact of the estimated factors on the distribution of z.
The e¤ects are displayed in sequence; each panel holds an additional modelled
factor to its 1994 structure and examines the impact of this adjustment compared
with the prior distribution.
Panel a shows the e¤ect of the changing conditional distribution of the returns
to the female characteristics (which also reect changes in the real wages of women
at xed female characteristics)47. In another words, it shows how these returns
and increases in the female labour force participation between 1994 and 2004 have
changed the distribution of z between 1994 and 2004. Had they remained the
same between 1994 and 2004, the distribution of the female breadwinner index
would have been more to the left of the distribution prevailing in 2004. The
adjusted distribution of z has more mass in the lower tail of the distribution
(below z := 0:4) and less above that point, with only limited di¤erence in the
upper tail. The observed rise in the female labour force participation increased
earnings indirectly while increases in real wages, at xed characteristics, had a
direct e¤ect in increasing the female earnings and hence the female breadwinner
index.
Panel b of Figure 4.4 displays the changing conditional distribution of the re-
turns to the male characteristics. It has to be emphasized again that the increases
in the returns to male characteristics reect also increases in the real wages of men,
keeping the male characteristics xed. Holding the returns to the male character-
istics to their 1994 levels would have led to a leftward shift in the distribution of
47Although in principle one can distinguish between the two.
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z in 2004. This suggests that increases in the relative returns to male graduates
outweighed any fall in the returns to lower educated men. Interestingly Panel a
shows a larger rightward shift in the distribution relative to the leftward shift in
Panel b, reecting the fall in the gender pay gap over the years in the UK (Blundell
et al., 2007).
One key question in this paper relates to the impact of changes in assortative
mating patterns on the female earnings share. As mentioned earlier, it is quite hard
to investigate the changes given the diverse mating decisions of women of similar
or diverse traits of interests over time. Panel c presents the e¤ect that changes
in assortative mating have had on the distribution of z. It is not surprising to
nd that the distribution has more mass in the middle. This is explained by
the increase in positive assortative mating as detailed in section 4.2.3. While the
counterfactual distribution of z has thinner tails at the bottom arising from an
increase in the proportion of low educated women partnering up, the distribution
has a thinner tail at the upper end because high educated women are less likely to
partner with low educated men.
Finally in panel d, the changing distribution of the womens characteristics
appears to have caused a uniform modest rightward shift in the distribution of z
because women in partnerships were older and more educated over the period of
analysis.
The quantitative analogue to the visual representation is listed in Table 4.8.
Column (2) presents the actual total change in the measured statistics between the
two years - i.e. the 2004 value minus the 1994 value. It shows that z increases across
the distribution but the rise is larger mostly at the lower half of the distribution.
The additional columns show the portion of the total change that can be attributed
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to changes in the explanatory factors. The overall percentage contribution to the
total change is presented in italics. Column (6) presents the unexplained factor
which is dened as the di¤erence between the total change and the net portion
accounted for by the explanatory factors. The sum of columns (2) to (6) thus
equals the total change presented in column 1. If the individual grouping result
has a di¤erent sign from the overall change, then the percentage change is presented
as a negative change.
The rst column of Table 4.8 shows the actual change in the female breadwin-
ner index across the distribution of z. The biggest change occurs at the median (a
5 percentage point increase) and the lower tail of the distribution (a 4.4 percentage
point increase at the 25th percentile). The estimates listed in the second column
indicate that, relative to the other factors considered, the changing distribution of
the returns to the female characteristics (i.e. changes in the female labour force
participation and the real wages, at xed characteristics) had the largest e¤ect on
the female breadwinner index, except at the 25th percentile of the distribution of z.
At the mean changes in the returns to the female characteristics explain virtually
all of the rise in the breadwinner index (107%). Interestingly a rise in womens
participation and real wages, at xed characteristics, imply a much larger rise at
the top of the distribution (160%) than at the bottom (9%). This suggests that
changes in the labour market prospects of women largely favoured those who pro-
portionally contributed more to the family budget. These are presumably women
who are not only low earners but also paired with men with low labour market
potential. Non-parametric estimates of the association between z and the level of
earnings of men and women are separately considered to investigate this inference.
The estimates are obtained by using the Nadarayan-Watson kernel regression and
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plotted in Figure 4.5. The horizontal axis shows the female breadwinner index
which ranges from 0 to 1 and the vertical axis refers to the earnings level of the
individual in the couple. A vertical line is drawn at z = 0:5 which designates
households with equal earnings shares.
Figure 4.5 displays a spike at the upper end of the earnings distribution of the
female partner in both years. This indicates that women who contribute more in
the family income are actually low earners (top panel) in both 1994 and 2004. As
for the male partners, the earnings distribution continuously falls as the female
breadwinner index increases from 0 to 1. It appears that men in couples where the
women nancially contributed more were also low earners (bottom panel) and this
pattern did not change over time. These people are also more likely to be poorly
educated (refer to Figure A4.1 in Appendix) and more likely to be in their mid
forties and older (Figure A4.2 in Appendix).
Results listed in the third column of Table 4.8 indicate that changes in the
returns to the male characteristics (also reecting changes in mens real wages, at
xed characteristics) has a dampening impact, rising gradually from 19% at the
25th percentile to 43% at the 75th percentile of the distribution of z. Overall, the
net e¤ect of rising returns to the male and female characteristics is positive across
most part of the distribution of z.
The fourth column lists the e¤ects of changes in assortative mating in age and
in education. Their impact is mainly concentrated in the middle and bottom of
the distribution of z. The increased likelihood of couples homogamy (especially
among medium educated women) and to a lesser extent, hypogamy (older women
have a greater tendency to partner with younger men) were more important for
the rising female breadwinner index than was the increasing likelihood to form
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hypergamous relationships among low educated and younger women.
The fth column displays the e¤ects of the changing distribution of the female
characteristics on the distribution of the breadwinner index. Once the e¤ects of
the other factors mentioned above are conditioned out in the previous steps of the
decomposition, the e¤ect of changes in the female characteristics gradually rises
from the bottom of the distribution of z to the top extreme, again explained by
the fact that women are more educated and older in 2004 as compared to 1994.
Finally, the contribution of residual factors is listed in the nal column of Table
4.8. The impact is negative (-16%) at the mean, which is indicative of a coun-
terfactual reduction in the female breadwinner index. In other terms, unobserved
factors has led to a fall in the female earnings share within families over the last
decade. While the e¤ect at the mean is small, it is not negligible at the lower and
upper end of the z distribution. Residual factors seem to account for more than
50% of the changes in the female breadwinner index.
Overall, the four explanatory factors fare well in explaining the changes in
the female breadwinner index at the mean (116%) rather than at the tails of
the distribution. Unobserved factors explain only -16% of the change at the mean
which implies that the model slightly overpredicts the changes (i.e. residual factors
are associated with a reduction in the female breadwinner index). The rising
labour force participation of married women appears to be the main driving force
behind the increase in the intra-household relative earnings share of women and
this e¤ect is consistent across the middle and upper end of the distribution of the
female breadwinner index.
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4.6 Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper, the trends in the relative position of women within the family are
updated. The paper moves on to examining four factors which account for the
changes. Based on simple economic reasoning, the factors include returns to the
female characteristics (including female labour force participation and real wages),
returns to the male characteristics (including real wages), assortative mating pat-
terns and female characteristics. The paper uses the semiparametric approach of
DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux to quantify the impact of these four explanatory
factors on the relative position of women within families.
The sequential decision-making of women in couples has to be considered with
caution because it ignores the e¤ect of children on motherslabor supply. Fertility
decisions are hard to address in this context because of the endogeneity prob-
lem with respect to female labour supply. Incorporating in it here will make the
model untractable. Another concern could arise because later age of marriage
and increased divorce and remarriage rates may lead to a fall in educational ho-
mogamy48. If this is the case, changes of assortative mating may overpredict the
increase in the female breadwinner index. Unfortunately, these factors are not
accounted for in the model because there is no information on marriage dates in
the data.
With these caveats in mind, this paper brings out three main empirical nd-
ings. First, there is evidence of a rising proportion of dual-earner families in the
48Gelissen (2004) shows that women are no more or less likely to be better matched to their
new spouses by educational attainment. Dean and Gurak (1978) argue that remarried women
experience low homogamy in both rst and subsequent marriages. Ni Brolchain (1988) shows
that less educated individuals are more likely to marry up in remarriage than rst marriage and
that the highly educated are more likely to marry down.
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UK between 1994 and 2004. The increase is mainly accounted by women who con-
tribute relatively more than men to the household budget. Second, the dominant
factor driving the increase in the female breadwinner measure is the changing dis-
tribution of the returns to female characteristics. Furthermore, a rise in womens
participation and real wages led to a much larger increase at the top of the distri-
bution (160%) than at the bottom (9%). This implies that changes in the labour
market prospects of women largely favoured those who were proportionally con-
tributing more to the family budget. These women are poorly educated and are
partnered with low educated men. Third, the increases in positive assortative
mating especially among more educated and older women accounted for a mod-
est 14% increase in the female breadwinner index on average. Overall, the four
explanatory factors explain 116% of the increase in the female breadwinner index
at the mean, although the e¤ect of residual factors are not negligible at the upper
and lower end of the distribution. The model slightly overpredicts the changes in
the female breadwinner index at the mean so that residual factors are associated
with a reduction in the female breadwinner index.
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Figure 4.1
Proportion of Women in Partnerships by Female Earnings
Deciles
Notes: The Figure reports the percentage distribution of women
in partnerships by the female earnings group. Female earnings
group include the earnings deciles for female who are in work
(from Bottom to Top) and a group of women who are unemployed
(not emp group).
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Notes: The Figure reports the female earnings share distribution
in partnerships for the years 1994 and 2004. This is also defined
as the female breadwinner index, z.
Figure 4.2
Actual Density of Breadwinner Measure, z
z=0.5
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Figure 4.3
Female Partner Participation and Hours of Work
By Male Earnings Group
Notes: The Figure reports the labour market behaviour of women in
partnerships. The top panel displays the labour force participation
of female partners by the male earnings groups. The bottom panel
shows the number of hours worked for the female partners who are in
work by male earnings groups. Male earnings groups include the
earnings deciles for men who are in work (from Bottom to Top) and a
group of men who are unemployed (not emp group).
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(a) Adjusted for Returns to
Female Characteristics
(b) Adjusted for (a) and
Returns to Male Characteristics
(c) Adjusted for (a), (b) and
Assortative Mating Patterns
(d) Adjusted for (a),(b),(c)
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(e) Residual (Unexplained) Factors
Figure 4.4
The Density of Breadwinner Index, z, in 2004, Adjusted for the
1994 Distribution of the Indicated Factors
Notes: The Figure reports the impact of the different explanatory factors on the
distribution of the breadwinner index, z in 2004. Changes in returns to female
characteristics include changes in female labour force participation and real wages
for women. Changes in returns to male characteristics imply changes in real wages
for men. The effects are displayed in sequence where each panel holds an additional
factor to its 1994 value and examines the impact of this adjustment compared with
the prior distribution. For example, panel (a) shows the effect of the changing
distribution of the returns to female characteristics. Had the distribution of the
returns to female characteristics remained constant between 1994 and 2004, the
distribution of z would have been further to the left of the actual, unadjusted,
distribution of z in 2004. The effects of the other factors are interpreted in a
similar way.
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Figure 4.5
Average Earnings of Females and Males by Level of z
Female
Male
1994 2004
Notes: The Figure reports the non-parametric estimates of the average
earnings-female breadwinner index association for both males and females
for the years 1994 and 2004, using the Nadarayan-Watson kernel
regression. The kernels are estimated using the Epanecknikov kernel with
a bandwith of 0.2.
z z
z z
z=0.5 z=0.5
z=0.5 z=0.5
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Table 4.1
Summary Statistics
1994 2004
Mean Standard Mean Standard %
Deviation Deviation Change
Monthly Couple
Earnings 1880 1158 2261 1391 20.3
Monthly Male
Earnings 1449 958 1644 1152 13.5
Monthly Female
Earnings 704 608 934 728 32.7
Hourly Male
Earnings 8.32 6.91 8.86 7.85 6.5
Hourly Female
Earnings 5.71 4.64 7.51 5.25 31.5
Age Female Left Full Time
Education 17 3.04 18 5.33 6.6
Age Male Left Full Time
Education 17 3.77 18 4.80 4.7
Age of Female 39 8.75 40 8.47 2.7
Age of Male 42 9.47 43 9.12 2.6
Labour Force
Participation
Male 0.90 0.003 0.91 0.003 0.5
Female 0.72 0.005 0.77 0.004 7.0
Employment
Male 0.68 0.005 0.74 0.005 9.6
Female 0.61 0.005 0.68 0.005 11.1
Proportion of Male
Reporting Earnings 0.74 0.77 0.002
Proportion of Female
Reporting Earnings 0.91 0.90 0.003
Self-Employed
Male 0.16 0.004 0.15 0.004 -5.6
Female 0.04 0.002 0.04 0.002 8.1
Proportion of Male
Reporting Earnings 0.94 0.93
Proportion of Female
Reporting Earnings 0.92 0.84
Sample Size 9678 9417
Notes: Sample Selection: men aged 24-64 and women in partnerships, aged
24-55. Earnings include wages, salary earnings and self-employment
income. Source: Family Resource Surveys, 1994 and 2004.
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Table 4.2
Types of Families
Family Type 1994 2004 % Change
No Earner 0.081 0.06 -26.5
One Earner: 0.269 0.254 -0.6
Male 0.219 0.207 -5.2
Female 0.051 0.047 -8.3
Two-Earners: 0.65 0.687 5.7
Male Share > Female Share 0.539 0.533 -1.0
Male Share ≤ Female Share 0.111 0.153 38.2
Notes: The Table reports the proportion of families where no-one works
(no-earner), at least one person works (one-earner) and both persons
work (two-earner). Source: Family Resource Surveys, 1994 and 2004.
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Table 4.3
Female Earnings Shares in Total Couple's Earnings
by Male Earnings Decile Groups
Male Female Earnings Share
Earnings
Group 1994 2004 Change
Not emp 1.00 1.00 0.00
Bottom 0.38 0.40 0.02
2nd 0.30 0.34 0.04
3rd 0.28 0.32 0.04
4th 0.27 0.32 0.04
5th 0.24 0.28 0.04
6th 0.24 0.28 0.04
7th 0.21 0.26 0.05
8th 0.21 0.25 0.04
9th 0.19 0.21 0.02
Top 0.12 0.14 0.01
Notes: Male earnings group is defined as earnings deciles for men who
are in work (Bottom to Top) and a group of unemployed men (not emp).
Source: Family Resource Surveys, 1994 and 2004.
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Table 4.4a
Estimates of the Heckman Model - 1994
Wage Equation Selection Equation
ˆ Standard Error ˆ Standard Error
Education of Female Partner
Low -0.602*** 0.130 -0.291*** 0.047
Medium -0.367*** 0.046 -0.063 0.050
Age Group of Female Partner
30-34 -0.023 0.055 -0.075 0.052
35-39 -0.082 0.059 0.064 0.062
40-44 -0.010 0.124 0.257*** 0.070
45-49 -0.027 0.132 0.270*** 0.077
50-55 -0.023 0.094 0.148** 0.083
Region of Residence
North -0.378*** 0.068 0.077 0.072
York & Humshire -0.358*** 0.054 0.033 0.064
North West -0.208*** 0.050 0.003 0.060
East Midlands -0.347*** 0.099 0.199*** 0.067
West Midlands -0.257*** 0.058 0.066 0.062
East Anglia -0.424*** 0.115 0.224*** 0.083
South East -0.301*** 0.077 0.148*** 0.053
South West -0.485*** 0.082 0.151** 0.064
Wales -0.360*** 0.070 -0.061 0.075
Scotland -0.285*** 0.054 0.029 0.064
Education of Male Partner
Low -0.112 0.072 0.160*** 0.045
Medium -0.055 0.077 0.164*** 0.051
Age Group of Male Partner
30-34 -0.120** 0.052 -0.051 0.057
35-39 0.200*** 0.060 -0.055 0.066
40-44 0.219*** 0.065 -0.051 0.073
45-49 -0.149** 0.071 -0.072 0.079
50-55 -0.147** 0.088 -0.124 0.085
56-59 -0.024 0.208 -0.414*** 0.098
60-64 0.132 0.280 -0.543*** 0.117
Male Partner Earnings 0.002** 0.001
Mills -0.790 0.897
Constant 7.572*** 0.428 0.539*** 0.068
Notes: The Table reports the estimates of the two-stage Heckman model for the
year 1994. The sample includes women aged 24-55 and men aged 24-64. The base
category is a high-educated woman of age 24-29 who partners with a high-
educated man of age 24-29, both of whom live in Greater London. The “sign”
column indicates whether the changes in the returns to characteristics over
time are statistically significant.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
*** significant at 1%. Source: Family Resource Surveys, 1994 and 2004.
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Table 4.4b
Estimates of the Heckman Model - 2004
Wage Equation Selection Equation
ˆ Standard Error Diff ˆ Standard Error
Education of Female Partner
Low -0.783*** 0.240 ** -0.331*** 0.045
Medium -0.384*** 0.065 -0.064 0.047
Age Group of Female Partner
30-34 0.098 0.085 * 0.075 0.061
35-39 0.182 0.159 ** 0.191*** 0.067
40-44 0.422 0.346 * 0.464*** 0.074
45-49 0.505 0.404 * 0.550*** 0.082
50-55 0.412 0.339 ** 0.448*** 0.088
Region of Residence
North -0.069 0.167 0.184** 0.088
York & Humshire -0.111 0.207 0.260*** 0.073
North West -0.009 0.195 0.245*** 0.065
East Midlands -0.100 0.147 0.169** 0.071
West Midlands -0.083 0.129 0.140** 0.069
East Anglia -0.118 0.172 0.208*** 0.068
South East -0.053 0.200 0.257*** 0.062
South West -0.150 0.236 0.307*** 0.071
Wales -0.031 0.199 0.253*** 0.064
Scotland -0.008 0.180 0.220*** 0.070
Education of Male Partner
Low -0.011 0.074 0.083* 0.044
Medium 0.048 0.096 0.117** 0.049
Age Group of Male Partner
30-34 -0.141 0.126 -0.136* 0.073
35-39 -0.260 0.171 -0.199*** 0.077
40-44 -0.273 0.209 -0.251*** 0.083
45-49 -0.306 0.246 -0.305*** 0.090
50-55 -0.290 0.247 -0.307*** 0.095
56-59 -0.256 0.322 -0.413*** 0.107
60-64 -0.340 0.456 -0.584*** 0.126
Male Partner Earnings -0.000 0.001
Mills 1.363 1.605
Constant 6.486*** 0.766 *** 0.577*** 0.075
Notes: The Table reports the estimates of the two-stage Heckman model for the
year 2004. The sample includes women aged 24-55 and men aged 24-64. The base
category is a high-educated woman of age 24-29 who partners with a high-
educated man of age 24-29, both of whom live in Greater London. The “diff”
column indicates whether the changes in the returns to characteristics over
time are statistically significant. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
*** significant at 1%. Source: Family Resource Surveys, 1994 and 2004.
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Table 4.5
OLS Estimates of the Wage Equation of the Male Partner
1994 2004
mˆ Standard Diff mˆ Standard
Error Error
Education of Male Partner
Low -0.402*** 0.022 -0.424*** 0.023
Medium -0.203*** 0.025 * -0.270*** 0.025
Age Group of Male Partner
30-34 0.080*** 0.029 * 0.173*** 0.039
35-39 0.093*** 0.034 ** 0.206*** 0.042
40-44 0.122*** 0.038 * 0.241*** 0.045
45-49 0.119*** 0.041 0.212*** 0.049
50-55 0.013 0.045 0.139*** 0.052
56-59 -0.107** 0.055 -0.002 0.060
60-64 -0.270*** 0.075 *** -0.251*** 0.077
Region of Residence
North -0.153*** 0.039 -0.156*** 0.048
York & Humshire -0.137*** -0.137 -0.157*** 0.040
North West -0.152*** -0.152 -0.099*** 0.036
East Midlands -0.113*** -0.113 -0.065* 0.039
West Midlands -0.058* -0.058 *** -0.129*** 0.038
East Anglia -0.059 -0.059 0.010 0.037
South East 0.028 0.028 0.029 0.033
South West -0.137*** -0.137 -0.087** 0.038
Wales -0.124*** 0.041 -0.131*** 0.035
Scotland -0.080*** -0.080 *** -0.165*** 0.038
Education of Female Partner
Low -0.120*** 0.023 -0.133*** 0.023
Medium -0.019*** 0.024 -0.030*** 0.024
Age Group of Female Partner
30-34 0.070*** 0.027 0.056* 0.033
35-39 0.100*** 0.032 0.120*** 0.037
40-44 0.144*** 0.036 0.131*** 0.040
45-49 0.154*** 0.040 0.204*** 0.045
50-55 0.150*** 0.045 0.189*** 0.049
Constant 7.382*** 0.034 7.363*** 0.039
Notes: The Table reports the OLS regression results for the wage equation
of the male partner. The sample is restricted to women aged 24-55 and men
aged 24-64. The base category is a high-educated man of age 24-29 who partners
with a high-educated woman of age 24-29, both of whom live in Greater London.
The “diff” column indicates whether the changes in the returns to
characteristics over time are statistically significant. * Significant at 10%;
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Source: Family Resource
Surveys, 1994 and 2004.
186
Table 4.6
Assortative Mating on Education For Couples, 1994 and 2004
Male Partner's Education
Female
Partner's Low Medium High %
Education
1994
Low 82.9 11.7 5.4 60.7
Medium 54.2 26.4 19.4 22.1
High 22.7 16.5 60.8 17.2
All 65.5 16.4 18.1 9678
2004
Low 78.6 13.7 7.7 46.8
Medium 49.7 30.3 20.0 26.4
High 22.0 17.1 60.9 26.8
All 55.1 19.4 25.5 9417
Panel a
Male Partner's Education
Female Partner's Low Medium High
Education
Low -4.3 +2.0 +2.3
Medium -4.5 +3.9 +0.6
High -0.7 +0.6 +0.1
Panel b
Notes: The Table reports statistics on assortative mating by education.
Panel a displays the percentage distribution of the male partner's
education conditional on the female partner's education. Panel b reports
changes in assortative mating by education between 1994 and 2004. Source:
Family Resource Surveys, 1994 and 2004.
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Notes: The Table reports statistics on assortative mating by age. Panel a displays
the percentage distribution of the male partner's age conditional on the female
partner's age. Panel b reports changes in assortative mating in age between 1994
and 2004. Source: Family Resource Surveys, 1994 and 2004.
Table 4.7
Assortative Mating on Age For Couples, 1994 and 2004
Age of Male Partner
Age 24-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-55 56-59 60-64 %
of Female
Partner
1994
24-29 52.0 36.5 7.7 1.8 1.2 0.7 0.1 0.0 18.5
30-34 9.0 46.7 32.3 8.0 2.8 0.8 0.2 0.2 19.7
35-39 1.6 9.2 44.1 32.4 8.6 3.1 0.6 0.4 18.3
40-44 0.6 2.6 7.8 44.3 32.7 8.5 2.3 1.2 17.0
45-49 0.2 0.4 2.0 6.9 47.8 35.0 6.0 1.8 16.4
50-55 0.1 0.1 0.6 1.9 8.3 48.2 29.0 11.7 10.1
All 11.9 18.3 17.8 17.3 18.0 16.8 17.8 18.8 9678
2004
24-29 45.6 36.9 12.9 3.4 0.6 0.5 0.1 0.1 13.5
30-34 7.5 42.2 34.3 11.1 3.3 1.0 0.4 0.2 18.0
35-39 1.2 10.0 44.6 32.2 7.6 3.5 0.8 0.2 20.7
40-44 0.6 2.7 10.9 44.4 28.2 10.5 1.9 0.9 19.6
45-49 0.2 0.7 2.6 9.5 42.9 33.7 7.2 3.2 16.2
50-55 0.1 0.1 0.7 2.4 6.9 50.8 29.0 10.0 12.0
All 8.0 15.4 20.1 20.3 17.0 19.2 20.2 21.2 9417
Panel a
Age of Male Partner
Age 24-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-55 56-59 60-64
of Female
Partner
24-29 -6.4 +0.4 +5.2 +1.6 -0.6 -0.2 +0.0 +0.1
30-34 -1.5 -4.5 +2.0 +3.1 +0.5 +0.2 +0.2 +0.0
35-39 -0.4 +0.8 +0.5 -0.2 -1.0 +0.4 +0.2 -0.2
40-44 +0.0 +0.1 +3.1 +0.1 -4.5 +2.0 -0.4 -0.3
45-49 +0.0 +0.3 +0.6 +2.6 -4.9 -1.3 +1.2 +1.4
50-55 +0.0 +0.0 +0.1 +0.5 -1.4 +2.6 +0.0 -1.7
Panel b
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Table 4.8
Decomposition of Changes in the Distribution of the Breadwinner Index, z,
1994-2004
Effect of:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Value of z Total Returns to Returns to Assortative Female Residual
at Change Female Male Mating Characteristics Factors
Characteristics Characteristics
mean 0.030 0.032 -0.010 0.004 0.008 -0.005
1.071 -0.334 0.142 0.283 -0.162
25th 0.044 0.004 -0.008 0.011 0.003 0.035
percentile 0.091 -0.193 0.242 0.067 0.792
median 0.050 0.048 -0.015 0.011 0.007 -0.001
0.956 -0.302 0.211 0.149 -0.014
75th 0.034 0.056 -0.015 0.000 0.012 -0.019
percentile 1.629 -0.433 0.007 0.350 -0.553
Notes: The Table reports the effect of changes in four explanatory factors on changes in the
breadwinner index, z, between 1994 and 2004 at the mean and at different percentiles of the
distribution. The effect of one explanatory factor indicates how much of the divergence between the
1994 and 2004 density of z is explained by replacing the 2004 density of z by the corresponding
counterfactual density. The Table reads from left to right. For example, the total change in the mean
of z between 1994 and 2004 can be explained by changes in each of the subsequent factors. Each
specific factor can over or under estimate the total change.  Numbers in italics show the percentage
share of the explained change in the total change. The sample is restricted to families where the men
are aged 24-64 and the women are aged 24-55. Assortative mating is based on education and age. Female
characteristics include dummy variables for age, education and region of residence of the women in
the family. Returns to female characteristics include female labour force participation and real
wages for women. Returns to male characteristics include real wages. Source: Family Resource Surveys,
1994 and 2004.
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Figure A4.1
Educational Level of Females and Males by Level of z
Female Male
1994 2004
High Education
Medium Education
Low Education
1994 2004
Notes: The Figure reports the non-parametric estimates of the education-female
breadwinner index association for both males and females for the years 1994 and
2004, using the Nadarayan-Watson kernel regression. The horizontal axis plots the
value of z between 0 and 1 and the vertical axis is the proportion in each
education category. The kernels are estimated using the Epanecknikov kernel with a
bandwith of 0.2.
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Figure A4.2
Age of Females and Males by Level of z
Female Male
1994 2004 1994 2004
Age: 24-29
30to34
35to39
50to55
Notes: The Figure reports the non-parametric estimates of the age-female
breadwinner index association for both males and females for the years 1994 and
2004, using the Nadarayan-Watson kernel regression. The horizontal axis plots the
value of z between 0 and 1 and the vertical axis is the proportion in each age
category. The kernels are estimated using the Epanecknikov kernel with a bandwith
of 0.2. Age categories, 40-44, 45-49 (and 56-59, 60-64 for males) are not shown due
to lack of space. However trends for both males and females in their forties are
similar to those of 35-39 and trends in the association for males aged over 55 are
similar to those aged 50-55.
5 Conclusion
The thesis attempts to highlight ongoing concerns in understanding womens labour
market and welfare participation decisions in the UK. At present there is insu¢ -
cient quantitative evidence on the labour supply e¤ects of means-tested and non-
means tested benets (except for tax credits) in the UK especially with respect
to women. The thesis tries to provide better answers to such questions. In short
results suggest that Income Support, one of the main means-tested benets in the
UK, lead to work disincentives and that single mothers who are more likely to be
on welfare and out of work respond to economic incentives. Once their entitlement
to Income Support ceases they either move into work or engage in job search. Oth-
ers who report themselves as disabled or having health problems are more likely
to move onto sickness and disability benets. Mothers who transit from Income
Support into these benets appear to have no work history. The thesis also ex-
amined the intra-household earnings share of men and women within couples in
the UK. It was observed that the proportion of dual-earner families has continued
to increase over the last decade whereby the main factor driving this change was
the rising female labour force participation. Changes in assortative mating had a
modest impact on the changing family structure.
In more detail the thesis consisted of three chapters. Chapter 2 assessed the
work disincentive e¤ects of the Income Support program system on single mothers.
The objectives of income transfer systems in the UK for low-income families are
mainly to reduce poverty and encourage work. There has been considerable success
in encouraging single parents to work 16 hours or more since 1997. Research
has however focused on the work incentives of in-work benets like the Working
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Families Tax Credits resulting in a lack of research on the disincentives of means-
tested benets. The contribution of chapter 2 is two-fold. First it aimed to provide
a quantitative analysis of the behavioural impact of the Income Support program.
Second although the institutional features of this program allows for a Regression
Discontinuity design quasi-experimental evidence was non-existent. The age rule
in the Income Support program which states that single mothers automatically
lose their entitlement to Income Support when their youngest cohabiting child
turns 16 provides a natural setting for analyzing its impact on labour market and
benets outcomes. The empirical estimates showed a strong and discernible impact
of the age-eligibility rule on the probability of claiming Income Support by single
mothers when their youngest child turns 16. They experienced an exogenous fall
in total family income and this in turn, induced them to increase their labour
market participation and to increase their hours of work beyond 16. There is also
an ensuing e¤ect on the job search e¤ort which is induced by Government actions
as soon as the youngest child of single mothers turns 16. They are directed to
job centres where they are registered as unemployed. Although mechanical, this
directive increases the likelihood of nding a job for these mothers and this can
explain the rise in unemployment benets.
Chapter 3 built on the ndings of chapter 2 and provided insights into the
participation decisions of single mothers with no qualications into sickness and
disability benets in the UK given the age-eligibility rule in the Income Support
program. The contribution of the paper is three-fold. First, it endeavoured to ll
in some gaps in the disability literature in the UK by analyzing labour market
and welfare participation responses of women. Second a simple theoretical model
of benets choice was developed to show that it is fully rational for individuals to
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respond to economic incentives upon benet withdrawal. The third contribution
is empirical. While the previous chapter revealed that a portion of single mothers
with no qualications either work or engage in job search at the age-16 threshold,
this paper provided complementary evidence that poorly educated single mothers,
in the margin of claiming either Income Support or disability benets, positively
respond to sickness and disability benets programs participation following the
loss in Income Support entitlement. The empirical estimates showed that 25.5%
of poorly educated single mothers who were initially on Income Support move
into sickness and disability benets at the age-16 threshold, mainly driven by an
increase in the probability of claiming income support with a disability premium.
This suggests that these single mothers are more likely to have no work history.
Also, single mothers with no qualications are 7-8 percentage points more likely
to self-identify as disabled as their youngest child turns 16 either because they
mechanically become more aware of their own disability status or they had no
other choice but to apply for the health benets by lying on their health status
with an exogenous fall in their resources.
Finally chapter 4 examined the trends in the relative position of women within
the family over the last decade. The main contribution of the paper is method-
ological. It uses the semiparametric approach of DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux to
quantify the impact of four explanatory factors on the relative position of women
within families namel the returns to the female characteristics (including female
labour force participation and real wages), the returns to the male characteris-
tics (including real wages), assortative mating patterns and female characteristics.
The chapter brought out three main empirical ndings. First, the observed rise
in dual-earner families in the UK between 1994 and 2004 is mainly accounted by
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women who contribute relatively more than men to the household budget. Sec-
ond, the dominant factor driving the increase in the female breadwinner measure
was the changing distribution of the returns to female characteristics. A rise in
womens participation and real wages led to a much larger increase at the top of
the distribution than at the bottom implying that changes in the labour market
prospects of women largely favoured those who were proportionally contributing
more to the family budget. Third, increases in positive assortative mating espe-
cially among more educated and older women accounted for a modest 14% increase
in the female breadwinner index on average.
From the research work presented in the thesis it can be argued that future
research can easily include an extended analysis of the labour supply impact of the
automatic loss of Income Support by adding more recent years of data. The micro
data includes the longitudinal Labour Force Surveys up to 2002 because data
on the age and the date of birth of individuals beyond Autumn 2002 were not
available from the UK data archive for reasons of condentiality. Additionally the
age eligibility rule in the Income Support program was lowered in November 2008.
Single mothers are now automatically entitled to Income Support so long as their
youngest cohabiting child is less than 13 years old. At the same time Incapacity
Benets and Income Support on grounds of incapacity have been replaced by
Employment and Support Allowance where everyone now has the opportunity to
work and people with an illness or disability can get the support needed to move
into suitable jobs. Therefore as soon as data becomes available the impact of these
welfare reforms can be evaluated using natural experiments. Other related avenues
of future work imbed a closer look at whether mothers who transit onto sickness
and disability benets are truly disabled or lying on their disability status. Further
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research is also necessary to tackle the selection issue which remained unresolved
in chapter 4, caused by the unequal change in the probability of being partnership
over the income distribution. Researchers may also consider incorporating fertility
decisions in the sequential decision making process of women.
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